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This study is the final report of project IARM (www.
transcrime.it/iarm). IARM is co-funded by the Preven-
tion of and Fight against Crime Programme of the 
European Union and it has been carried out by an 
international consortium coordinated by Transcrime 
– Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Italy). Oth-
er research partners are: 
• the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (the Netherlands)
• the University of Leicester (United Kingdom)
Research partners have contributed to IARM by car-
rying out the analysis and by writing this report.
Associate partners are:
• the Italian Ministry for the Economy and Finance 
(Italy)
• UIF – the Italian Financial Intelligence Unit, with-
in the Bank of Italy (Italy)
• the Dutch Ministry of Finance (the Netherlands)
• the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice (the 
Netherlands) 
• the NPCC – National Police Chiefs’ Council 
(United Kingdom)
Associate partners have contributed to IARM by pro-
viding valuable inputs, discussion and feedback but 
cannot be held responsible for what is written in this 
report.
Bureau van Dijk provided support as data provider.
Objectives and methodology
Project IARM develops an exploratory methodolo-
gy for assessing the risk of money laundering (ML). 
In particular, it develops a composite indicator of 
money laundering risk:
• at geographic area level
• at business sector level
The methodology is tested in three pilot countries (It-
aly, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and 
follows 7 methodological steps, which include: 
• identifying ML risk factors across areas and sec-
tors; 
• operationalising risk factors into a set of proxy 
variables to allow measurement;
• combining the variables, through various statisti-
cal techniques, into a final indicator of ML risk;
• validating the indicator through a sensitivity anal-
ysis and comparison with other measures of ML.
IARM adopts a quantitative approach which com-
plements the qualitative perspective of most exist-
ing national and supranational ML risk assessments 
(NRA and SNRA). 
It responds to the need, stressed by regulatory de-
velopments at both EU and national level, to develop 
objective and robust methodologies for ML risk 
assessment.
Risk factors
In each of the three pilot countries, a country-specific 
set of risk factors is identified on the basis of: 
• the relevant international and national litera-
ture (e.g. FATF guidelines, FIU reports, judiciary 
evidence, academic literature); 
• interviews with experts (e.g. FIU officers, in-
vestigators, policy-makers, private sector);
• data availability: because it is not possible to 
find the same data and variables in all the three 
countries.  
Risk factors are distinguished between ML threats 
and vulnerabilities, as suggested by FATF and as 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure E1 – ML risk factors analysed at sub-national area level (Italy and UK)



























































In Italy IARM assesses the ML risk across the 110 
provinces and 77 economic sectors (NACE divi-
sions).
The analysis provides empirical support for the main 
findings of the 2014 National Risk Assessment 
and of the 2016 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report. 
It complements the NRA qualitative approach with a 
data-driven one, and supplements a regional analy-
sis, while the NRA adopts only a national perspective. 
ML risk across provinces
The provinces with the highest ML risk (Figure 3) are 
in the south, with four Calabrian provinces ranking at 
the top (Reggio Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Catanzaro, 
Crotone). They record high levels of mafia-type infiltra-
tion, cash-intensiveness and underground economy.
In other southern regions, also Napoli, Caserta, 
Palermo and Trapani show high ML risk. Among 
non-southern regions, Imperia and Prato rank high-
est, showing relatively high levels of opacity of busi-
ness ownership, of underground and cash-intensive 
economy and of money transfers.
At province level, ML risk is significantly correlated 
with the rate of suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs) – although some provinces seem to “un-




Figure E3 - ML risk across Italian provinces
Top 12 provinces according to 






















Source: Transcrime - UCSC elaboration 
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ML risk across business sectors
At business sector level, analysis is made difficult 
by the paucity of data and of appropriate proxies. 
Therefore, only some exploratory analysis is car-
ried out.
According to the composite indicator (Table 1), the 
economic sector with highest estimated ML risk in It-
aly are bars and restaurants (NACE division I 56). 
They are characterised by high cash-intensiveness, 
irregular labour, opacity of business ownership and 
relatively high levels of organised crime infiltration.
They are followed by other service activities (NACE 
section S), which include a variety of businesses, 
from repair services, to personal service activities - 
like massage parlours, beauty centres and spas - but 
also security and investigation companies and fidu-
ciary services.
The entertainment sector (Section R) also ranks 
highly. This not only includes gambling and gaming 
activities (R 92), such as casinos, VLT rooms (sale 
slot), but also related activities (in divisions R 90 and 
R 93), such as the management of beach facilities, 
leisure activities (e.g. racecourses) and sporting 
associations.
Several segments of the construction supply-chain, 
from sand extraction, to cement production, to build-
ing companies and relevant professional activities 
(e.g. engineering and architecture firms) rank among 
the first 20 most risky sectors, confirming the link 
between the construction industry, the underground 
economy and mafias’ business cycle.
The high value of travel agencies and tour opera-
tors (N 79) is explained by the high cash-intensive-
ness and the close relationship with the tourism in-
dustry, which has proven to be vulnerable to criminal 
infiltration and money laundering activities. 
Table E1 - ML risk across business sectors in Italy
Top 10 NACE divisions according to ML risk composite indicator
Source: Transcrime - UCSC elaboration 
Business sector (NACE division)
 
I 56. Food and beverage service activities
S 95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods
S 96. Other personal service activities
N 79. Travel agency tour operator reservation service and  related activities
R 92. Gambling and betting activities
R 90. Creative arts and entertainment activities
P 85. Education
A 03. Fishing and aquaculture
M 74. Other professional scientific and technical activities
C 19. Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products















In the Netherlands IARM assesses the ML risk across 
83 economic sectors (NACE divisions).
According to the composite indicator, the business 
sector with highest ML risk is casinos, gambling 
and gaming businesses (R 92). Despite being un-
der AML obligations, it shows evidence of OC infiltra-
tion, of ‘cooking the books’ activities and a high cash 
intensity and opacity of beneficial ownership. Also R 
93 – which in the Netherlands includes legal prosti-
tution services – and R 90 – which is related to art 
and entertainment activities – are in the top 10 sec-
tors (see Table 2). 
Also hotels (I 55) and bars and restaurants (I 56) 
rank highly. These sectors show high levels of OC in-
filtration, confirming their vulnerability to ML activities 
as suggested by the literature. Security and investi-
gation services (N 80) also rank high, confirming ev-
idence from the Dutch Police regarding involvement 
of organised crime in this business sector. 
The analysis may provide inputs to the on-going 
Dutch NRA (2017), supplementing its qualitative ap-
proach with a purely quantitative perspective. It could 
be used at both policy-making and investigative level, 
for example to better detect the economic activities to 
be placed under the BIBOB screening (an adminis-
trative measure to prevent OC infiltration).
However, the analysis should be further enhanced 
by improving the quality and availability of data, and 
by exploring further indicators and measurement ap-
proaches.
Table E2 – ML risk across business sectors in the Netherlands
Top 10 NACE divisions according to ML risk composite indicator
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration 
Business sector (NACE division)
 
R 92. Gambling and betting activities
I 55. Accommodation
R 90. Creative, arts and entertainment activities
N 80. Security and investigation activities
S 95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods
N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities
S 96. Other personal service activities
O 84. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
R 93. Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
I 56. Food and beverage service activities














Source: University of Leicester elaboration
In the United Kingdom, IARM has assessed ML risk 
across the 43 police areas in England & Wales. It 
was not possible, due to lack of workable data, to ex-
tend the analysis to Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
The paucity of data in relation to UK threats and 
vulnerabilities remains a significant issue, especial-
ly when trying to assess ML risk at business sector 
level.
The United Kingdom is at obvious risk from money 
laundering due to its position as a major world finan-
cial centre. This leads to a number of companies – 
especially in the City of London – with connections to 
risky jurisdictions.
Among the three IARM countries, UK shows the 
highest complexity of corporate structures, with 
an average distance to beneficial owners1 of 1.6 – 
which becomes 3.7 and 3.4 in the Channel Islands 
and Isle of Man respectively. 
A number of other ML threats and vulnerabilities 
could also be identified across UK areas – such as 
the number of organised crime groups operating, 
the volume of predicate offences and cash-inten-
siveness of businesses.  
According to IARM analysis, the City of London 
emerges as the area with the highest ML risk – repre-
senting an outlier in most of the considered variables. 
Conurbations such as the Metropolitan Police area, 
Greater Manchester and the West Midlands also 
emerge as high risk areas. These locations appear to 
be most exposed to serious and organised crime, to 
businesses’ connections with risky jurisdictions and 
with the highest cash-intensiveness. 
Although the approach outlined here is a pilot, it could 
be used to complement the 2015 UK ML NRA and 
to support future National Risk Assessments. The 
risk-factors approach adopted by IARM could lead to 
a more transparent methodology to be developed 
to measure territorial and business level risks.  
United Kingdom
1. BOs in the BvD definition are the individual(s) who ultimately own or 
control a company or other legal entity. BvD identifies them by re-
constructing the ownership chain until finding natural persons holding 
above a certain shareholding. For the purpose of this study, it has 
been decided to set the minimum threshold at 10% of the sharehold-
ing at the first level of the company ownership chain and 10% at fur-
ther levels. The threshold adopted is lower than that indicated by the 
current EU Directive’s definition (25% threshold) but allows for a more 
comprehensive analysis. When BO distance equals 1, the company is 
directly controlled by its BO(s) (see Annex for details).





Thanks to the use of an innovative set of data and 
proxies, IARM also carries out the first in-depth analy-
sis of the degree of opacity of business ownership 
in Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Italian companies exhibit more direct control patterns: 
BO distance is lower than in the Netherlands and the 
UK (respectively 1.3, 1.7 and 1.6) and also the vol-
ume of connections with risky jurisdictions (such as 
off-shore countries) is more limited. However, figures 
vary greatly across areas and economic activities.
Business sectors like mining (NACE section B), en-
ergy (D), water and waste (E) and finance (K) are 
characterised by higher complexity and opacity in all 
the three countries, but also by a higher number of 
multinational companies. 
After controlling by company size, hotels, bars and 
restaurants (section I), entertainment & gaming (R) 
and other services (S) emerge promptly. In the UK, 
real estate businesses (L) also rank high, highlight-
ing the risk of a link between the UK property market 
and companies/individuals from opaque jurisdictions.
Some other statistics would deserve further research 
– for example the high number of shareholders (espe-
cially legal persons) from Luxembourg, Cyprus and 
Switzerland and of beneficial owners from Spain (in 
all the three countries, but especially in some south-
ern Italian areas and sectors like R 92 - gambling & 
betting).










Figure E5 – Average distance to beneficial owners (min=1)
Figure E6 – Shareholders’ and BOs’ links with risky jurisdictions by business sector
Weighted by average company size. Average score of Italy, the Netherlands and UK. 100=max risk score
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IARM added value
The IARM methodology builds on FATF guidelines. 
It does not intend to replace the qualitative approach 
of current ML national and supranational risk assess-
ments (NRA and SNRA) but to complement it with a 
quantitative and data-driven perspective. With re-
spect to existing risk assessment, IARM offers:
• a higher disaggregation detail (e.g. a regional 
perspective vs the national perspective of most 
NRAs);
• coverage of all business sectors (while NRA usu-
ally do not adopt a sectorial perspective);
• an innovative analysis of business ownership 
opacity;
• a synthetic measure of a complex phenomenon 
such as ML risk.
The indicators of ML risk developed by IARM could 
be adopted in the operational domain by both pub-
lic agencies and private entities, for example: 
• by policy-makers, to support a better allocation 
of AML resources and measures across the ar-
eas and sectors based on their risk level;
• by investigative agencies (e.g. LEAs and FIUs), 
to identify the areas and sectors on which to 
strengthen monitoring and investigations;
• by obliged entities (e.g. banks, professionals, 
etc.), to enrich the set of indicators and red-flags 
to be used in AML customer due diligence.
Future challenges
IARM is only a first step towards a systematic as-
sessment of ML risks across areas and businesses. It 
follows an exploratory methodology which is affect-
ed by data availability – it works better in contexts 
characterised by richer set of information, while it will 
underestimate those risk factors for which data are 
still lacking (like emerging ML risks which by definition 
lack estimates).
In order to improve this approach, data quantity and 
quality should be enhanced. In particular:
• at business sector level;
• on important ML threats such as tax crimes and 
fraud;
• on important ML vulnerabilities such as cash 
use, for which statistics are available in most EU 
countries only at the national level;
• on the ownership structure of European busi-
nesses;
• on suspicious transaction reports/suspicious ac-
tivity reports (STRs/SARs) which could be rich 
sources of information but are only partially ex-
ploited for research purposes
The IARM data-driven methodology should be 
combined with the qualitative approach of other NRAs 
in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of 
ML risks. It should be replicated in other countries, 
both in Europe and abroad, to test its validity and re-
fine the methodology. Moreover, it should take into 
consideration other factors (e.g. vulnerabilities in AML 
regulation). 
The benefits would go much beyond the AML field, 
reinforcing also the fight against terrorist financing, 
tax evasion and corruption and improving the effi-
ciency and security of the EU internal market.  




ABI – Associazione Bancaria Italiana (Italian Banking Association)
AML – Anti-money laundering
AMLD – Anti-money laundering directive
ANAC – Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione (National Anti-Corruption Authority – Italy)
ANBSC – Agenzia Nazionale per l’amministrazione e la destinazione dei Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati 
(Italian agency for the recovery and management of seized and confiscated assets)
ARO – Asset Recovery Office 
ATM – Automated teller machine
BEIS – Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (United Kingdom)
BIBOB – Wet ter Bevordering Integriteitsbeoordelingen door Het Openbaar Bestuur (The Public Adminis-
tration Probity Screening Act – the Netherlands)
BO – Beneficial owner
BvD – Bureau van Dijk
CBS – Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Agency for Statistics – the Netherlands)
CDD – Customer due diligence
CFT – Combating the financing of terrorism
CONSOB – Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Italian Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion – Italy) 
CSC – Centro Studi Confindustria (Confindustria Research Center – Italy)
CSF – Comitato di Sicurezza Finanziaria (Financial Security Committee – Italy)
CVS – Commercial victimisation survey 
DIA – Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (Anti-mafia investigation agency – Italy)
DNA – Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (Anti-mafia Prosecutors’ Office – Italy)
DNFBPs – Designated non-financial businesses and professions
DPA – Dutch Payment Association 
EC – European Commission
ECB – European Central Bank
ECOLEF – The Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist 
Financing Policy (Research project)
EBITDA – Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization
EMCDDA – European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
ESA – European supervisory authorities 
EU – European Union
EURODAD – European Network on Debt and Development
FATF – Financial Action Task Force
FDI – Foreign direct investments
FIOD – Fiscale inlichtingen en opsporingsdienst (Fiscal information and investigation service – The Neth-
erlands)
FIU – Financial intelligence unit
FSI – Financial Secrecy Index 
FSS – Secrecy Score of the Financial Secrecy Index
GdF – Guardia di Finanza (Italy)
GDP – Gross domestic product
HMRC – Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (United Kingdom)
IARM – Identifying and Assessing the Risk of Money laundering in Europe (Research project)
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IMF – International Monetary Fund
ISO – International Organization for Standardization
ISTAT – Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (National Institute for Statistics – Italy)
IT – Information technology (or Italy depending on the context)
ITTP – Illicit trade in tobacco products
LEA – Law enforcement agency
MEF – Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance) 
MER – Mutual evaluation report
ML – Money laundering
MONEYVAL – The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of 
Terrorism
MoRiLE – Management of Risk in Law Enforcement 
MS – Member state
MTBs – Money transfer businesses
NACE – Nomenclature Générale des Activités Économiques dans les Communautés Européennes (Statistical classi-
fication of economic activities in the European Community)
NCA – National Crime Agency (United Kingdom)
NCC – Dutch Central Catalogue (the Netherlands)
NGO – Non-governmental organization
NL – the Netherlands
NPCC – The National Police Chiefs Council (United Kingdom)
NPM – New payment methods
NRA – National risk assessment 
NUTS – Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OC – Organised crime
OCG – Organised crime group
OCM – Organised Crime Monitor (Research project)
OCP – Organised Crime Portfolio (Research project)
ODCEC – Ordine dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti Contabili (Professional association of Certified Public 
Accountants, Auditors and Advisors – Italy)
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPC – Organised property crime
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PC – Principal component
PCA – Principal component analysis
PEP – Politically exposed person
POCA – Proceeds of Crime Act (United Kingdom) 
POS – Point of sales
PPO – Public Prosecution Office (the Netherlands)
PSC – People with significant control 
RBA – Risk-based approach
RF – Risk factor
ROE – Return on equity
ROA – Return on assets
SAR – Suspicious activities report
SNRA – Supra national risk assessment 
SOCA – Serious organised crime agency United Kingdom)
SOCTA – Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
STR – Suspicious transaction report
TBML – Trade based money laundering
TF – Terrorist financing 
TI – Transparency International 
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TJN – Tax Justice Network
UCSC – Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano (Italy)
UIF – Unità di Informazione Finanziaria (Italian Financial Intelligence Unit – Italy)
UK – United Kingdom
ULEIC – University of Leicester (United Kingdom)
UN – United Nations
UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
VAT – Value added tax
VLT – Video lottery terminal
VU – Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (the Netherlands) 
WODC – Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek en Documentatiecentrum (Research and documentation Centre of the 
Dutch Ministry of Justice)
WWFT – Wetter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme (Dutch law on money laundering and 
terrorist financing) 
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This study is the final report of project IARM – Iden-
tifying and Assessing the Risk of Money Laundering 
in Europe (www.transcrime.it/iarm). IARM is co-fund-
ed by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Pro-
gramme of the European Union, DG Home Affairs 
(HOME/2013/ISEC/AG/FINEC/4000005193).
IARM has been carried out, from January 2015 to 
January 2017, by an international consortium coor-
dinated by Transcrime – Università Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore (Italy). Other research partners are: 
• the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (The Nether-
lands) 
• the University of Leicester (United Kingdom)
Research partners have contributed to IARM by car-
rying out the analysis and by writing this report (cred-
its are illustrated at the beginning of each chapter).
and associate partners are:
• the Italian Ministry for the Economy and Finance 
(Italy)
• UIF – the Italian Financial Intelligence Unit, with-
in the Bank of Italy (Italy)
• the Dutch Ministry of Finance (the Netherlands)
• the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice (the 
Netherlands) 
• the NPCC – National Police Chiefs’ Council 
(United Kingdom)2 
Associate partners have contributed to IARM by pro-
viding valuable inputs, discussion and feedback but 
cannot be held responsible for what is written in this 
report.
Bureau van Dijk provided support as data provider.
Introduction
The objectives of IARM are:
• to develop a standardised methodology for mon-
ey laundering risk assessment, and in particular 
a composite indicator of ML risk:
-     at sub-national regional level
-     at business sector level
• to test the indicator in three pilot countries: Italy, 
the Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
IARM fits the current debate on money laundering 
risk assessment, and it complements existing assess-
ment exercises at both national and EU supranation-
al level. Beneficiaries of the project are researchers, 
practitioners, institutions and private companies 
in the AML field. IARM will help European public au-
thorities and obliged entities (e.g. banks, profession-
als, real estate agencies, etc.) to develop more effec-
tive AML/CTF risk assessment policies and customer 
due diligence screenings.
The report is structured as follows:
• Chapter 1 describes the institutional, conceptual 
and methodological framework for ML risk and 
ML risk assessment;
• Chapter 2 presents the results of the ML risk as-
sessment in Italy;
• Chapter 3 presents the results of the ML risk as-
sessment in the Netherlands;
• Chapter 4 presents the results of the ML risk as-
sessment in the United Kingdom;
• Chapter 5 focuses on the analysis of the opacity 
of business ownership across the three coun-
tries and economic sectors;
• Conclusions briefly discuss research and policy 
implications.
The Methodological Annex (available at the link http://
www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/IAR-
MAnnex.pdf) provides more details on the methodology 
and relevant legislation.
2. Support has been provided also by UK Home Office. See Acknowl-
edgements section for the full list of people and institutions that have 
supported the project.
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In the past twenty years the risk-based approach 
(henceforth RBA) has become the pivot of the AML/
CFT regime worldwide. Key references for the RBA 
at international level are FATF Recommendation 1 
and its Interpretative Note (FATF, 2012 - see Annex 
for details). The basic principle of the RBA is simple:
• AML/CFT measures (e.g. due diligence on a 
bank’s customer) should be “commensurate 
with the risks identified”: higher risks require en-
hanced measures, lower risks allow simplified 
ones (FATF, 2012, pp. 11, 31);
• AML/CFT resources (e.g. the number of AML of-
ficers or FIU staff) should be allocated according 
to these risks: more resources where the risk is 
higher.
Risk assessment is the exercise which allows to 
identify the areas, sectors, operations, and subjects 
at higher risk (FATF, 2013a; ISO, 2009a, 2009b).
The risk-based approach in the EU regulatory 
framework
This approach is fully endorsed by the EU regulatory 
regime. Directive 2015/849 (or Fourth AML Direc-
tive), and its following amendments and proposals for 
amendments are centred on the RBA concept:
In its Section 2 (Risk assessment), the Directive 
specifies that RBA and risk assessment should be 
performed:
• at the supranational level, to assess the ML/
TF risks of the EU internal market and relative to 
cross-border activities (Article 6);
• at the national level, by each single EU MS (Ar-
ticle 7);
• by obliged entities (e.g. banks, professionals), 
as part of their CDD activity (Article 8 and Artt. 
10-24). 
In other words, EU proposes a three-level approach 
(European Commission, 2015): each level (e.g. 
obliged entities, national, supranational) should take 
account of the risk assessment conducted at other 
levels, so as to achieve the holistic nature advocated 
by the Directive.3 The following paragraphs describe 
in detail how risk assessment is performed at the 
three levels, and discuss the current shortcomings 
and challenges of this approach.
Risk assessment at supranational, na-
tional and obliged entity level
Risk assessment at the supranational level
In line with Art. 6 of the Directive, the European Com-
mission has been conducting a Supranational Risk 
Assessment (SNRA) with the aim of identifying 
and assessing supranational ML/TF risks, i.e. those 
which affect the internal market and are related to 
cross-border activities. The assessment is conducted 
by a working group led by EU Commission in cooper-
ation with a variety of stakeholders, including:
(22) The risk of money laundering and 
terrorist financing is not the same in 
every case. Accordingly, a holistic, risk-based 
approach should be used. The risk-based ap-
proach is not an unduly permissive option for 
Member States and obliged entities. It involves 
the use of evidence-based decision-making in 
order to target the risks of money laundering 
and terrorist financing facing the Union and 
those operating within it more effectively” (Di-
rective 849/2015 - EC, 2015).
3. Also FATF recommends that RBA be applied by both countries and 
obliged entities. In particular “countries should identify, assess and 
understand the ML/TF risks […] and should take action, including des-
ignating an authority or mechanism to coordinate actions to assess 
risks […]” (FATF, 2012, p. 6); and “financial institutions and DNFBPs 
should be required to take appropriate steps to identify and assess 
their ML/TF risks (for customers, countries or geographic areas; and 
products, services, transactions or delivery channels). […] [They] 
should be required to […] manage and mitigate effectively the risks” 
(FATF, 2012, p. 33)
1.1  Institutional framework
• The EU Experts Group on Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing (EGMLTF)
• The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), 
namely the European Banking Authority, Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority, European 





• Other stakeholders, including representatives of 
obliged entities at EU level, NGOs, academics
The SNRA report – which is expected by the end of 
June 2017 and which must be updated every two 
years – will provide an overview of the ML/TF supra-
national risks. It will be based on the analysis of the 
“interplay of estimated threats and vulnerabilities for 
each type of modus operandi” (i.e. ML/TF exploitable 
mechanisms) (European Commission, 2015, p. 11), 
while consequences will not be covered (see below). 
Risk assessment at the national level
In recent years, following FATF Recommendation 1 
and Art. 7 of Directive 849/2015, numerous countries 
have undertaken ML/TF National Risk Assessment 
(NRA) processes. In most cases, they have been car-
ried out in preparation of an upcoming FATF Mutual 
Evaluation (e.g. in Italy, Spain, Sweden, etc.).
The map below shows the current status of NRA across 
EU member states – some countries have NRA in 
progress while others have already published the NRA 
report. In response to FATF Rec. 1, also other coun-
tries outside Europe have undertaken the NRA process. 
They include the United States (2015), Canada (2016), 
Japan (2015), Switzerland (2015), Singapore (2013). 
Figure 1 – Current status of NRA across EU Member States Updated at January 2017 
Source: Transcrime-UCSC elaboration on various sources
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Risk assessment at obliged entity level
The third level subject to ML/TF RBA and risk as-
sessment obligations is that of obliged entities 
(e.g. banks, financial intermediaries, professionals, 
high-value dealers, etc. – for an official list at EU level 
see Directive 849/2015, Article 2 and relevant nation-
al legislation).
In recent years, numerous risk assessment guide-
lines have been issued by the supervisory author-
ities of each category of obliged entity at EU and 
national level. They include a long list of ML/TF risk 
factors and anomaly indicators to be taken into ac-
count when conducting CDD activity.4
In order to implement these guidelines, obliged en-
tities have introduced a variety of measures, which 
include:
• appointment of dedicated personnel (e.g. AML 
Risk Managers, often cooperating with Chief 
Risk Officers);
• development and adoption of ad hoc ML risk 
models and software, which help in monitoring 
clients’ risk and improving customer due dili-
gence.
The adoption of these solutions has been greater for 
those obliged entities (like banks and financial insti-
tutions) which by their nature must manage greater 
amounts of customers and transactions, and it 
has been lower for other categories such as profes-
sionals, lawyers, notaries, high value dealers. The 
effectiveness of the AML risk models adopted varies 
widely even within the same industry.
The lack of harmonisation 
Unfortunately, the increasing number of risk-assess-
ment exercises is not accompanied by increasing 
harmonisation among the methods adopted. Despite 
the existence of common guidelines (e.g. those is-
sued by FATF, IMF, World Bank, Sectors’ Supervisory 
authorities – and those, in general, on risk assess-
ment provided by ISO 31000), each country or entity 
seems to follow its own RA methodology. 
As regards NRA by countries, most of them adopt a 
qualitative approach based more often on experts’ 
assessments than on hard data.5 A recent report by 
WODC (Veen & Ferwerda, 2016), as a pilot study for 
the Dutch NRA, has provided a comparative over-
view of five countries’ NRA (Canada, Italy, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States), and it has shown the 
wide variety of the information, sources, and meth-
ods adopted. In particular, the report pointed out the 
difficulties in replicating these methodologies in 
other contexts. 













Yes – with differ-
ent taxonomy
Semi-quantitative No No No
United Kingdom Yes Mostly qualitative Classification No No
Canada Yes Qualitative Classification No No
Italy Yes Semi-quantitative Classification No In part
Sweden Yes Qualitative Classification No No
Source: Veen & Ferwerda, 2016
4. See, for example, the guidelines issued by the Bank of Italy in April 
2013 (Banca d’Italia, 2013) and the Dutch National Bank in 2015 
(http://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/binaries/50-212353.pdf)
5. For a review of different risk assessment methods (qualitative, 
semi-quantitative, quantitative) see ISO 30001, p. 13.
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Likewise, each category of obliged entity may inter-
pret the risk assessment in a different way; and even 
within the same category (e.g. the banking industry) 
different stakeholders (e.g. different banking groups) 
may rely on different models, modi operandi and 
practical tools yielding very different analyses and 
risk maps. 
Obviously, this is part of the exercise itself – tailoring 
the risk assessment to the specific nature (and 
risks) of each area, sector, activity (the activity of 
a bank is not the same as that of a small law firm, 
which entails different risks and assessment needs). 
However, the lack of harmonised and data-based 
RA methodologies makes it difficult:
• to replicate the risk assessment over time;
• to produce comparative analyses across coun-
tries, sectors, areas; 
• to have transparent, accountable and verifi-
able methodologies;
• to accomplish a “holistic approach” as advo-
cated by the European AML Directive (EC, 2015, 
para. 22). 
How IARM addresses these gaps
The development of the ML risk composite indi-
cator by IARM follows a methodology which is: 
- transparent
- verifiable 
- replicable, because it is tested in different 
countries (Italy, the Netherlands, the UK) and 
extended to business sectors as well
- and allows comparative analysis over time 
and across areas.
The quantitative approach followed by IARM 
complements the qualitative method adopted 
by most NRA and SNRA. It helps to improve 
understanding of ML risks across areas and 
sectors and can support the everyday work of 
AML practitioners.
Furthermore, it may produce market distortions – fa-
vouring the less compliant and less transparent asses-
sors, in regard to both countries and obliged entities. 
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Before the IARM methodological approach is pre-
sented, it is necessary to provide some key defini-
tions and concepts.
Money laundering (and terrorist 
financing)
IARM applies the definition of money laundering 
adopted at EU level and included in the Directive 
849/2015/EC, Article 1: 
1.2  Conceptual framework
3. For the purposes of this Directive, 
the following conduct, when committed inten-
tionally, shall be regarded as money laundering:
(a) the conversion or transfer of property, 
knowing that such property is derived from 
criminal activity or from an act of participation 
in such activity, for the purpose of concealing 
or disguising the illicit origin of the property or 
of assisting any person who is involved in the 
commission of such an activity to evade the le-
gal consequences of that person’s action;
(b) the concealment or disguise of the true 
nature, source, location, disposition, move-
ment, rights with respect to, or ownership of, 
property, knowing that such property is derived 
from criminal activity or from an act of participa-
tion in such an activity;
(c) the acquisition, possession or use of 
property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that 
such property was derived from criminal activity 
or from an act of participation in such an activity;
(d) participation in, association to commit, at-
tempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitat-
ing and counselling the commission of any of 
the actions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c).
4. Money laundering shall be regarded as such 
even where the activities which generated the 
property to be laundered were carried out in the 
territory of another Member State or in that of a 
third country.
The focus of IARM is on money laundering, rather 
than terrorist financing. The main reason is that – 
although these offences are often addressed by the 
same regulatory measures – they are completely dif-
ferent phenomena which require separate analysis of 
threats and vulnerabilities, as also recommended by 
FATF (FATF, 2013a, p. 10). 
Not by chance, recent NRAs (like the Dutch one) try 
to avoid conducting a single risk assessment encom-
passing both ML and TF risks, while they keep the two 
exercises separate (Veen & Ferwerda, 2016). The EU 
SNRA is evaluating each risk factor and modus ope-
randi with reference to respectively the risk of ML and 
of TF – although the assessment often leads to the 
same risk score (European Commission, 2015). 
Nevertheless, some ML risk factors apply also to 
terrorist financing: for example, the level of cash-in-
tensiveness or the opacity of certain legal persons 
may be exploited both by criminals wanting to launder 
money or by criminals funding terrorist groups. As-
sessing their likelihood furnishes better understand-
ing of TF risks as well.
Money laundering risk and risk 
factors
In the risk assessment/risk management domain, risk 
is usually defined as a function of two elements (ISO, 
2009b, p. 1):
• the probability (or likelihood) that the event/
phenomenon will occur;
• the impact (or consequences) which it would 
generate. 
This concept applies to an almost infinite variety of risk 
types: from earthquakes (the probability of an earth-
quake happening times the damage which it could 
produce) to credit risk (e.g. the likelihood of credit 
default and its possible consequences on the econ-
omy, society, etc.). And it applies also to money laun-
dering. FATF defines ML risk “as a function of three 
factors: threat, vulnerability and consequence” 
(FATF, 2013a, p. 8), where threats and vulnerabilities 
concur in determining the probability of ML. 
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Figure 2 - Money laundering risk
Analysis of these three risk factors (or risk dimensions 
in the IARM taxonomy) – threats, vulnerabilities, con-
sequences – is therefore at the core of any ML risk 
assessment.6 But what do they mean exactly? They 
are briefly defined here, while section 1.4 and Annex 
A1 will provide an in-depth discussion and review. 
Threats
ML threats are people or activities that may need 
to launder money (FATF, 2013a, p. 7; Dawe, 2013, p. 
112):7 for example, criminal groups involved in drug 
trafficking or tax crimes which have accumulated dirty 
funds. In other words, threats are related to the scale 
of ML predicate offences which generate illicit pro-
ceeds others (see below section 1.4).
Vulnerabilities
In the ML domain, vulnerabilities are the factors 
which attract, facilitate or allow money launder-
ing to happen. In other words, they are those factors 
which may be exploited by threats (FATF, 2013a, p. 
7): for example, high levels of cash diffusion or the 
presence of weaknesses in the AML legislation. Ac-
6.  In the FATF’s words, ML risk assessment requires “making judgments 
about threats, vulnerabilities and consequences” (FATF, 2013c, p. 8).
cording to IMF, vulnerabilities refer to “intrinsic prop-
erties in products, services, distribution channels, 
customer bases, systems, structures and jurisdictions 
(including weaknesses in systems, controls or mea-
sures)” (Dawe, 2013, p. 113). Indeed, the list of direct 
and indirect ML vulnerabilities could be almost end-
less (FATF identifies more than 60 vulnerabilities 
– see below for details).
Consequences
Consequences concern the impact or harm that 
ML (or TF) events may produce on the economy, 
society and financial markets. They can be relat-
ed to “cost, damage caused, […] effect on financial 
systems and institutions and jurisdictions more gen-
erally” (Dawe, 2013, p. 113). They can be short- or 
long-term consequences; they can be direct or indi-
rect; and they can be associated with the ML process 
itself or result from the use of the assets that are then 
successfully laundered (Dawe, 2013; FATF, 2013a). 
Provided below is a detailed review based on Ferw-
erda (2013) and Unger (2007).
7.  As defined by Dawe (2013, p. 112), “a threat is largely related to the 






Defining the unit of risk assessment
The concept of ML risk assessment may apply to a 
variety of levels or units of analysis (FATF, 2013a, 
p. 4; Wolfsberg Group, 2015, p. 7), e.g.:
• countries (i.e. the risk that a country may be mis-
used or affected by money laundering)
• regions
• economic sectors
• services (e.g. the intermediation service offered 
by a real estate agency)
• transactions or products (e.g. cash deposits at 
ATMs, bank cheques, etc.)
• persons (i.e. the risk that a certain company or 
natural person may be misused, affected or may 
conduct ML activities)
Although the concepts of threats, vulnerabilities and 
consequences apply to all of these levels, the identi-
fication of risk factors can change according to the 
unit of analysis chosen (FATF, 2013a, p. 22).
For example, if the assessment is conducted at 
sub-national regional level, some vulnerabilities re-
lated to the weaknesses in the ML legislation do not 
apply because different regions of the same country 
are generally subject to the same regulatory regime. 
Similarly, some threats which may be considered in a 
territorial assessment (e.g. the amount of revenues 
locally generated by drug markets) become meaning-
less when the perspective is at business sector level.
 
Other risk factors, such as cash-intensiveness, ap-
ply to all units of analysis, but they are declined into 
different forms: e.g. cash-intensive territories may 
be defined as those where the diffusion of cash as 
means of payment is higher; cash-intensive business 
sectors may be those where the weight of cash on to-
tal assets is higher; cash-intensive persons are those 
who perform/receive more payments in the form of 
cash, etc. Defining the unit of assessment is therefore 
a crucial preliminary step for any ML risk assessment.
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8. The EU SNRA, for example, explains that “the ‘impact/consequenc-
es component is regarded as constantly significant and will there-
fore not be assessed. […]. While it is important to understand the 
consequences associated with the ML/TF activities (physical, social, 
environmental, economic and structural consequences), from a meth-
odological point of view it is particularly challenging to measure their 
consequences in quantifiable or numerical terms. For the purpose of 
this risk assessment it is therefore assumed that ML/TF activities gen-
erate constant significant negative effects […]. From a methodological 
point of view, as the impact/consequences component is assumed 
as a fix high value […], the determination of the residual risk for each 
scenario (modus operandi versus scenario) will be determined by the 
combination of the identified level of threat and vulnerability only” (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2015). 
9.  In other words, what is performed is an assessment of the ML like-
lihood and not properly of ML risk. But the expression “risk assess-
ment” is kept for the sake of clarity and in line with current mainstream 
RA taxonomy.
From risk factors to a composite 
indicator of ML risk
The idea behind the IARM study, in line with the FATF 
conceptual framework, is that the overall ML risk of 
a certain area or business sector is a function of 
the level of the risk factors in that area or sector. 
Building on this approach, and on the risk assess-
ment methodologies applied in previous NRAs, IARM 
develops a measure of ML risk:
• at sub-national regional level, i.e. across regions 
in the same country 
• at business sector level
It tests this approach in Italy (in the 110 provinces 
and in NACE business sector divisions), the Nether-
lands (in the NACE business sector divisions) and in 
the United Kingdom (in the 43 police areas of En-
gland & Wales). 
To do so, IARM identifies, in each of these areas/sec-
tors, a variety of risk factors grouped as threats and 
vulnerabilities as defined above. It transforms them 
into proxies so as to allow measurement, and it com-
bines the factors, through a range of statistical tech-
niques, into a composite indicator representing a 
synthetic measure of ML risk at area or sector level. 
1.3 Methodological framework : 
         the IARM  approach
Given the difficulties of measurement, consequenc-
es are not considered in the analysis and they are 
not covered by the final indicator. This choice is in line 
with previous NRAs and with the EU SNRA.8  Indeed, 
the FATF RA guidelines suggest that “countries may 
opt to focus primarily on […] understanding threats 
and vulnerabilities” (FATF, 2013a, p. 8).9
The IARM methodological approach can be better il-
lustrated in 7 steps.
This 7-step process follows the OECD guidelines for 
the construction of composite indicators (OECD 
& JRC, 2008) and previous works aimed at producing 
indicators of criminal phenomena, in particular organ-
ised crime (see, e.g., Dugato, De Simoni & Savona, 
2014; Transcrime, 2013; Calderoni, 2011; Van Dijk, 
2007). The process also follows the three stages de-
fined by FATF as part of the risk assessment process 
(FATF, 2013, p. 21): 
• identification – related to the identification of 
threats, vulnerabilities and other risk factors; 
• analysis – related to the assessment of these 
factors; 
• evaluation – related to the consideration of the 
assessed risks and determination of priorities of 
intervention.
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10. The sensitivity analysis (STEP 7) proves that the approach is robust 
and results of the assessment is not driven by outliers.
11. Principal component analysis is a multivariate data analysis tech-
nique used, in a similar way to other approaches (e.g. factor anal-
ysis), to reduce the information contained in large datasets into a 
smaller number of components (or factors, in factor analysis), each 
of them able to summarise a specific phenomenon explained by a 
range of correlated variables. For this purpose, PCA uses an orthog-
onal transformation of the correlated variables into a set of principal 



























In each country, at each level (regional /or business sector), ML 
risk factors are identified through a review of the literature 
(academic papers, LEA/FIU/ARO reports, judicial evidence, 
other institutional reports) and are then validated through 
interviews with experts. 
For each risk factor identified, a range of proxy variables is 
identified and measured. Proxies might differ from country to 
country depending on the country-specific context and data 
availability.
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are produced 
among the identified variables, e.g. to see how variables 
distribute, relate and covariate and in order to identify outliers. 
The IARM approach keeps outliers in the model, because the 
exact aim is to identify those areas/sectors characterised by the 
highest risks.10  
For each component extracted from the PCA, values are 
generated per each province and sector. The components are 
then aggregated and combined into a composite indicator of 
ML risk after appropriate weighting and normalisation. As a 
result, each province and sector is attributed a relevant value of 
the ML risk composite indicator ranging from 0 to 100.
After factors and relevant proxies are identified, data are 
collected from a variety of sources (see chapters 2-4 and Annex 
for details), organised and validated. When necessary, data are 
treated through imputation of missing values, normalisation and 
transformation techniques.
Variables are aggregated using principal component 
analysis11 (henceforth PCA), which makes it possible to identify 
(and determine the relative weight of) the different dimensions 
(components) of ML risk. Other aggregation and clustering 
techniques (e.g. factor analysis) are also explored to validate 
PCA results.
The composite indicator is validated in two ways. First, a 
sensitivity analysis is performed in order to determine whether 
and how it changes after modifying certain parameters in the 
process (e.g. normalisation and weighting criteria, type of PCA 
rotation, etc.) and after excluding certain variables from the 
model. Second, the indicator, where possible, is compared to 
alternative measures of ML (e.g. number of suspicious 










Figure 3 – From risk factors to a composite indicator of ML risk
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Strengths and weaknesses 
Strenghts
The IARM approach complements existing ML/TF 
risk assessments at national and supranational lev-
el, addressing some of the gaps of current approach-
es described in section 1.1. It builds on the FATF 
guidance, but stresses the quantitative method and 
incorporates some innovative elements, which are 
discussed below.
Higher disaggregation detail
IARM adopts a sub-national perspective (across 
the Italian 110 provinces and UK 43 police areas) 
while existing works have a national perspective. It 
also covers all business sectors (at the NACE di-
vision disaggregation, in Italy and the Netherlands) 
while existing studies focus only on regulated sectors 
(i.e. industries under AML obligations such as banks 
or professionals). 
A synthetic measure of a complex phenomenon 
IARM develops two composite indicators (at area 
and industry level) which condense a complex and 
multifaceted concept like ML risk into one value. 
Most existing NRAs adopt a qualitative approach, 
which yields an in-depth understanding of threats and 
vulnerabilities but lacks a bird’s-eye perspective on 
the problem.
A transparent and replicable methodology
IARM adopts a transparent methodology, which is 
applied uniformly in the three countries covered by 
the study (Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom) 
and can be replicated also in other contexts and ar-
eas. Most other ML indicators do not disclose meth-
odological details, which makes it difficult to cross-
check, compare and validate results across areas, 
sectors and stakeholders.
An easy-to-use tool for practitioners
The indicator of ML risk produced by IARM can be 
easily applied in the everyday work of practi-
tioners in the AML field: both investigators, who can 
improve the detection of risky areas, and obliged en-
tities (e.g. banks, professionals, real estate agencies, 
high value dealers, etc.), which can use IARM ML 
risk indicators to improve the assessment of clients in 
their customer due diligence (CDD) activity. 
An innovative analysis of the ownership structure of 
European businesses 
Based on the analysis of a large volume of company 
data (provided by BvD), IARM has performed the first 
large-scale investigation of who are the owners of 
companies in Italy, the Netherlands and United King-
dom, and where they come from (see chapters 2-4 
and in particular chapter 5). This analysis is particu-
larly important in light of the recent developments in 
the EU AML regulatory framework, most notably the 
adoption of beneficial owner registries.
Weaknesses 
Despite its innovative contribution, the approach ad-
opted by IARM has some weaknesses and shortcom-
ings:
• only those RFs which can be actually mea-
sured given available data are covered. For 
some serious ML threats and vulnerabilities (in-
cluding important predicate offences like, e.g., 
corruption and extortion) reliable measures at 
sub-national and business sector level are not 
available, and for this reason they are not taken 
into account by the indicator;
• this means that the methodology does not fully 
take into account emerging threats and vulner-
abilities which, by definition, are characterised 
by lack of data and estimates: for example, the 
use of virtual currencies or new payment meth-
ods (e.g. prepaid cards, mobile or internet based 
payments); 
• given the cross-regional and cross-sectori-
al focus, the risk factors at the national level, 
such as the vulnerabilities in the AML regulation 
or in company law, are not taken into account in 
the IARM model, so that risk should not be com-
pared among countries; 
• like other risk assessment exercises (such as 
the EU SNRA or the Italian and British NRA), the 
indicator does not cover ML consequences: the 
risk assessment which stems from this approach 
therefore does not take into account the impact 
of money laundering activities across regions 
and sectors.
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Table 2 – Strengths and weaknesses of the IARM methodological approach  
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
• Complex phenomenon condensed into a single 
measure of risk
• Sub-national perspective (vs. NRAs’ national 
perspective) 
• All business sectors covered (vs. NRAs’ cover-
age of regulated sectors only)
• Transparent and replicable methodology
• Easily applied in the everyday work of AML 
practitioners (e.g. in CDD by obliged entities)
• Suffers from lack of data on certain risk factors 
(e.g. corruption) and emerging trends (e.g. vir-
tual currencies, NPMs)
• No coverage of risk factors at national level 
(e.g. weaknesses in AML legislation) 
• No coverage of ML consequences 




As mentioned, ML threats are people or activities that 
produce illicit proceeds or that may need to launder 
money. In other words, they are related to ML pred-
icate offences. The literature identifies a wide array 
of threats. For example FATF, while recommending 
to expand as most as possible the range of predi-
cate offences (FATF Recommendation 312), suggests 
a list of 24 threat categories to be considered in risk 
assessment (for a comprehensive review see FATF, 
2013a, pp. 33–38). Among them: 
• participation in organised crime
• human trafficking/smuggling
• illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs
• corruption and bribery 
• tax and excise evasion
IARM focuses on those threats which are particu-
larly relevant (in terms of seriousness/volume of 
illicit proceeds generated) in Italy, the Netherlands, 
and the UK, and which can be measured according 
to available data – with some differences among the 
three countries and if the analysis is conducted at ter-
ritory or business sector level. They are illustrated in 
the following chart and discussed below.
Table 3 - Threats analysed by IARM by country
12. “Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all serious 
offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate of-
fences” (FATF, 2012, p. 14)
1.4 Focus: ML threats, vulnerabilities, 







































Organised crime (henceforth OC) involves a wide 
variety of criminal activities, many of which may 
be identified as predicate offences in their own right 
(e.g. illicit drug trafficking, extortion, etc.) and are dis-
cussed separately below. However, IARM assumes 
that OC can be considered as a threat alone itself. 
High levels of OC may in fact increase the likelihood 
of criminal infiltration of the legitimate economy, 
whatever the amount of proceeds generated by illic-
it markets, which in turn could increase the ML risk 
(Savona, Riccardi, & Berlusconi, 2016 - see Annex 
A1 for details). 
Illicit drug trafficking
Historically, drug trafficking has been considered the 
most serious money laundering predicate crime. 
The modern AML regime was developed in the 1980s 
in order to fight the trafficking of narcotics, and FATF 
itself was conceived in the framework of the 1988 UN 
Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. Ac-
cording to recent estimates, the illicit retail drug market 
in Europe (heroin, cocaine, cannabis, amphetamines 
and ecstasy) amounts to between 20 and 30 billion 
euros per year, equivalent to 0.2%-0.6% of EU GDP 
(EMCDDA, 2016; Savona & Riccardi, 2015).13 How 
much of this figure is laundered, and where, varies. It 
depends on the market structure, the type of criminal 
group involved, and emerging trends – like the growth 
of home-made drugs (e.g. cannabis) or the availabili-
ty of dark web drug markets (see Annex A1). 
Other illicit markets
The coverage of other criminal offences and illic-
it markets considered in the IARM model depends 
on the availability of data: in Italy, estimates of illicit 
revenues at regional level (NUTS 2 disaggregation) 
are available for sexual exploitation, illicit traffick-
ing in tobacco products, and counterfeiting (see 
Chapter 2). In the UK, good data at police area level 
are available for both drug trafficking and organised 
property crime (see Chapter 4). In the Netherlands, 
analysis is conducted only at business sector level, 
so that the concept of illicit markets does not apply. 
Unfortunately, no data are available at regional level 
on important predicate crimes – at least in the IARM 
countries – like extortion racketeering and usury 
(see Chapter 2). The same applies to fraud (e.g. 
MTIC fraud, excise fraud, credit card fraud, etc.) for 
which some estimates exist but only at national ag-
gregate level. 
Corruption 
Corruption is related to ML as both a predicate of-
fence (bribes and monetary benefits which are laun-
dered in the legal economy) and a facilitator (e.g. 
corruption of a bank official in order to ease the de-
posit or transfer of illicit funds). Unfortunately, no data 
on the amount of corruption proceeds at regional lev-
el are available either in Italy or in the UK. At business 
sector level the concept of corruption threat is hard 
to operationalise and therefore is not taken into ac-
count. In Italy, given the close relationship between 
corruption (especially in public procurement) and 
organised crime, the phenomenon is indirectly mea-
sured by considering the level of OC presence and 
infiltration in the legal economy (see Chapter 2).
Tax evasion (and underground economy)
Tax evasion is an important ML threat. It is includ-
ed in the predicate offences listed in the 4th EU AML 
Directive. However, it is also a good proxy for the un-
derground economy which, in turn, is widely consid-
ered as a vulnerability in the ML risk assessment 
framework. The amount of illicit proceeds generated 
by tax evasion is huge, in all its forms: e.g. VAT and 
excise fraud, evasion of personal income taxes and 
of corporate taxes, evasion of local government taxes 
and social contributions. It is taken into account in the 
IARM model by using different proxies: tax gap in the 
analysis across Italian regions, labour tax irregulari-
ty in Italy at business sector level and corporate tax 
fraud in the Netherlands at business sector level – 
see respectively Chapter 2 and 4 for details.
13. In particular, EMCDDA estimates the illicit retail drug market in 2013 
at between 20.8 and 30.8 billion euros (EMCDDA, 2016, p. 4). Tran-
scrime’s OCP project estimates that the drug market in the EU (on 
2013-2015 data, depending on the drug) produces 27.7 billion euros 
per year at the retail level, equivalent to nearly 0.25% of EU GDP 
(Savona & Riccardi, 2016, p. 36).
36
Issues in measuring ML threats
Measuring ML threats means measuring the level 
or volume of people and activities, in a certain area 
or sector, that need to launder money. In other words, 
it means assessing the scale of ML predicate of-
fences in that area or sector (FATF, 2013a, p. 7; 
Dawe, 2013, p. 112). There are three main critical is-
sues in this assessment (see also Annex A1):
1. the choice of whether to focus on people, ac-
tivities or both. For example it may be possible 
to assess the scale of the ML threat ‘drug traffick-
ing’ in a certain area by measuring the number of 
recorded criminal groups (or criminals) involved 
in drug trafficking or by estimating the volume of 
illicit drug proceeds generated. It should not be 
assumed that both the approaches point in the 
same direction: for example, a certain area may 
have a low number of OC groups but a high vol-
ume of proceeds (e.g. because of a large con-
sumer market). And much depends also on the 
chosen perspective, methodology and disaggre-
gation level;14 
2. the difficulties in validating threat measures. By 
definition, ML threats imply illicit transactions or 
hidden activities which are not recorded. In recent 
years, a number of studies have addressed the 
issue of how to estimate the scale of illicit mar-
kets, and estimation methodologies have much 
improved – although the risk of producing “myth-
ical numbers” (Calderoni, 2014b, p. 138; Reuter, 
1984, p. 135) still remains. Annex A1 provides a 
comprehensive review of threats measurement 
methodologies, showing how much they vary: for 
example, some may adopt a supply-driven or de-
mand-oriented approach. Problems may arise if, 
e.g., threats measured with different approaches 
are then combined together;
3. The difficulties in taking the transnational na-
ture of ML threats into account. Proceeds gen-
erated by the sale of drugs in a region or coun-
try i may be then laundered in another region or 
country j. Is the ML risk higher in region i or j? 
The literature, when dealing with threat analy-
sis, stresses the importance of distinguishing 
between dirty funds produced locally or inter-
How IARM addresses these issues
In the IARM methodological approach, it is not 
possible, given the current availability of data, to 
use the same measurement method for each dif-
ferent threat. For example, while in some cases 
the focus is on people (e.g. number of OC groups 
per area j, as a proxy for organised crime across 
UK territories, see Chapter 4), in other cases it is 
on activities (e.g. estimated illicit revenues from 
drug trafficking or sexual exploitation, as proxies 
for these illicit markets in Italy). In doing so, IARM 
follows the most updated measurement method-
ologies as regards both illicit markets and organ-
ised crime (see Annex A1 and infra chapters).
As regards the transnational nature of ML threats, 
IARM is based on one assumption: that illicit 
proceeds generated in an area (or sector) are 
laundered in the same area (or sector). In oth-
er words, it is not foreseen that one area may 
launder proceeds generated elsewhere. This is 
a major weakness of this approach – but it is 
the only one which could be adopted given the 
available knowledge and data on transnational 
(and trans regional) illicit flows. 
However, to address this problem, it is assumed 
that the inclusion of vulnerabilities in the mod-
el (see below) could help in measuring the ‘at-
tractiveness’ of a certain area (or sector) for 
dirty proceeds generated elsewhere: e.g. if 
one area has relatively small illicit markets, but 
a high cash intensiveness which could ease the 
placement of illicit cash, then it may attract ‘for-
eign’ illicit funds. As a result, it may record low 
levels of ML threats but high ML vulnerabilities 
and then, overall, a medium-high ML risk.  
14. The distinction between activities and structures is, for example, a 
central issue in the organised crime literature (see e.g. Riccardi & 
Berlusconi, 2016; von Lampe, 2015; Finckenauer, 2005).
nationally. In other words, also “illicit proceeds 
generated outside […] that are likely to enter 
the jurisdiction for laundering” should be taken 
into account (Dawe, 2013, p. 112; FATF, 2013a). 
However, in practice, it is often almost impossible 
to follow this advice.
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Vulnerabilities
According to the IMF, vulnerabilities refer to “intrinsic 
properties in products, services, distribution chan-
nels, customer bases, systems, structures and juris-
dictions (including weaknesses in systems, controls 
or measures)” (Dawe, 2013, p. 113). The list of ML 
vulnerabilities could be almost endless. In its RA 
guidelines, FATF identifies more than 60 vulner-
abilities grouped into six categories (the so-called 
P-E-S-T-E-L approach, see FATF, 2013, p. 42):
• political factors (e.g. “stability of the govern-
ment”, “level of political commitment to AML”, 
etc.)
• economic factors (e.g. the “opacity of the finan-
cial system”, “prevalence of cash-based transac-
tions”, etc.)
• social factors (e.g. “social inclusiveness”, “ethnic 
diversity”, “significant population shifts”, etc.)
• technological factors (e.g. “use of technology in 
money transfers”, “new communication meth-
ods”, etc.)
• environmental factors (e.g. “availability of water”, 
“re-use of resources”, etc.)
• legislative factors (e.g. “strengths and weak-
nesses in AML legislation”, “adequacy of AML 
controls”, “limited regulation of money value 
transfer systems”, etc.)
Such a wide perspective risks extending the assess-
ment to any social or economic factor, including 
those which exert only very indirect effects on the 
likelihood of ML, and overburdening the model with 
factors which are virtually impossible to operation-
alise and measure.
IARM focuses only on a limited number of vulnera-
bilities: those which – according to the literature and 
experts’ interviews – are particularly relevant in the 
country, for which data are available at regional and 
business sector level and which apply to the defined 
unit of assessment. For example, weaknesses in 
the AML legislation are not taken into account be-
cause they refer only to a national level while there 
are usually no differences in the regulatory regime 
across regions and sectors in the same country.
Table 4 – Vulnerabilities analysed by IARM by country
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Cash-intensiveness
Opacity of business ownership
High volume of money remittances
Presence of transit hubs























Cash-based economies and sectors are more vul-
nerable to money laundering. Cash is a facilitator 
for committing crimes (first of all tax evasion) and for 
concealing and laundering the proceeds of crime. It 
is anonymous and cannot normally be traced. It 
is a bearer negotiable instrument which gives no de-
tails either on the origin of the proceeds or on the 
beneficiary of the exchange (Soudijn & Reuter, 2016). 
This makes it harder for law enforcement to follow the 
audit trail (Riccardi & Levi, 2017; Europol, 2015). It is 
not surprising that most STRs/SARs around Europe 
are related to anomalous use of cash, and that most 
confiscated assets are in the form of cash or are mov-
able goods. 
In the framework of the IARM model, cash-intensive-
ness is analysed by considering two aspects:
• the extent to which cash is used as means of 
payment in a certain area;
• the cash-intensive nature of businesses in a cer-
tain area or sector.
The first is measured through an indirect proxy called 
cash-ratio, available at regional level only in Ita-
ly (see Chapter 2). The latter is analysed in all the 
three IARM countries (at both territorial and/or busi-
ness sector level) by measuring the average value of 
companies’ cash (and other current assets) on the 
total assets in a certain area or sector (see Annex).
Opacity of business ownership
Complex corporate structures, especially if estab-
lished in risky jurisdictions with a low level of financial 
transparency, are helpful for concealing illicit flows 
and hiding beneficial ownership (FATF, 2016b, 
2014a; Reuter, 2012; de Willebois, Halter, Harrison, 
Park, & Sharman, 2011; Blum, Levi, Naylor, & Wil-
liams, 1999). The need for more precise and trans-
parent information on business ownership (in 
particular on beneficial owners – henceforth BO) has 
been stressed by FATF Recommendations and then 
acknowledged at EU level in the latest AML Directive. 
However, problems of accessing data on ownership 
across different business registers and jurisdictions 
remain (Riccardi & Savona, 2013; EBOCS Consor-
tium, 2015).
For all these reasons, the opacity of business owner-
ship is a key ML vulnerability. In the IARM context, it 
is analysed by considering two sub-dimensions:  
• the level of complexity of businesses’ owner-
ship structure as such;
• the volume of business ownership connections 
with shareholders and BOs from risky jurisdic-
tions.
They are measured by means of innovative proxies 
applied to an invaluable set of data on business own-
ership provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). Opacity 
of business ownership is analysed in Italy (Chapter 
2), the Netherlands (Chapter 3) and the UK (Chapter 
4) at both territorial and business sector level. Chap-
ter 5 provides a comparative overview across the 
three countries.
Other vulnerabilities at territorial level
When carrying out the risk assessment at regional 
level in Italy and the UK, other ML vulnerabilities are 
considered. In both the countries, the presence of 
transit hubs (e.g. international airports, ports, inter-
modal freight stations) is considered to increase the 
risk of illicit financial flows, for example of cash-smug-
gling (FATF, 2015b; Soudijn & Reuter, 2016).
In Italy, the literature stresses the role of money 
transfer services in facilitating illicit financial flows: 
for example, the movement of proceeds produced by 
Chinese-speaking criminal organisations and other 
foreign OCGs (Clemente, 2016; Maresca, 2016; CSF, 
2014a, p. 23). Therefore, a measure of the volume of 
money remittances per capita is included in the mod-
el (see Chapter 2).
In the United Kingdom, the real estate market is 
widely considered to be an attractiveness factor for 
both legal and illicit financial flows (HM Treasury, 
2015; Goodrich & Cowdock, 2016). For this reason, 
a proxy for the relative increase in property values 
across UK areas is included in the analysis as ML 
vulnerability (see Chapter 4).
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Other vulnerabilities at business sector level
There is no general agreement on whether the prof-
itability of a business sector should be considered 
a money laundering vulnerability: some scholars ar-
gue that profitable businesses may attract illicit in-
vestments (Kruisbergen, Kleemans, & Kouwenberg, 
2015; Masciandaro, Takæts, & Unger, 2007, p. 7; Un-
ger & Rawlings, 2008; Williams, 2001). But, despite 
some single case studies (e.g. renewable energy in 
Italy or VLT/gaming in some EU countries) the empir-
ical evidence showing a correlation between money 
laundering/criminal infiltration and industry’s profit-
ability is weak (e.g. see Riccardi, 2014; Donato, et 
al. 2013; Transcrime, 2013). For this reason, in the 
IARM analysis at business sector level in Italy and 
in the Netherlands, two models are presented: one 
including profitability as a ML vulnerability, and one 
excluding it (see Chapters 2 and 4).
Issues in measuring ML vulnerabilities
There are various challenges in measuring ML vul-
nerabilities: first, the lack of appropriate proxies to 
operationalise complex and multifaceted phenome-
na (such as cash-intensiveness, opacity of business 
ownership, and others); second, the paucity of data 
related to some of these factors. The difficulties in-
crease when the analysis is carried out at business 
sector level, where data are scant and the relevant 
literature is still in its infancy. 
Consequences
The FATF RA guidance defines ML/TF consequenc-
es as “the impact or harm that ML or TF may cause 
and includes the effect of the underlying criminal and 
terrorist activity on financial systems and institutions, 
as well as the economy and society more general-
ly” (FATF, 2013a, p. 7). This means that the effect of 
money laundering includes all the consequences 
of all different predicate crimes, making it a very 
broad subject. 
Moreover, as mentioned, FATF admits that measur-
ing consequences may be very difficult, and it sug-
gests focusing only on assessment of threats and 
vulnerabilities. The majority of available NRAs (and 
the EU SNRA itself) adopt this approach and exclude 
analysis of consequences from ML risk assessment. 
How IARM addresses these issues
IARM develops an innovative set of proxies 
and indicators for ML vulnerabilities. Some – 
e.g. the measures of cash intensiveness or of 
business profitability – are operationalised by 
taking inspiration from the literature in other 
domains (e.g. accounting, corporate finance, 
monetary economics, corporate governance, 
etc.). Others – e.g. the measures related to the 
complexity of business ownership structure, to 
the degree of connections with risky jurisdic-
tions, etc. – are very new proxies which for the 
first time are applied at a regional or sectorial 
level (while normally they are used at a micro 
level, i.e. for the analysis of individual firms).  
IARM does likewise and focuses only on 
threats and vulnerabilities. However, the fol-
lowing paragraphs provide a brief overview of 
the consequences of money laundering with a 
specific focus on the empirical underpinning. 
An in-depth literature review is provided in the 
Annex.
ML consequences may be positive or negative, of 
an economic and non-economic nature. They may 
have an effect on the real sector, on the financial 
one, or on the public and monetary market. They may 
be appreciated in the short or long term. But most 
of them are not supported by empirical evidence. 
Empirical studies on ML impact are hampered by 
the lack of a reliable estimate of the amount of mon-
ey laundering across countries and over time (Levi 
& Reuter, 2006, p. 294). Unger et al. (2006, p. 102) 
conclude that “most literature on money laundering 
effects is pure speculation [..] one source refers to the 
other source, without much of an empirical solid back 
up”. 
Table 5 below reports a list of 24 categories of con-
sequences (focusing only on those generated by ML 
itself, and not by predicate offences) stemming from a 
comprehensive literature review based on Ferwerda 
(2013) and Unger (2007; 2006).
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1. Law enforcement gets a second 
chance
● ● ●
2. Distortion of consumption ● ● ●
3. Distortion of investment and savings ● ● ●
4. Artificial increase in prices ● ● ●
5. Unfair competition ● ● ●
6. Changes in imports and exports ● ● ●
7. Decrease of economic growth ● ● ●
8. Decrease of output income and 
employment ● ● ●
9. Higher/lower revenues for the 
public sector ● ● ●
10. Threat to privatisation ● ● ● ●
11. Changes in the demand for 
money, interest and exchange rates ● ● ●
12. Increase in the volatility of interest 
and exchange rates ● ● ●
13. Changes to availability of credit ● ● ●
14. Higher capital inflows/outflows ● ● ● ●
15. Changes in foreign direct investment ● ● ● ●
16. Risk for the financial sector, 
solvability and liquidity ● ● ● ●
17. Profits for the financial sector ● ● ●
18. Reputation of the financial sector ● ● ● ●
19. Contamination of illegal business 
by legal business ● ● ● ● ●
20. Distortion of economic statistics ● ● ●
21. Corruption and bribery ● ● ● ●
22. Increase in crime ● ● ● ●
23. Undermining of  political institutions ● ● ●
24. Undermining of foreign policy goals ● ● ●
25. Increase in terrorism ● ● ●
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
15. See the Annex for the sources of each category of consequence. 
Although this literature overview is based on an extensive literature 
search, its completeness can, of course, not be guaranteed. The 
review is based on a systematic reviewing of the publications by in-
ternational organisations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) and the Fi-
nancial Action Task Force (FATF). In addition Econlit, an economic 
search database that includes about 750 journals and over 44,000 
working papers, has been browsed. Other sources used are the 
Dutch Central Catalogue (NCC), which includes around 14 million 
books and 500 000 magazines and Google Scholar. Specific focus 
was given to the Journal of Money Laundering Control and the Jour-
nal of Financial Crime. This overview is an updated version of the 
one published in Unger et al. (2006, pp. 110–111), Unger (2007) and 
(Ferwerda, 2013).
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16. This idea seems to be the reason that money laundering was crim-
inalized in the first place. When the US found that it could not win 
the ‘war on drugs’, it decided to go after the money made from the 
drugs trade. In 1986, the Money Laundering Control Act was enact-
ed, which basically started a ‘war on drugs money’ (Ferwerda, 2012).
Law enforcement gets a second chance
The first is somehow a positive effect. Criminalisation 
of money laundering gives law enforcement agen-
cies a second chance to catch the criminal. Even if 
the police are unable to prove the original crime, the 
criminal can still reveal himself when he starts to 
transfer/transform/invest the money made from his 
crime. And he can still be convicted for money laun-
dering, and the proceeds of the crime can be con-
fiscated (Ferwerda, 2012).16 This consequence is not 
really a risk factor for a risk assessment, since it is 
the result of considering money laundering a crime, 
not an effect that happens when money laundering 
is committed. However, this effect is included to keep 
the literature overview complete.
Distortion of consumption, investment, 
savings, imports and exports, output, income and 
employment
The criminalisation of money laundering may make 
criminals spend their money differently (Walker, 
1995; 2016). Criminals may buy or invest solely for 
money laundering purposes (for instance in real es-
tate). They may not buy something because it might 
attract the attention of the authorities, or select suppli-
ers in order to avoid the suspicion of money launder-
ing. Criminal organisations usually opt for laundering 
in cash-intensive assets or business sectors (such as 
bars, restaurants, gambling/betting activities) which 
facilitate the placement of illicit proceeds (Riccardi 
& Levi, 2017; Kruisbergen et al., 2015; Transcrime, 
2013). This may result in financial resources alloca-
tion in sub-optimal industries and distort markets – 
especially if businesses used by criminals to launder 
adopt illicit behaviours such as extortion, corruption, 
accounting manipulation or market abuse. When the 
different spending and investing pattern is related to 
foreign-produced goods, it also has an effect on im-
ports and exports. This consequence seems to be 
particularly important for developing countries, where 
rich criminals spend their money on imported luxury 
goods rather than on local products (Bartlett, 2002, 
p. 20).
However, empirical evidence in this regard is poor, 
apart from some countries. In Italy a variety of studies 
show that mafia investments in legal businesses dif-
fer substantially from legal investments (Riccardi, So-
riani, & Giampietri, 2016; Riccardi, 2014; Transcrime, 
2013) and that the impact on market, investments and 
import/export is substantial (Pinotti, 2015; Gurciullo, 
2014; Lavezzi, 2008). In the Netherlands, empirical 
evidence shows that the spending behaviour of crim-
inals is not substantially different from that of normal 
people (Unger, 2007, p. 122) compares Meloen et al. 
(2003) with Alessie et al. (2002, p. 358), so that the 
distortion may not be that large. 
Artificial increase in prices and unfair 
competition
Related to the previous category of consequences 
is the possible impact of investments of criminal pro-
ceeds in terms of artificial increases in prices. Because 
of their large funds, criminals will for example out-
bid honest buyers to acquire assets (Walker, 1995, 
p. 33). Or they may be able to make very low (and 
unfair) tenders in response to public and private 
procurement announcements, outbidding legal 
competitors (Fazekas, Sberna, & Vannucci, 2016). In 
regard to the first consequence, there is some anec-
dotal evidence concerning the effect on land prices in 
Colombia of the laundering of proceeds by the Me-
dellin Cartel (Keh, 1996, p. 5); in regard to the sec-
ond, there is a large body of literature (Fazekas et 
al., 2016; PWC & Ecorys, 2013; Chaikin & Sharman, 
2009; Baker, 2005).
Capital outflows and effects on volatility of 
exchange and interest rates
Some scholars point out the effects produced by il-
licit inflows/outflows in terms of volatility of exchange 
and interest rates which directly affect the demand 
for money (Tanzi, 1997, p. 8; McDonell, 1998, p. 10; 
Camdessus, 1998, p. 2; FATF, 2002, p. 3; Boorman 
& Ingves, 2001, p. 9). In particular, considering the 
capacity of Western economies to attract illicit finan-
cial flows from the rest of the world, various scholars 
stress the harm caused by global ML to developing 
countries – which are impoverished by cash outflows 




The literature identifies two main concerns regarding 
the financial sector. First, if launderers’ economic be-
haviour is less predictable than that of conventional 
investors, there may be some risk for the solven-
cy and liquidity of the financial sector (Alldridge, 
2002, p. 310). The second effect involves reputation: 
when money laundering operations are detected, 
the financial sector – specifically the financial insti-
tutions concerned – will lose credibility and cus-
tomer confidence (Bartlett, 2002). This applies also 
at country level: a negative reputation for countries 
could produce a detrimental effect on inward foreign 
direct investments (Boorman & Ingves, 2001, p. 9).
Greater availability of credit in the short run, 
shortage in the long run
Related to the previous point, financial institutions 
may benefit from higher deposits and inflows of dirty 
money. This may lead to a greater availability of 
credit, even for legitimate businesses (Unger, 2007, 
p. 140). This is not, per se, a negative effect, at least 
in the short term, but in the long run it may produce 
market distortions, e.g. on how this credit is allo-
cated. Moreover, if illicit funds are frozen or seized, 
it could turn in shortage of credit producing as men-
tioned solvency and liquidity risks.
17. How AML policy influences the incentives of (potential) criminals is 
modeled in Ferwerda (2009). One can use this model to show alge-
braically that anti-money laundering policy reduces crime. 
Increases in crime
Money laundering may increase crime. It makes crim-
inal activities worthwhile and provides criminal organ-
isations with capital that they can use to expand their 
criminal activities (Mackrell, 1997). If governments 
succeed in making money laundering difficult, be-
coming a criminal will be less attractive17 since it will 
be harder to enjoy the illicit gains – even when the 
crimes committed result in large gains and are not 
detected. A study by Ferwerda (2009) suggests that 
anti-money laundering policy can be used to reduce 
crime levels, and that more intense international co-
operation in the fight against money laundering could 
be associated with lower crime rates.
Detrimental effects on economic growth
Money laundering can dampen economic growth 
because of the negative implications in terms of mar-
ket distortions and misallocation of funds (Tanzi, 1997, 
p. 96; Bartlett, 2002, p. 18). Quirk (1997) and Ferwer-
da & Bosma (2005) provide evidence in this regard. 
Ferwerda & Bosma (2005) point out that crimes that 
are intermingled with money laundering actually hurt 
the economy more than money laundering itself. 
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This chapter presents an analysis of the main risk factors of 
money laundering in Italy, across the 110 Italian provinces 
and at business sector level (across 77 NACE divisions).
It is structured as follows: first, it provides background on 
ML risk assessment in Italy (Section 2.1). Second, it presents 
the analysis at sub-national area level (Section 2.2). It then 
presents the analysis at business sector level (Section 2.3). 
Finally, it discusses some research and policy implications 
(Section 2.4).
Michele Riccardi                                  Riccardo Milani                                  Diana Camerini 
Transcrime-Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Italy
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• IARM carried out an exploratory assessment of 
ML risk in Italy. In particular, it developed a com-
posite indicator:
- at territory level, across the country’s 110 prov-
inces
- at business sector level, across 77 NACE di-
visions
• the analysis provides empirical support for (and 
complements) the 2014 National Risk Assess-
ment (NRA). Moreover, it confirms some of the 
main findings of the 2016 FATF Mutual Evalua-
tion Report (MER) of Italy.
Assessment at territory level: ML risk 
across the 110 Italian provinces
• At territory level (110 provinces), IARM identified 
and analysed 6 risk factors of money laundering:
1. Organised crime infiltration
2. Illicit markets
3. Tax evasion & Underground economy
4. Cash-intensiveness
5. Opacity of business ownership
6. Money transfers
• The six risk factors are operationalised in proxy 
variables and then combined, through principal 
component analysis (PCA), in a composite indi-
cator of ML risk;
• According to the composite indicator, the prov-
inces with the highest ML risk are in the south, 
with four Calabrian provinces at the top (Reggio 
Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Catanzaro, Crotone) 
followed by other southern areas (e.g. Naples, 
Caserta, Palermo, Trapani);
• These provinces record high levels of mafia-type 
infiltration, cash-intensiveness and underground 
economy (measured by tax gap and irregular la-
bour);
• Among non-southern regions, Imperia and Prato 
rank highest. They record high levels of opacity 
of business ownership, cash-intensiveness, un-
derground economy and (in the case of Prato) 
money remittances;
• The ML risk composite indicator at province level 
is significantly correlated with the rate of STRs – 
although some provinces seem to “under-report” 
with respect to their estimated level of risk.
Assessment at business sector level: ML 
risk across 77 NACE divisions
• At business sector level (77 NACE divisions) the 
analysis is more difficult – due to lack of avail-
able data and of appropriate proxies. Therefore, 
only and exploratory assessment is completed.
• IARM has identified 4 risk factors of money laun-
dering:
1. Organised crime infiltration
2. Underground economy
3. Cash-intensiveness
4. Opacity of business ownership
Another model is developed including a further risk 
factor, business profitability (the more profitable, the 
more vulnerable to ML).
• As in the territory analysis, risk factors are com-
bined in a composite indicator of ML risk
• According to the model, the economic sector 
in Italy with the highest ML risk are bars and 
restaurants (NACE division I 56): it is a tradition-
al cash-intensive activity, but it shows also high 
levels of opacity of business ownership, irregular 
labour and mafia-type infiltration
• Divisions of NACE sector S come second. These 
include a variety of businesses, from repair ser-
vices, to personal service activities - like mas-
sage parlours, beauty centres and spas - but 
also security and investigation companies and 
fiduciary services
• Ranking high are R 92 (Gambling and betting 
agencies) and R 93 (recreational activities rang-
ing from VLT rooms to beach facilities – stabili-
menti balneari): both divisions are characterized 
by relatively high evidence of mafia-type infiltra-
tion and high opacity of business ownership
Main findings - Italy
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• Sectors related to the building industry sup-
ply-chain also show high ML risk: mining (NACE 
section B), cement production (NACE divisions C 
19 and C 23), construction (section F), landscap-
ing, architectural and civil engineering profession-
al businesses (divisions N 81, M 73 and M 71). 
Research and policy implications 
• The indicators produced by IARM respond to the 
need, stressed by regulatory developments at 
both EU and Italian level (see proposed changes 
to L. 231/2007, art. 15), to develop more objective 
and solid methodologies for ML risk assessment
• In particular they can be used by, for example:
-  Policy-makers, to support the design of more 
evidence-based and specific interventions
-  Investigators, to identify more easily anoma-
lies and emerging ML trends (if the exercise is 
repeated over time)
-  Obliged entities (e.g. banks or professionals), 
to facilitate customer due diligence (CDD) and 
assessment of clients’ risks
• However, IARM quantitative assessment should 
be combined with the qualitative approach ad-
opted by NRA 2014 and FATF MER 2016 in or-
der fully to appreciate ML risks in the country
• Future developments should improve data avail-
ability and quality, refine proxies for risk factors 
and explore alternative proxies and measure-
ment approaches.




Source: Transcrime - UCSC elaboration 
Source: Transcrime - UCSC elaboration 
Business sector (NACE division)
I 56. Food and beverage service activities
S 95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods
S 96. Other personal service activities
N 79. Travel agency tour operator reservation service and  related activities
R 92. Gambling and betting activities
R 90. Creative arts and entertainment activities
P 85. Education
A 03. Fishing and aquaculture
M 74. Other professional scientific and technical activities














ML risk – first 10 NACE divisions 
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In recent years, the understanding of money laun-
dering risks in Italy (and of the effectiveness of AML 
countermeasures) has benefited greatly from two re-
ports (see box below):
• The National Risk Assessment (NRA) pub-
lished in December 2014 (CSF, 2014a);
• The FATF mutual evaluation report (MER) 
published in February 2016 as a result of the mu-
tual evaluation process conducted in 2015-2016 
(FATF, 2016a).
IARM builds on these two exercises. It complements 
the NRA and provides an added value by incorporat-
ing some innovative elements:
• It adopts a sub-national disaggregation, while 
the NRA has only used a national approach;
• It covers all the economic sectors, while the 
NRA does not adopt a sectorial perspective;
• It stresses the quantitative approach, ultimate-
ly producing a composite indicator of ML risk. 
The combination of the findings of IARM, the NRA 2014 
and the MER 2016 could contribute to more in-depth 
knowledge on how ML risks develop in the country and 
vary across areas and economic activities.
The Italian ML NRA 2014 and the MER 2016
The first ML National Risk Assessment (NRA) 
was carried out in 2014, in compliance with FATF 
Recommendation no. 1, by the Financial Secu-
rity Committee (CSF - Comitato di Sicurezza 
Finanziaria). It involved supervisory authorities, 
the FIU, LEAs, financial institutions, profession-
als, the national statistical office (ISTAT), the pri-
vate sector and academics (CSF, 2014b, p. 2). 
The Italian NRA has encompassed: 
• An assessment of the inherent ML and TF 
risks through identification of threats to and 
vulnerabilities of the socio-economic system;
• An assessment of the effectiveness of the 
AML/CFT regime at preventive, investiga-
tive and enforcement levels and focusing 
on the categories of entities subject to AML/
CFT obligations (financial intermediaries, 
professionals, non-financial operators).
On the other side, The Fourth Round FATF 
Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) of Italy was 
published in February 2016 as a result of the 
AML/CFT assessment conducted by the IMF 
in 2015 (including on-site visits). The report, in 
line with the FATF approach, assesses a) the 
country’s level of compliance with the 40 FATF 
Recommendations and b) the level of effective-
ness of its AML/CFT system. 
According to the MER, Italy faces significant 
ML risks but has a “mature and sophisticat-
ed AML/CFT regime, with a correspondingly 
well-developed legal and institutional frame-
work” (FATF, 2016a, p. 19). In particular, as re-
gards technical compliance, Italy is evaluated 
as compliant - see taxonomy in (FATF, 2013b, 
p. 5) - with 10 Recommendations; largely com-
pliant with 26; partially compliant with 4 recom-
mendations. No recommendations are rated as 
non-compliant (FATF, 2016a, p. 14). In terms of 
effectiveness, 11 aspects were rated from high 
to low, with the result of 8 aspects with substan-
tial effectiveness and 3 with moderate effective-
ness (see Methodological Annex).
Both the NRA and MER exercises stress that 
ML inherent risks in Italy are related to three 
main issues: tax crimes, serious and organ-
ised crime (with a key role of corruption) and 
the cash-intensive nature of the domestic 
economy (CSF, 2014a, p. 12; FATF, 2016a, p. 
17). All these factors emerge clearly also from 
the IARM statistical analysis as major threats 
and vulnerabilities in the country.
2.1 Introduction and background
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The idea behind this chapter, as with the whole IARM 
approach, is that the overall ML risk of a given Italian 
province or business sector is a function of the lev-
el of the ML risk factors in that area or sector. The 
composite indicator of ML risk at province and busi-
ness sector level is developed following the 7 meth-
odological steps described in Chapter 1. They are 
illustrated in detail below. 
STEP 1 – ML RISK FACTORS 
IDENTIFICATION
ML risk factors (henceforth RF) across Italian regions 
are identified on the basis of a review of academic 
literature, institutional reports, investigative and 
judicial evidence, and then validated by means of 
interviews with experts. Although the starting list of 
RF suggested by FATF and the relevant literature 
(see (FATF, 2013a; Dawe, 2013), is very long, the 
analysis reported here focuses on those which:
• are particularly important in the Italian context;
• allow for in-depth analysis because of data avail-
ability.
Identified RF are classified according to the FATF taxon-
omy (Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences – see 
Chapter 1) and conceived in a tree-structure (risk di-
mensions, risk factors, proxy variables) which is depict-
ed in the chart below. As mentioned, the focus is posed 
on threats and vulnerabilities, while consequences 
are not included in the analysis (see Chapter 1). 
Figure 4– ML risk factors and proxy variables at sub-national area level in Italy
2.2 Analysis at sub-national area level
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STEP 2 – ML RISK FACTORS 
OPERATIONALISATION
Each risk dimension, and in particular each risk factor, 
is operationalised into one or more proxy variables 
in order to allow for their measurement and analysis. 
Proxies have been identified according to previous lit-
erature and data availability, and are illustrated in the 
table below (see Annex for details). 
Some phenomena which are stressed by the liter-
ature as important RF for money laundering in Italy 
18.  For example, estimates of the illegal revenues produced by extortion 
exist at the national level (see (Lisciandra, 2014; Transcrime, 2013)) 
but not at regional level. The same applies to usury (see (Scaglione, 
2014). Available measures at sub-national level, such as administra-
tive or judicial statistics on people reported to the police, prosecuted 
or sentenced, are considered unreliable for these offences due to 
the high dark number and data variability. As regards corruption, no 
reliable measures exist at the regional level. The on-going victimis-
– such as corruption, usury, extortion (see (CSF, 
2014b; FATF, 2016a) – are not included in the mod-
el because of the lack of measures and estimates at 
sub-national level.18
Money laundering threats
Threats are identified starting from the predicate of-
fences listed by the FATF (FATF, 2013a), reported in 
the 4th AMLD (Directive 2015/849, Art. 3) and by the 
CSF in the latest NRA (CSF, 2014a).










































































































ation survey conducted by ISTAT (ISTAT, 2016b) could in the future 
provide key indications of how this phenomenon varies across terri-
tories in the country. However, given that corruption in Italy is strictly 
related to infiltration in public procurement (Fazekas, Sberna, & Van-
nucci, 2016; Fondazione Res, 2014; Transcrime, 2013), it is partially 
covered in the model because of the inclusion of a wide variety of 
measures of organised crime and mafia infiltration in the legitimate 
economy and in the public administration. 
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19. See e.g. the Qian Liu and Qian Ba operations against Chinese OCGs 
which revealed extensive ML schemes and illicit financial flows from 



























No reliable estimates at sub-national area level






















Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
Organised crime
Organised crime is widely recognized as one of the 
main ML RF in the country (FATF, 2016a, p. 6; CSF, 
2014a; DIA, 2015; Visco, 2015). Although constant-
ly evolving, it can be classified into two categories: 
indigenous OC groups, with a predominant role of 
Italian mafias, and foreign groups, in particular Chi-
nese-speaking and Eastern European OC (Becuc-
ci & Carchedi, 2016; DIA, 2015; Ministero dell’Interno, 
2014; Varese, 2001). Both play a major role in illicit 
markets; but, with some exceptions,19 most evidence 
on ML activity is related to Italian mafias (DIA, 2015, 
2014, DNA, 2014, 2013). It is therefore on the latter 
that the analysis is focused. In particular mafia-type 
OC is analysed with respect to two sub-dimensions: 
presence and infiltration in the legal economy. 
Building on previous exercises (Calderoni, 2011; 
Transcrime, 2013; Fondazione Res, 2011; Asmundo, 
2011), mafia presence is measured in terms of ma-
fia homicides and attempted homicides (representing 
the violent component of mafias) and the number of 
people reported to the police because of mafia asso-
ciation (Art. 416-bis of the penal code). In both cases, 
southern provinces (especially in Calabria) show the 
highest levels. 
The mafia infiltration component is instead mea-
sured through three proxy variables:
• the number of city councils and public agencies 
dissolved due to mafia infiltration (Calderoni, 
2011; Transcrime, 2013; Barone & Narciso, 
2012; Coniglio, Celi, & Scagliusi, 2010), as a 
measure of infiltration in the public administra-
tion; 
• the number of real estate assets confiscated 
from mafia groups, as a measure of investments 
in the real estate sector (Transcrime, 2013; Du-
gato, Giommoni, & Favarin, 2015);
• the number of confiscated companies as a mea-
sure of infiltration in legitimate businesses 
(Riccardi, Soriani, et al., 2016; Riccardi, 2014; 
Transcrime, 2013).
Also in this case ratios are higher in southern Italy, con-
firming a strict relationship between mafia presence 
and investment/infiltration (Riccardi, 2014; Transcrime, 
2013; Pinotti, 2015). However, also some areas in the 
north (especially in Lombardy, Liguria, Piedmont and 
Emilia-Romagna) record high ratios. It is widely ac-
knowledged, by both scholars and public officials, that 
infiltration in non-traditional regions has increased 
as a result of the transplantation of mafia groups fol-
lowing business opportunities, in particular large-scale 
public works (Riccardi, Soriani, et al., 2016; Balsamo, 
2016; CROSS, 2015; Fondazione Res, 2014).
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Figure 5 - Confiscated companies (left) and confiscated real estate (right)
Ratio on registered companies (2004-2014) and registered houses (2009-2012). 
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ANBSC – DIA data
Illicit markets
The volume of illicit markets in Italy is significant and 
constitutes a major ML threat in the country (FATF, 
2016a). As measures at sub-national level, esti-
mates of the illicit revenues generated by these 
markets at the retail level are used, on the ratio-
nale that the higher the volume of illicit proceeds in a 
certain region, the higher the ML risk in that region.20 
Unfortunately it is not possible to use the recent es-
timates produced by ISTAT (ISTAT, 2016a) on three 
main illicit markets (drugs, illicit tobacco and prostitu-
tion) because they are only available at the national 
level. Therefore the estimates produced by Tran-
scrime in 2013 (Transcrime, 2013; Calderoni, 2014a; 
Calderoni et al., 2014; Giommoni, 2014; Mancuso, 
2014) on four illicit markets (illicit drugs – including 
cannabis, cocaine, heroin, synthetic drugs – ITTP, 
counterfeiting and sexual exploitation) are preferred. 
They are the one closest to official ISTAT figures,21 
they have a regional (NUTS 2) disaggregation level; 
and they adopt a common methodological approach 
(see Annex for details). They are reported in the table 
below.
In terms of volume, Lombardy is the biggest illicit 
market (considering drugs, sexual exploitation, ITTP 
and counterfeiting) with an annual average of about 
2 billion euro illicit revenues. In terms of % on GDP, 
Campania records the highest value (1.2%). This re-
gion plays a crucial role in the production of illegal 
goods such as counterfeits (UNODC, 2014) but it is 
also an important hub (especially the port of Naples) 
for the trafficking of drugs and illicit tobacco, with 
a key role played by Camorra groups (Calderoni, 
2014a; KPMG, 2015; Transcrime, 2015). 
20. Obviously, proceeds generated in one region could be laundered 
in other areas. However, taking cross-regional flows into account 
is very difficult given the available data. As mentioned in Chapter 
1, the inclusion of illicit market variables is therefore based on the 
assumption that illicit proceeds are laundered locally. Other vari-
ables included in the PCA model will help to mitigate the effect of 
this strong assumption. Estimates of illicit revenues are preferred to 
other variables available at sub-national level like administrative or 
judicial statistics (e.g. number of people arrested for drug trafficking 
or sexual exploitation, amount of drugs seized, etc.) because the 
latter are heavily influenced by dark figure biases and geographical 
patterns (e.g. seizures are higher in areas with ports, airports or at 
foreign borders) (Levi & van Duyne, 2005; Maguire, 2002; Calderoni, 
2014b; Robert, 2009).
21. Transcrime estimates of drugs, prostitution and ITTP are close to 12 
billion euros (0.7% GDP) versus 17 billion euros estimated by ISTAT 
(1% GDP).
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Table 7 – Estimates of the revenues of four illicit markets across Italian regions 
Illicit drugs (annual average 2008-2012), counterfeiting (2008), ITTP (annual average 2009-2012) and sexual 
exploitation (annual average 2004-2009). Midpoint estimates
Region
















Abruzzo 64.1 0.20% 10.5 0.03% 98.9 0.31% 85.3 0.27% 258.8 0.81%
Basilicata 19.3 0.18% 7.6 0.07% 33.4 0.31% 36.2 0.33% 96.5 0.89%
Calabria 86.2 0.27% 10.6 0.03% 119.6 0.38% 43.6 0.14% 259.9 0.82%
Campania 399.8 0.41% 157.0 0.16% 425.4 0.44% 143.2 0.15% 1125.4 1.16%
Emilia-
Romagna
235.3 0.16% 34.5 0.02% 372.8 0.26% 147.0 0.10% 789.7 0.54%
Friuli - V. G. 43.4 0.12% 15.8 0.04% 121.4 0.34% 170.9 0.48% 351.5 0.98%
Lazio 261.4 0.14% 55.1 0.03% 434.3 0.23% 520.9 0.28% 1271.7 0.68%
Liguria 128.7 0.27% 13.8 0.03% 123.8 0.26% 152.3 0.32% 418.6 0.88%
Lombardy 676.6 0.19% 124.4 0.04% 771.5 0.22% 478.9 0.13% 2051.3 0.58%
Marche 74.9 0.19% 16.0 0.04% 102.9 0.26% 111.6 0.28% 305.3 0.77%
Molise 19.3 0.31% 3.8 0.06% 18.9 0.30% 16.6 0.26% 58.5 0.93%
Piedmont 285.5 0.22% 46.8 0.04% 295.9 0.23% 239.7 0.19% 867.9 0.68%
Apulia 188.7 0.27% 31.4 0.05% 256.8 0.37% 102.0 0.15% 579.0 0.84%
Sardinia 129.6 0.40% 16.1 0.05% 101.0 0.31% 33.4 0.10% 280.1 0.86%
Sicily 193.3 0.23% 30.2 0.04% 307.6 0.36% 126.6 0.15% 657.6 0.78%
Tuscany 175.6 0.16% 26.3 0.02% 283.8 0.26% 166.3 0.15% 652.0 0.59%
Trentino / 
Alto-Adige
51.9 0.04% 8.2 0.05% 79.4 0.00% 96.6 0.07% 236.1 0.16%
Umbria 38.4 0.18% 8.5 0.04% 60.5 0.00% 134.7 0.62% 242.1 0.84%
Valle 
D’Aosta
10.9 0.24% 1.1 0.02% 8.0 0.00% 12.1 0.27% 32.1 0.53%
Veneto 224.2 0.15% 44.8 0.03% 525.7 0.00% 263.6 0.18% 1058.3 0.36%
ITALY 3307.1 0.21% 662.7 0.04% 4541.3 0.24% 3081.4 0.23% 11592.4 0.72%
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration on Giommoni, 2014; Calderoni et al., 2014; Calderoni, 2014a; Mancuso, 2014. 
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Tax evasion (and underground economy)
According to FATF MER and NRA (FATF, 2016a, 
p. 17; CSF, 2014a), tax evasion is the main “pro-
ceeds-generating crime” in Italy. It is therefore a 
major ML threat. However, it is also one of the prox-
ies for the underground economy, which, in the litera-
ture on ML risk assessment is often considered to be 
a vulnerability because it facilitates the concealment 
of illicit proceeds (FATF, 2013a; Dawe, 2013; Ardizzi, 
Petraglia, Piacenza, & Turati, 2014; Schneider, 2013).
Tax  evasion
According to Confindustria, total tax and contributions 
evasion in Italy amounted to 122 billion euros in 2015, 
equivalent to 7.5% of GDP (CSC, 2015), a figure in 
line with the estimates provided by ISTAT on the under-
ground economy (see below). The highest contribution 
is related to VAT evasion. A study by CASE & CPB  in-
dicates that Italy‘s VAT gap averaged 26% of the total 
VAT theoretical liability in the period 2000-2011 (CASE 
& CPB, 2013, pp. 62–63), which puts Italy in the clus-
ter of EU MS with the highest VAT evasion (together 
with Romania, Lithuania, Slovakia and Greece). 
Table 8 – Tax evasion by type





Other indirect taxes 11,402 0.7
IRPEF (personal income tax) 23,449 1.4
IRES (corporate tax) 5,188 0.3
IRAP (regional corporate tax) 3,052 0.2
Local taxes 4,881 0.3
Social contributions 34,418 2.1
Total Tax Evasion 122,208 7.5
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of CSC (2015:77) 
Corruption, extortion and usury
These crimes play an important role in terms of 
money laundering in Italy (CSF, 2014). Howev-
er, they are not included in the model because 
of difficulties in finding appropriate and reliable 
measures at sub-national level. They are there-
fore discussed briefly below.
Corruption
Corruption is related to ML both as a predicate 
offence (bribes and monetary benefits which 
are laundered in the legal economy) and a facil-
itator (e.g. corruption of a bank official to ease 
the deposit of illicit funds).
In Italy, corruption cases are very often, but not 
exclusively, related to public procurement 
(Transcrime, 2013; Caneppele, 2014; Fondazi-
one Res, 2014; Fazekas et al., 2016). Despite 
large-scale judicial investigations in the past 
(first of all the Mani Pulite investigation in the 
1990s – see Della Porta & Vannucci, 2007; 
Vannucci, 2009) and the introduction of a new 
National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) in 
2014, bribery cases are still numerous in public 
tenders, contracts, and the supply of products 
and services to local and central public agencies 
(Golden & Picci, 2006; Mariani, 2015).
Although not overlapping, in Italy there is a close 
relationship between corruption and criminal in-
filtration of public procurement. Not by chance, 
the economic sectors with the highest infiltration 
levels are those with the largest amounts of pub-
lic expenditure and procurement - e.g. NACE 
Sections B, E and F. In this sense, corruption as 
a ML threat is (only) partially covered in the mod-
el by including measures of organised crime. 
Extortion and Usury
Extortion and usury play a pivotal role in 
the economy of Italian Mafias and of foreign 
OCGs, producing a large amount of illicit pro-
ceeds (Lisciandra, 2014; Becucci & Carchedi, 
2016). According to estimates at regional level, 
the revenues from extortion in Campania ac-
count for 30% of all the illicit money earned from 
racketeering in the country as a whole (Di Genn-
aro & La Spina, 2010). Also usury represents 
a significant source of illicit proceeds. It has in-
creased in recent years due to the economic cri-
sis, benefiting OC groups which have turned to 
be lending channels for businesses in financial 
distress (Marinaro, 2016). According to a recent 
study, section G (Wholesale & Retail) and sec-
tion F (Construction) are the business sectors 
which suffer the most from extortion in terms of 
revenues in Italy (Rusev et al., 2016, p. 200). 
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At sub-national level, tax evasion is operationalized 
through the tax gap reported by the Italian Revenue 
Agency - Agenzia delle Entrate (Argentiero, Chiarini, 
& Marzano, 2015; Braiotta, Pisani, & Pisano, 2012).22 
The map below shows the average tax gap at provin-
cial level in 2001-2009 (data are made available only 
for this period). The highest levels are recorded in 
southern provinces, with Vibo Valentia and Agrigen-
to ranking highest. Also some areas of northwestern 
Italy (e.g. the provinces of Imperia, Savona, Vercelli) 
show high levels. Important information at regional 
level can be derived also from the cluster analysis 
carried out by the Agenzia delle Entrate in 2015 (Car-
bone & Spingola, 2015), which groups the 110 Italian 
provinces according to tax evasion patterns. 
Figure 6 - Average Tax gap  (2001 – 2009)
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration on Agenzia delle Entrate 
data
Underground economy
Tax evasion is, with irregular labour, the main compo-
nent of the so-called underground economy (which, 
with illegal activities, constitutes the non-observed 
economy – EUROSTAT, 2015). ISTAT estimates the 
underground economy at about 200 billion euros, 
representing on average 13.1% of Italian value added 
in the period 2011-2014 (with an increasing trend). Of 
this figure, 51.4% is attributable to under-declaration 
and 38.2% to irregular labour (ISTAT, 2016a).
Table 9 - Underground economy components as 
% of Italian Added Value (2011 – 2014)
2011 2012 2013 2014
Under-
declaration1 
6.4% 6.8% 6.9% 6.8%
Irregular 
Labour 
4.8% 4.9% 5.0% 5.3%
Other 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2%
% Italian 
added value
12.7% 13.1% 13.2% 13.3%
Source: Transcrime-UCSC elaboration of ISTAT (2016)   
1 Under-declaration is a sub-category of tax evasion and refers to 
the concealment of income by deliberately misreporting revenues 
and/or costs (“omissione contributiva”)
Information on irregular labour is available at both re-
gional (NUTS 2) and business sector level (see be-
low). Southern Italian regions have the highest ratios 
of irregular labourers (lavoro nero) to the total number 
of employees (with Campania (23.4%) and Calabria 
(21.2%) in the top positions). Among northern regions 
only Liguria (12.1%) and Friuli Venezia Giulia (10.5%) 
record ratios higher than 10%.
22. The tax gap estimated by the Italian Revenue Agency can be defined 
as the difference between the potential tax levy and the tax that is actu-
ally paid. The agency adopts a top-down approach based on compar-
ison between tax data and national account figures provided by ISTAT 
(for more details see Argentiero, Chiarini & Marzano, 2015, p. 33). No 
details at regional level on the components of tax gap are available. 
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Money laundering vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are identified on the basis of the liter-
ature on ML NRA, of available data and proxies at 
sub-national level (see Chapter 1). They are listed 
and discussed below.






















































































































Control variables and ML measures – used to validate the indicator
ML 
measures
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a Variables ending with “_w” are weighted for the average company size in the area so as to control for the presence of multinational companies (see 
below and Annex for details)
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
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Cash-intensiveness
As described in Chapter 1, cash-based economies 
are more vulnerable to money laundering. Cash is 
a facilitator for committing crimes (first of all tax eva-
sion) and for concealing and laundering the proceeds 
of crime (Riccardi & Levi, 2017; Europol, 2015; U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2015; Soudijn & Reuter, 
2016). Italy is one of the EU MS with the highest levels 
of cash use (see table below), which therefore rep-
resents a major ML vulnerability in the country (CSF, 
2014a, p. 8). The use of alternative (and more trace-
able) payment methods is still infrequent, even though 
the diffusion of point of sales (POS) terminals in Italy 
is the second highest in Europe (see Table 12 below 
- ECB, 2016), whose use, however, may be hampered 
by the high fees for merchants and retailers.
In order to reduce the use of cash, in recent years 
the maximum threshold for cash payments has been 
revised down from 12,500 euros in 2008 to 1,000 eu-
ros. Since 1 January 2016, cash payments are only 
allowed up to 3,000 euros (Legge di Stabilità, 2016). 
The same law has also introduced requirements on 
merchants and professionals to accept payments 
with debit and credit cards, although implementation 
decrees have not yet been introduced.
Table 11 - % purchases made in cash by price range
< 20 euros 30 - 100 euros 200 - 1000 euros > 10.000 euros
Europe 87% 55% 20% 4%
Belgium 84% 48% 18% 5%
Germany 91% 69% 21% 4%
Spain 90% 64% 30% 6%
France 80% 15% 3% 0%
Italy 91% 77% 31% 4%
Luxembourg 77% 27% 10% 3%
Netherlands 65% 20% 8% 4%
Austria 82% 60% 29% 10%
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ECB (2011) 
Table 12 – Number of POS terminals provided by resident payment service providers
Ratio on population. First 10 EU countries - 2015











EU AREA (median) 18,758.47
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ECB (2016: 54)
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The level of cash use across Italian provinces is mea-
sured through three different proxies:
• The so-called cash-ratio (Ardizzi & Iachini, 
2013);23
• The number of POS per capita;
• The amount of bank deposits as % of the GDP;
While the first two are indirect measures of cash use 
(versus other payment methods like credit and debit 
cards), the third can be taken as a measure of the de-
gree of integration of citizens’ wealth in the financial 
system (Ardizzi & Iachini, 2013; Ardizzi et al., 2014). 
The assumption is that the higher the cash-ratio, the 
lower the number of POS per capita; and the lower 
the % of bank deposits on GDP, the higher the ML 
risk. 
Sardinia (especially the provinces of Ogliastra, 
Carbonia-Iglesias and Sassari) and Calabria (Cro-
tone, Vibo Valentia) are the regions with the highest 
cash-ratio (in the period 2011-2015). These spatial 
patterns are confirmed by that of POS distribution 
and of bank deposits, where southern Italian provinc-
es (especially Calabrian ones) show low figures. 
The extent of cash use may be determined both by 
legal factors (e.g. the share of elderly people, the na-
ture of the local business structure) and illegal ones 
(e.g. the level of tax evasion and underground econ-
omy). A recent study by the Bank of Italy (Ardizzi, De 
Franceschis, & Giammatteo, 2016) on ‘anomalous’ 
cash use shows a negative correlation between cash 
adoption and level of education and financial litera-
cy: “confidence in alternative payment instruments, 
being positively correlated with higher general edu-
cation and financial literacy, leads to a lower use of 
cash” (Ardizzi et al., 2016, p. 21) but a positive cor-
relation with criminal intensity and money-laundering 
measures.
23. Cash-ratio is an indirect proxy for cash use. It measures the ratio be-
tween the economic value of ATM withdrawals, taken as a proxy for 
cash use, and the sum of the total value of POS operations (i.e. with 
Figure 7 Cash-ratio (average 2011-2015)
Opacity of business ownership structure
The opacity of corporate structures, although widely 
acknowledged as a key ML vulnerability (see Chap-
ter 1 - (FATF, 2016b, 2014a; ECOLEF, 2013; Riccardi 
& Savona, 2013; de Willebois et al., 2011) is very 
hard to operationalise and measure. IARM focuses 
on two sub-dimensions:
• The level of complexity of Italian businesses’ 
ownership structure as such;
• The volume of business ownership connections 
with shareholders and BOs from risky jurisdic-
tions.
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ABI data
credit and debit cards) with ATM withdrawals (Ardizzi & Iachini, 2013). 
For the purposes of this study only operations with debit cards are 
considered.  
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24. BOs in the BvD definition are the individual(s) who ultimately own or 
control a company or other legal entity. BvD identifies them by recon-
structing the ownership chain until finding natural persons holding 
above a certain shareholding. For the purpose of this study, it has been 
decided to set the minimum threshold at 10% of the shareholding at 
the first level of the company ownership chain and 10% at further lev-
els. The threshold adopted is lower than that indicated by the current 
EU Directive’s definition (25%) but allows for a more comprehensive 
analysis. When BO distance equals 1, the company is directly con-
trolled by its BO(s) (see Annex for details).
Level of complexity of Italian businesses’ owner-
ship structure
A good measure of business ownership complexity is 
the so-called BO distance, provided by Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD), which represents the number of ‘steps’ 
which separate a company from its beneficial own-
er(s).24 The greater the BO distance, the more com-
plex the ownership structure, and the higher the ML 
risk. A higher complexity makes it more difficult to 
trace actual beneficial owners, who can more easily 
conceal illicit funds. Information on the BO distance 
of Italian companies is collected and then aggregat-
ed for each registered company; averages have been 
then computed by area or business sector. 
On average, each of the 3.7 million Italian companies 
in the database has 1.42 shareholders, a value lower 
than in other EU MS. The figure would be even lower 
after including other types of legal forms like unlim-
ited companies or individual enterprises (not widely 
covered by the dataset). Moreover, the average BO 
distance is close to one (1.21)25 which denotes, gen-
erally, a simple and almost direct control of Italian 
companies. Indeed, more than 50% of Italian compa-
nies are individual enterprises.
Despite this general pattern, the complexity of the 
business ownership structure varies across regions 
and business sectors. Large urban provinces and ar-
eas on foreign borders are usually characterized by 
greater BO distance (e.g. Imperia 1.5, Savona 1.4, 
Bolzano and Milano 1.4). This may be due to the 
higher number of FDI and multinational companies. 
For this reason, in order to control for the effect of 
multinationals and identify the actual anomalies, the 
BO distance in each area is weighted by the average 
company size in that area (see Annex for details). As 
a result, the scores of large urban areas decrease, 
while provinces on the border still rank high (see map 
below). In the south, Catanzaro ranks high, represent-
ing an outlier with respect to other southern areas.
Table 13 – Data on ownership of Italian businesses, by nationality of shareholder and BO
25. This value is calculated as the average BO distance across Italian 
provinces. It is 1.34 if calculated as the average across Italian busi-
ness sectors (see Chapter 5)
26.  Although the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) AIDA and ORBIS databases cover 
almost the entire universe of the 6 million Italian companies, ownership 
information is available only for about 3.7 million companies, i.e. those 
legal forms (like limited companies) which are required to file owner-





N. Companies26 - - - 3,669,902
N. Shareholders 2,542,091 (48.7%) 44,971 (0.9%) 2,634,204 (50.5%) 5,221,265
  N. Legal person shareholders 404,834 29,733 - 434,566
  % Legal persons/Tot. Shareholders 15.9% 66.1% - 16.8%
N. Beneficial Owners 1,994,735 (42.4%) 26,500 (0.6%) 2,687,697 (57.1%) 4,708,932
Ratio Shareholders/Companies - - - 1.4
Ratio Beneficial owners/Companies - - - 1.3
Ratio Shareholders/Beneficial 
owners
1.3 1.7 1.0 1.1
Beneficial ownership distance (av-
erage)
- - - 1.2
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data
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Another proxy for complexity is the percentage of legal 
persons among shareholders. The higher the number of 
companies as shareholders, the more difficult it is to trace 
the ultimate owner. Legal persons27 represent 16.8% of 
the total number of shareholders of Italian companies. It 
is interesting to note that the percentage is much low-
er among Italian shareholders (15.9%) than foreign 
ones (66.1%). In particular, according to the data pro-
vided by BvD, there are no natural person sharehold-
ers from San Marino (100% are legal entities) while 
Luxembourg (98.7%), Cyprus (98.1%), Liechtenstein 
(95.2%) show similar patterns (Table 8). Notably, the per-
centage of natural persons among Swiss shareholders 
is significant (28.7%) and can also refer to Italian individ-
uals who have moved their tax residence to Switzerland.






































Business ownership connections with risky juris-
dictions
The connections with ‘risky jurisdictions’ can be un-
derstood by considering the average level of risk and 
opacity of the nationalities of shareholders and BOs 
of Italian companies. In order to calculate it, the % of 
foreign shareholders and BOs in each province and in 
each business sector is multiplied by an indicator of 
opacity and low transparency (the Secrecy Score 
of the Financial Secrecy Index, henceforth FSS).28
28. The Secrecy Score is a component of the Financial Secrecy Index 
(FSI) developed by the Tax Justice Network. It is a composite indicator 
which evaluates different dimensions of secrecy in the financial sector 
and in the legislation of selected jurisdictions. In particular, it evaluates: 
A)  the level of banking secrecy; B) access to beneficial ownership 
information; C) corporate transparency; D) efficiency of tax and finan-
cial regulation; E) compliance with international standards; F) interna-
tional cooperation (Tax Justice Network, 2015). For further details see 
Chapter 5 and Annex. The secrecy score has been preferred to other 
measures of risky jurisdictions (e.g. international or national blacklists) 
because of its independency and transparency of the evaluation meth-
odology. For the purpose of the study the acronym  FSS is used.
27. BvD distinguishes among 15 types of shareholders: Insurance com-
pany; Bank, Trade & Industry organisation; Nameless private stock-
holders; Mutual & Pension fund / Nominee / Trust / Trustee, Financial 
company; One or more named individuals or families; Foundation / 
Research Institute; Other named shareholders; Employees/Manag-
ers/Directors; Private Equity firms; Public authority/State/Government; 
Venture Capital; Hedge funds and Public (Publicly listed companies). 
Legal persons are here considered to be all types of shareholders ex-
cluding individuals and families.
Figure 8 – Average BO distance across Italian 
province
Weighted by average company size
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data
Figure 9 - % legal person shareholders on total 
shareholders by nationality
Selected nationalities with at least 20 shareholders. In 
brackets number of shareholders by each nationality 
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration on BvD data
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This indicator was used also in previous studies 
(Cassetta, Pauselli, Rizzica, & Tonello, 2014; Gara & 
De Franceschis, 2015; Riccardi, Milani, & Campedel-
li, 2016). In particular, each nationality is weighted by 
the relevant value of the FSS, and again corrected 
with a measure of company size to control for the 
presence of multinational companies (see Annex for 
details).
At area level, the provinces with highest risk score for 
shareholders are Imperia, Bolzano, Como and Go-
rizia. For beneficial owners, they are Catanzaro, Im-
peria, L’Aquila and Bolzano. Again, border areas rank 
high even after controlling for average company size.
Foreign shareholders represent only 1% of the total 
number of shareholders in Italy (1.7% excluding those 
with no information on nationality - see the above 
table). Italy registers much lower percentages than 
other EU MS (e.g. among IARM countries: 7.8% of 
shareholders of Dutch companies are foreign, 9.1% 
of UK ones). 
Switzerland is the first nationality represented 
(5,115 between natural and legal persons, 11.4% of all 
foreign shareholders) followed by Germany, UK, US, 
France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. These na-
tionalities also rank high when considering only legal 
person shareholders (see Annex). In terms of BOs, 
surprisingly the most frequent nationality is Spain, 
followed by Germany and Switzerland. Spanish BOs 
are numerous in various provinces (e.g. Catanzaro, 
L’Aquila, Vercelli, Milan or Bolzano) a situation which 
is not easy to explain and warrants further research 
(see box below for some possible interpretations).
 
Figure 10 – Level of business ownership connections with risky jurisdictions
Shareholders’ risk score (left) and BOs’ risk score (right). Weighted by average company size
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD and TJN data
60
On considering the ratio between shareholders and 
beneficial owners, the statistics change substantially. 
The jurisdictions at the top are Liechtenstein, Lux-
embourg and Netherlands. It can be assumed that 
the higher the ratio, the more likely it is that companies 
established in that country play a role as holding com-
panies to respond to tax optimisation and other corpo-
rate drivers.
Figure 12 – Ratio shareholders/BOs of Italian 
companies
First 10 nationalities with highest value





















Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data
The anomalous number of Spanish 
beneficial owners
According to BvD data, the most represented 
nationality among foreign BOs in Italy is Span-
ish: 21.7% of total foreign beneficial owners 
(see Figure 7). This number is difficult to explain 
because it does not fully mirror the relatively 
low volume of FDI from Spain, nor the size of 
the Spanish community in Italy.
Although, in terms of absolute values, Milan and 
Rome record the highest number of Spanish 
BOs, values are  relatively higher in South-
ern provinces, especially Catanzaro (95% 
of total foreign BOs), L’Aquila (87.2%), Nuoro 
(66.7%), Caserta (65.3%) and Naples (64.0%).
Spanish BOs are very numerous in divi-
sions R92 (Gambling and betting activities), 
E36 (Water collection, treatment and supply), 
C18 (Printing and reproduction of recorded me-
dia) and F42 (civil engineering). To be noted is 
that, in the gambling sector, recent investiga-
tions have revealed that mafia organisations 
(especially Camorra, but also ‘Ndrangheta) 
Figure 11 – Foreign shareholders and BOs by na-
tionality
First 10 nationalities (% of total foreign shareholders 
and BOs)
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% Spanish BOs/ 
Foreign BOs
R 92. Gambling and betting 
activities
86.6%
E 36. Water collection, treat-
ment and supply
85.7%
C 18. Printing and reproduc-
tion of media
78.8%
F 42. Civil engineering 75.4%
C 10. Manufacture of food 
products
74.0%
D 35. Electricity, gas and air 
conditioning supply
71.6%
R 93. Sports activities and 
amusement 
58.4%
N 81. Services to buildings 
and landscape activities
52.2%
K 64. Financial service 
activities
47.7%
J 61. Telecommunications 43.8%
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data
Other ML vulnerabilities
Money transfers
Other ML vulnerabilities considered by the analysis 
are the volume of money remittances and the pres-
ence of transit hubs. As regards the former, according 
to experts, remittance services and money trans-
fer businesses (MTBs) can be misused for ML or TF 
purposes (CSF, 2014a; FATF, 2016c). In particular it 
is stressed that the distribution of MTBs outside the 
financial sector (e.g. travel agencies, bars, tobacco 
shops, internet points and call centres, etc.) may make 
thorough monitoring more difficult (Clemente, 2016; 
Maresca, 2016; CSF, 2014a, p. 23). Moreover, the 
complex and fragmented EU regulatory framework 
in the money transfer domain makes it often difficult for 
Italian authorities to monitor those EU intermediaries 
which operate in the country but are subject to foreign 
agencies’ supervision (home-country control principle). 
In this regard, to be noted is that in recent years nu-
merous intermediaries (IP – istituti di pagamento) have 
relocated outside Italy (keeping local agencies in the 
country), being induced to do so by lower compliance 
requirements and tax advantages (Clemente, 2016, p. 
6-8).
In terms of average value of money remittances as % 
GDP, besides the biggest cities (Rome, Milan, Flor-
ence, Naples), Prato records the highest volume due 
to the high presence of Chinese businesses and na-
tionals, followed by Imperia.  
Transit hubs
Transit hubs are measured by means of a categor-
ical variable at province level taking into account the 
presence of ports and airports and of borders with 
non-EU countries, i.e. Switzerland, San Marino, Holy 
See (see Annex for details). It is assumed that the 
presence of these patterns – especially of ports and 
borders – can increase the risk of illicit financial flows 
such as cash-smuggling (DIA, 2015; DNA, 2014; Ber-
nasconi, 2012; MEF, 2014).
Table 14 – Spanish BOs in Italy
Top 10 divisions 
Last available year
have channelled and laundered money through 
companies established in Spain and Malta – as 
highlighted, for example, by the so-called “Gam-
bling” investigation (Vita, 2015). Also to be not-
ed is that the Camorra is very present in Spain 
(Palomo, Márquez, & Laguna, 2016) and, be-
sides betting agencies, also other sectors listed 
in the Table below - such as waste and water 
collection, manufacture of food products, con-
struction and building and landscape activities – 
have been frequently involved in investigations 
against the Camorra.
Although the link with organised crime could be 
a hypothesis to explain this anomaly, it should 
be considered that also in the other two IARM 
countries (Netherlands and UK) Spain is the 
most represented foreign jurisdiction with re-
spect to BOs. This figure should therefore be 
investigated further.
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All those presented above are indirect measures 
of ML risk. But are other proxies and evidence of 
ML available in Italy? And what do they tell us? 
A first measure to consider is the volume of 
STRs - suspicious transaction reports (SOS 
- segnalazioni operazioni sospette) issued by 
obliged entities in compliance with the national 
AML regulation, and in particular with Legisla-
tive Decree no. 231/2007. The Italian FIU (UIF 
– Unità di Informazione Finanziaria) produces 
periodic reports with detailed statistics on STRs, 
to which the reader is referred.
STRs have steadily increased in the past few 
years, rising from 67,047 in 2012 to 82,428 in 
2015. Although most of the reports are issued by 
banks and financial intermediaries (above 90%), 
the weight of professionals and other non-finan-
cial operators is growing (UIF, 2016b). Part of 
the increase in STRs by professionals may be 
related to the recent adoption of the so-called 
Voluntary Disclosure procedure (Law 15 De-
cember 2014, no. 186) (UIF, 2016a, 2016b)
The map (Figure 13) shows the number of 
STRs (average 2012-2014) weighted by the 
number of bank agencies (which, as discussed, 
issue more than 90% of all STRs in the country) 
across Italian provinces (by province of origin 
of the STR). Large urban areas (Rome, Milan, 
Naples, Turin) show higher ratios, along with 
southern regions. Also Prato and Imperia show 
high levels. This variable will be used to validate 
the composite indicator of ML risk (see Fig. 13).
Figure 13 - Suspicious transactions reports 
(STRs) per bank agency
Average 2012-2014. Italian provinces
Table 15 - Suspicious Transactions Reports (STRs) by category of obliged entity
STRs 2012 STRs 2013 STRs 2014 STRs 2015
Banks and financial 
intermediaries
64,677 96.5% 61,765 95.6% 68,220 95.1% 74,579 90.5%
Professionals 1,988 3.0% 1,985 3.1% 2,390 3.3% 5,979 7.3%
Non-financial operators 382 0.6% 851 1.3% 1,148 1.6% 1,864 2.3%
Other 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 6 0.0%
TOTAL STRs received 67,047 100% 64,601 100% 71,758 100% 82,428 100%
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration on Banca d’Italia – UIF data
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of Banca d’Italia – 
UIF data
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and judicial evidence on money laudering
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Also administrative statistics on money laun-
dering in Italy – and in particular data on ML 
offences recorded by the police or on people 
prosecuted/sentenced for ML – are available, but 
they only partially measure the problem. Money 
laundering (like other economic crimes such as 
corruption or usury) has a very high dark fig-
ure (FATF, 2015a; Unioncamere, 2013). Further-
more, until 2015 the Italian Criminal Code did 
not cover self-money laundering, and this had a 
strong impact in terms of the representativeness 
of crime statistics.  
Nevertheless, in recent years the number of ML 
offences has been steadily growing, register-
ing a 100% increase in a 10-year time span (from 
977 in 2004 to 1,825 in 2013; 3.1 on 100,000 in-
habitants). In particular, central Italy has recorded 
a 250% growth, while the upward trend in South-


















introduction of the self-laundering offence in 
the Italian Criminal Code (art. 648 ter. 1), it is 
possible that prosecutions and sentences for 
ML will increase further.
Figure 14 – ML offences per macro region. 
Index 2004=100
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ISTAT data
STEP 3 – DATA COLLECTION AND 
NORMALISATION
Data collection, cleaning, imputation of missing 
value, validation
For each identified proxy variable, data are collected 
from the relevant sources. When not publicly avail-
able, information was requested from the relevant 
authority, institution or data provider. In most cases, 
variables were already available at province (NUTS 
3) or region (NUTS 2) level. In other cases, for in-
stance business ownership, microdata (e.g. at indi-
vidual company level) are collected and then aggre-
gated by province or business sector.
Due to limited data availability, different variables are 
covered with different time spans. 2011 is the me-
dian year of the variables collected, but more than 
50% have data covering 2014 or 2015. Missing data 
across provinces are usually replaced with weighted 
averages of neighbouring provinces (see Annex for 
details).
Data transformation and normalisation
The IARM methodological approach relies on the 
concept of relative risk (see above), which means 
that the level of ML threats or vulnerabilities is weight-
ed for the size of the local population and/or the econ-
omy (e.g. ratio on the provincial GDP). The arithmetic 
mean of the ratios is then calculated for the available 
years.
STEP 4 – DATA EXPLORATION AND 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
All the RF discussed above help to understand ML 
risk components in Italy. However, if taken alone, they 
appear to be not very meaningful: in order to cap-
ture the overall risk, it is necessary to compare and 
combine all the components together in a syn-
thetic measure of ML risk. This is the aim of the 
next phases (Steps 4-7), where a composite indicator 
of ML risk, condensing all the ML threats and vulnera-
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In order to do so, ML RF variables are first explored 
through descriptive statistics and basic inference 
tests to identify specific patterns in the data. Several 
variables are characterized by outliers (e.g. some 
southern provinces with respect to organised crime 
measures). Since PCA is not constrained to any spe-
cific data distribution (OECD & JRC, 2008), variables 
are kept in their value without omitting outliers or treat-
ing data with smoothing/centring techniques. Then 
the analysis of correlation is carried out to understand 
if and which variables share common patterns. The 
linear Pearson correlation among the identified vari-
ables is presented in the correlogram below. Non-sig-
nificant correlation coefficients (α = 10%) are left 
blank, whereas the colours denote significant correla-
tions (green positive, red negative). The colour inten-
sity is stronger, the higher the correlation coefficient. 
It can be noted that most of the proxies for ML threats 
and vulnerabilities are generally positively and 
strongly correlated. Important ML vulnerabilities such 
as cash-intensiveness are closely correlated with both 
OC measures and tax evasion/underground economy 
proxies (e.g. tax gap and irregular labour). Illicit mar-
kets are all correlated, except for sexual exploitation. 
As hypothesised, high levels of cash use (measured 
through the cash-ratio) are recorded in provinces where 
the number of per capita POS terminals and the level 
of integration of population wealth in the financial sys-
tem (measured as % bank deposits on GDP) are low. 
The measures of the opacity of business ownership 
(i.e. BO_DISTANCE, RISKY SHAREHOLDERS AND 
RISKY BENEFICIAL OWNERS) are correlated only 
when weighted by average company size (so as to 
control for the presence of multinationals and identify 
actual anomalies).29 
The number of suspicious transaction reports per 
bank agency (STR_BANK) has a strong and positive 
correlation with most of the threats and vulnerabilities 
identified, e.g. mafia measures, cash-intensiveness 
and proxies for the underground economy. STRs 
tend to be higher also in provinces/areas where the 
GDP per capita and the integration of the real econ-
omy into the financial sector (BANK_DEPOSITS) are 
lower. On the other hand, ML offences (ratio on the 
population) show a positive correlation with STRs but 
a weak or no linear correlation with threat and vulner-
abilities proxies. The result confirms what suggested 
above, i.e. that this measure could be not fully mean-
ingful and representative of the ML phenomenon for 
various reasons and bias. 
Figure 15 – Pearson correlation among identified proxy variables at province level
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
29. If unweighted, the proxies for ownership opacity are not positively 
correlated with other threats and vulnerabilities, and are not correlat-
ed with STRs, while are positively correlated with measures of finan-
cial development such as GDP per capita and the % of deposits on 
GDP. This confirms the idea that, when not weighted, opacity proxies 
are rather a measure of the presence of multinational companies and 
of the volume of FDI. 
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STEP 5 - PRINCIPAL COMPONENT 
ANALYSIS (PCA)
To develop the composite indicator of ML risk, as men-
tioned in Chapter 1, it is decided to adopt a principal 
component analysis (PCA) approach.30 This helps to 
downsize the number of variables into a smaller num-
ber of components (Kabacoff, 2015; OECD & JRC, 
2008; Jolliffe, 2002), which would correspond to sub-di-
mensions of ML risk. The PCA is carried out as follows:
1. First, variables showing non-significant linear 
correlations with most of the other variables (e.g. 
sexual exploitation, risky BOs, transit hubs) are 
dropped. Also STRs, ML offences and other con-
trols are dropped because they are used to vali-
date the final composite indicator (see STEP 7). 
Remittances are kept due to the strong positive 
relationship with STRs. As a result, 17 variables 
are included in the PCA;
30. Principal component analysis is a multivariate data analysis tech-
nique used, in a similar way to other approaches (e.g. factor anal-
ysis), to reduce the information contained in large datasets to a 
smaller number of components (or factors, in factor analysis), each 
2. The number of principal components (PCs) 
is selected on the basis of generally accepted 
standards – e.g. the so-called Kaiser-Harris cri-
terion (see Kabacoff, 2015; OECD & JRC, 2008; 
Rencher, 2002);
3. Extracted PCs are identified, ‘labelled’ and 
discussed. It is also checked if the structure of 
PC confirms the theoretical framework of risk 
factors described above (see STEP 1); 
4. PCs are then aggregated using as weights the 
proportion explained in the PCA (see STEP 6).
The results of the PCA are summarised in the table 
below (matrix of rotated components). 
Table 16 - Principal component analysis. Matrix of rotated components (Varimax rotation)
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
TAX_GAP 0.4 0.73 0.06 0.16 -0.05
IRREGULAR_LABOUR 0.5 0.69 0.35 -0.03 -0.03
BANK_DEPOSITS -0.17 -0.83 -0.01 0.04 0.05
POS_NUMBER -0.21 -0.71 -0.19 0.14 -0.01
CASH_RATIO -0.02 0.72 0.31 0.17 -0.17
DRUG 0.03 0.6 0.63 -0.11 -0.08
ITTP 0 0.21 0.84 -0.11 -0.03
COUNTERFEITING 0.34 0.47 0.5 -0.16 0.1
RISKY_SHAREHOLDERS_w -0.11 -0.03 -0.13 0.86 0
BO_DISTANCE_w 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.89 0.04
REMITTANCES 0.02 -0.13 -0.03 0.05 0.97
REAL_ESTATE 0.79 0.21 -0.1 -0.06 -0.03
CONFISCATED_COMPANIES 0.88 0.15 -0.04 -0.12 -0.03
SEIZED_COMPANIES 0.76 0.24 -0.19 -0.11 0.12
MAFIA_HOMICIDES 0.69 0.17 0.33 0.21 0.06
PA_DISSOLVED 0.84 0.13 0.14 0.09 -0.02
MAFIA_ASSOCIATION 0.81 0.08 0.25 -0.06 0
SS loadings 4.41 3.53 1.89 1.74 1.02
Proportion variance 0.26 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.06
Cumulative variance 0.26 0.47 0.58 0.68 0.74
Proportion explained (Pi) 0.35 0.28 0.15 0.14 0.08
Cumulative proportion 0.35 0.63 0.78 0.92 1
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
of them able to summarise a specific phenomenon explained by a 
range of correlated variables. For this purpose, PCA uses an orthog-
onal transformation of the correlated variables into a set of principal 
components which are uncorrelated with each other (OECD & JRC, 
2008; Jolliffe, 2002).
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The PCA confirms the theoretical approach sug-
gested above. It identifies five principal compo-
nents (all with eigenvalues >1 – the overall model 
captures 74% of data variability) which support, with 
empirical evidence, the system of ML risk factors, di-
mensions and sub-dimensions discussed in previous 
paragraphs. The PCA also confirms what the 2014 
NRA and 2016 FATF MER presented as the three 
main ML risk issues in Italy: mafia organised crime 
(PC1), illicit markets (PC3), tax evasion and cash-in-
tensiveness (both in PC2). The PCs are discussed 
and presented in the maps below.
Principal component 1 (PC1) – Organised crime 
presence and infiltration
This component groups together the set of OC threat 
variables and in particular proxies for mafia presence 
and infiltration in the legitimate economy. According 
to our model, it is the most significant component of 
the ML risk in Italy because on its own it explains 26% 
of all data variability and 35% of model variance.31 It 
can be noted that it is also positively correlated with 
irregular labour and tax gap. 
The map below represents the values of PC1 extract-
ed for each Italian province and classified according 
to deciles. Those with highest values are in the South, 
and in particular in Sicily, southern Calabria (Reg-
gio Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Catanzaro, Crotone), 
Campania (Naples and Caserta in particular) and 
southern Lazio (Latina, Frosinone, Rome). In the 
North, Milan also scores high (see Part 2).
Principal component 2 (PC2) – Underground 
and cash-intensive economy 
The second component groups together proxies for 
the underground economy (tax gap, as a measure 
of tax evasion, and irregular labour) and measures 
of the cash-intensiveness of Italian provinces (the 
cash-ratio and, with negative sign as expected, dis-
tribution of POS terminals and the % on GDP of bank 
deposits). Estimates of illicit markets revenues are 
also positively correlated with this PC, confirming a 
strict relationship between the underground and the 
illegal economies (ISTAT, 2016a; EUROSTAT, 2015; 
OECD, 2002). PC2 represents the second most sig-
nificant component, explaining 28% of the variance 
of the entire model. With few exceptions, southern 
provinces register high values. Also Sardinia and 
Liguria rank high. Not surprisingly, provinces of the 
biggest cities in Italy (Milan, Rome, Naples, Turin, Bo-
logna) record low values due to the lower cash-use 
and the higher financial integration of people’s wealth.
Principal component 3 (PC3) – Illicit markets 
Interestingly, in our PCA the measures of the three 
illicit markets covered by the analysis (drug traffick-
ing, counterfeiting, illicit trafficking of tobacco) group 
together in a single component which represents the 
third dimension of ML risk in terms of variance ex-
plained (15% of the model). The PC is also positively 
correlated with measures of OC threat and of cash-in-
tensity. Although all the three markets have region-
al estimates, it is possible to extract from the PCA 
values at provincial level (because of the contribution 
of the other variables in the model), which are pre-
sented in the map below. All provinces of Campania 
record very high values. Also Sardinia and southern 
Calabria rank high on PC3, and so do big cities (e.g. 
Milan, Naples, Rome). 
31. Calculated as the ratio between the proportion of variance (0.26) and 





Principal component 4 (PC4) – Opacity of 
business ownership 
The fourth component, explaining 14% of the vari-
ance, captures mainly the effects of the proxies mea-
suring, on the one hand, the complexity of busi-
ness ownership structure (BO distance), and on 
the other, the volume of shareholders from risky 
jurisdictions (weighted for the average company 
size, see above). With some exceptions in the South 
(Vibo Valentia, Catanzaro and Matera) all provinces 
with highest values of this PC are in the north (e.g. 
Como, Varese, Verbanio-Cusio-Ossola, Imperia, Alto 
Adige, Trieste) and usually at the border with for-
eign countries, such as Switzerland, Monaco and 
Austria which score high in the FSI score.
Principal component 5 (PC5) – 
Money remittances 
Although explaining a small part of the data variability 
(8% of the model variance), money remittances (as % 
of provincial GDP) are identified by the PCA as a sepa-
rate ML risk component. As stressed in Part 2, money 
transfers, besides being the only available measure of 
(opaque) financial transactions to foreign countries (no 
data is available on wire transfers), are an area partic-
ularly vulnerable to ML due to the difficult controls on 
money transfer agents as also highlighted by FATF and 
the Italian MER (FATF, 2010b; CSF, 2014a).
Those areas ranking higher on the money remittanc-
es component are the Italian provinces with high con-
centrations of migrants: Prato first of all (due to the 
large Chinese community) but also Florence, Rome, 
Naples, Milan. Most of these provinces have been in-
volved in 2010-2013 in the Qian Liu/Qian Ba police 
investigations, which revealed massive illicit financial 
flows to China through money transfer services (Ric-

























































































































































STEP 6 – AGGREGATION AND COMPOSITE 
INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION
The principal components, identified through the PCA, 
can be then combined together in order to construct a 
synthetic composite indicator of ML risk. For this pur-
pose, they are aggregated using as weight the pro-
portion of variance (of the model) explained by each 
component, and then normalised to the scale 0-100 
according to a min-max criterion, where 100 = highest 
ML risk.32 In other words (see Annex for details):
where the subscript i = 1, ... ,I indicates the province (in 
our case I = 110), j = 1, … , J the component (J = 5) and 
wj = proportion of variance (out of the total variance 
explained by the model) explained by each of the five 
components. Sij is the relevant value extracted by the 
PCA for each province and for each component.
32. The choice of using the proportion of variance as weight for compo-
nents’ combination makes it possible to address the weakness of 
most composite indicators currently available in the literature, i.e. 
Table 17 - Top 12 provinces by ML Risk Composite Indicator 
Province Macro region

















Calabria South 100 45.2 43.1 14.2 10.4 100
Vibo Valentia South 70 81.5 31.6 36.9 6.9 94.9
Catanzaro South 44.3 78 40.2 60.9 14.1 85.4
Crotone South 35.9 88.8 37 25.4 9.8 67.1
Napoli South 36.4 37.2 100 15.4 21 66.3
Imperia North-west 9.8 70.8 29.3 100 13.4 62.5
Caserta South 29.4 67.8 77.3 8.8 15 62
Agrigento Islands 42.9 99.1 0.7 11.2 13.9 59.9
Palermo Islands 72 56.7 5.7 0 4.5 59.5
Caltanissetta Islands 51.1 70.2 20.7 8.8 6.8 57.7
Trapani Islands 38.5 86.7 9.2 10.1 12.2 52.3
Prato Centre 5.8 66.8 22 27.7 100 51.1
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
The table below presents the top 12 Italian provinces 
ranked according to the overall ML risk. The top four 
are located in Calabria: they score high in terms of 
mafia threat (PC1), underground economy and large 
use of cash (PC2) and illicit markets (PC3). They are 
followed by Naples and Caserta (strong Camorra 
presence and infiltration, high volumes of illicit mar-
kets) and some Sicilian provinces (Agrigento, Paler-
mo, Trapani, Caltanissetta). The first among the prov-
inces not traditionally characterized by mafia presence 
are Imperia and Prato. Imperia ranks first for business 
ownership opacity, but it is also an area characterized 
by high levels of cash-use and underground econo-
my and an intense cross-border activity of OC groups 
(‘Ndrangheta in particular), especially because of the 
proximity with the PACA region in France (see Riccar-
di & Camerini, 2016). Prato is characterised by high 
cash-intensiveness, high irregular labour, and a high 
volume of money remittances (first province in Italy in 
terms of remittances on GDP), all of them mainly re-
lated to the presence of Chinese groups active on the 
boundary between the legitimate and illegal economy.
the fact that factors are aggregated attributing discretionary weights 
which heavily impact on the final result and ranking.
ML RISK INDICATORi = ∑
J    (Sij x wj )=
=(S1i x w1 )+(S2i x w2 )+(S3i x w3 )+(S4i x w4 )+(S5i x w5 )
j=1
70
STEP 7 – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND 
VALIDATION
Is the final ML risk indicator presented above in line 
with other evidence on ML in Italy? Is it possible that 
slight variations in the methodology could significantly 
affect the overall result and change the ML risk rank-
ing of the 110 Italian provinces? To address these 
questions and validate the composite indicator, 
two tests are carried out.
Correlation between ML risk composite 
indicator and other ML measures
First, the indicator is compared with an alternative 
measure of money laundering, in this case the num-
ber of STRs per bank (average 2012-2014). The two 
variables are positively and significantly correlat-
ed (Pearson’s r = 0.7). The ML risk indicator is cor-
related positively also with the ratio of ML offences to 
the population, even if to a lesser extent (r = 0.22). 
The two maps below show the final ML risk compos-
ite indicator (left) and the number of STRs per bank 
agency (right). The similarity between the two maps is 
evident: the darkest areas in the IARM model are also 
those with the highest ratios of STRs (e.g. southern 
Italian provinces, Prato, Imperia). 
Sensitivity analysis
Second, a sensitivity analysis is performed in order 
to check if changes in the methodology regarding, for 
example, the weighting, aggregation and normal-
isation of the variables involved in the PCA do af-
fect the overall result and ranking of ML risk. Table 18 
below lists the different methodological options which 
are tested in the sensitivity analysis (see Annex for 
details), while the two corrplots in Figure 18 present:
• the correlation among the composite indicators’ 
scores resulting from application of the various 
parameters/options.33 
• the correlation among the composite indicators 
scores produced after dropping one selected vari-
able at a time from the final model (Model 1).34
33. The final model is the VPSTM, which refers to the composite indi-
cator obtained from application of the following options: V = Vari-
max algorithm is used in the rotation of components in the PCA; P 
= components are aggregated based on the proportion of variance 
explained.; T = principal components not normalised; M = final indi-
cator normalised according to min-max criterion. As a matter of ex-
ample, the option OESDM refers to the composite indicator obtained 
from the application of the following options: O = Oblimin algorithm is 
Figure 17 - ML risk composite indicator (left) and STRs per bank agency (right)
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
used in the rotation of components in the PCA; E = components are 
aggregated using equal weights; S = components are aggregated 
using weighted arithmetic mean; D = components are normalised 
before being aggregated; M = components and the final indicator are 
normalised according to min-max criterion (see Dugato et al, 2014).
34. The full nomenclature of all models from Model 1 (final indicator pre-
sented) to Model 20 can be found in Annex
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Table 18 - Different parameters adopted to construct the ML risk composite indicator
Highlighted in grey are the options adopted to construct the final indicator (Model 1 - VPSTM)
Step Methodological options Label




Weights based on the proportion of variance explained P
Equal weights (average score) E
Aggregation Weighted arithmetic mean S
Normalisation method of the components
Standardisation or Z-scores T
Min - Max D
Normalisation method of the final indicator
Standardisation or Z-scores Z
Min - Max M
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
Figure 18 – Correlation among ML risk composite indicators after applying different methodological options 
(left) or using different proxy variables (right)
As illustrated by Figure 18, all the scores for the indi-
cators resulting from the different options are highly 
correlated (average Pearson’s r = 0.97), which sug-
gests that changes in the methodology do not signifi-
cantly affect the overall result and ranking, and that 
the IARM ML composite indicator remains solid 
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choices change the rank of certain provinces (e.g. 
using equal aggregation weights increases the risk of 
provinces, such as Prato, which have a high volume 
of remittances as % of GDP), but the overall picture 
remains the same (see the Annex for the ranking of 
the 110 provinces according to different methodolog-
ical choices).
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35. NACE Rev.2 is the statistical classification of economic activities in 
the European community, adopted in 2007. NACE uses different hi-
erarchical levels. Level 1 (or 1-digit) identifies 21 sections by alpha-
betical letters (A to U); Level 2 (or 2-digits) identifies 88 divisions by 
two-digit numerical codes (01 to 99) (see for details http://ec.euro-
pa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_
NOM_DTL&StrNom=NACE_REV2&StrLanguageCode=EN&IntP-
cKey=&StrLayoutCode=HIERARCHIC). The composite indicator is 
computed at the division level, but this chapter also presents some 
analyses and descriptive statistics for NACE sections. The section la-
bels used in charts slightly differ from the official NACE classification 
so that they are more readable. Moreover, sections O, T and U have 
been excluded from the analysis because there are fewer than 500 
registered companies in those business sectors in Italy. Consequently, 
statistics are presented for 18 sections and the composite indicator is 
computed for only 77 NACE divisions. For details see the Annex. 
The same 7-step methodological approach used 
to develop a composite indicator at provincial level 
(Section 2.2) is adopted for an analysis at business 
sector level. In particular, a composite indicator of 
ML risk is calculated for 77 NACE Rev. 2 divisions 
(2-digits).35
 
Developing a composite indicator at business sector 
level is even harder owing to the difficulties of iden-
tifying and operationalising risk factors, and to very 
limited data availability. Presented below is an ex-
ploratory analysis – the first of this kind performed 
in the literature – which represents only the first step 
for further investigation.
STEP 1 – ML RISK FACTORS 
IDENTIFICATION
As in the analysis at area level, ML RF across Ital-
ian business sectors are identified on the basis of 
a review of the academic literature, institutional 
reports, investigative and judicial evidence, and 
then validated by means of interviews with experts. 
The RF identified are classified according to the FATF 
taxonomy (Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequenc-
es – see Chapter 1) (Dawe, 2013; FATF, 2013a), 
and grouped into a tree-structure (risk factors, risk 
sub-dimensions) (see Figure 19 below).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the previous literature is 
scanty and focuses more on risks across territories 
than across economic sectors. Some of the RF cat-
egories identified for the provincial analysis are not 
applicable at industry level (e.g. illicit markets). As 
a result, the following RF are identified:
2.3 Analysis at business sector level
• OC infiltration (Threat)
• Tax evasion & Underground economy (Threat/
Vulnerability)
• Cash-intensiveness (Vulnerability)
• Opacity of business ownership (Vulnerability)
• Business profitability (Vulnerability)
STEP 2 – ML RISK FACTORS 
OPERATIONALISATION
Each RF is then operationalised into one or more 
proxy variables in order to enable their measurement 
and analysis. The proxies are illustrated in the chart 
and tables below. As said, data available at business 
sector level are even fewer than at area level. De-
pending on company law requirements in each coun-
try, some information (e.g. financial or ownership 
data) can be found on individual firms but it is not al-
ways possible to access and aggregate it at industry 
level. Other information, like data on the tax gap, is 
not available in Italy at either NACE section or divi-
sion level, at least for the purpose of this study. These 
difficulties translate into a lower number of variables 
available for use in the PCA.
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Money laundering threats 
The available data allow coverage of only two ML threats: infiltration by organised crime, and tax evasion/underground 
economy. 
36. Data on irregular labour are available at NACE rev.2 Division level only 
for Section C – Manufacturing, while for the other business sectors 
they can be found only at the section level.
Figure 19 - ML risk factors and proxy variables at business sector level in Italy
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
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OC infiltration in business sectors focuses on Italian 
mafias, and it is again measured as the ratio between 
the number of companies seized from mafia 
groups in Italy and the number of registered com-
panies.37 Other proxies adopted in the provincial 
analysis to measure mafia infiltration and presence 
(e.g. mafia homicides, dissolution of city councils, 
etc. – see 2.2) are not applicable to business sectors. 
The underlying hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, the 
higher the degree of infiltration, the greater the risk of 
ML in the same sector. 
According to available data provided by ANBSC, 
about 3,500 companies have been seized by Italian 
authorities since 1984, and 2,500 of them were even-
tually confiscated. Most of them concentrate in the 
wholesale and retail trade sector (NACE section G) 
and construction industry (section F). The sections 
with the highest ratios between confiscated and reg-
istered companies are mining and quarrying, water 
and waste management, construction, entertain-
ment and accommodation (respectively NACE sec-
tions B, E, F, R, I) (Figure 20).
As noted in previous studies, the first three sectors 
(B, E, F) are characterised by high public expendi-
ture and public procurement, and they allow mafia 
groups to benefit from their connections within the 
political elite and public administration (Sacco, 2010; 
Transcrime, 2013). In particular, mining (e.g. sand 
mines and pits), plays a crucial role because it is the 
first link in the construction industry/cement cycle 
(of key importance in the mafia economy), but also 
because it is used for illegal waste disposal – sand 
mines and quarries are ideal for hiding illegal waste 
(D’Amato, Mazzanti, & Nicolli, 2015; Legambiente, 
2016; Riccardi, 2014).
Bars, restaurants, hotels (Section I) are also wide-
ly exploited by criminal organisations for launder-
ing purposes because of their cash-intensive, la-
bour-intensive and low-tech nature (Transcrime, 
2013; Riccardi, Soriani, et al., 2016; Fondazione Res, 
2014; Fantò, 1999). Gambling and betting (Section 
R) have historically attracted the interest of organised 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
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37.  In this case, data are available on companies finally confiscated in 
the period 1984-2015 and seized from 2013 to 2015. It has been de-
cided to include also seized companies in order to ensure the better 
crime, but in recent years in Italy they have further 
developed with the spread of video-lottery terminals 
(VLT), slot-machines, and recreation rooms (DIA, 
2015; DNA, 2014; Cantone & Di Feo, 2014; Poto, 
2012; Busa & La Rocca, 2011).  
At the NACE division level, those with highest number 
of confiscated companies are construction of build-
ings (F 41), retail trade (G 47), bars and restaurants 
(I 56). In terms of ratio with registered businesses, 
ranking highest are divisions related to the extraction 
of sand, production of cement, and building industry 
(B 08, C 19, C 23, F 41), waste management (E 38), 
gambling and betting (R 92) and broadcasting (J60). 
Figure 20 - Companies confiscated from 
mafia-type OC by sector (NACE divisions)
1984-2015. % of total and ratio to 10,000 registered 
companies. NACE 2007 Sections excluding O, T, U
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ANBSC data
*Out of the total number of 3447 confiscated companies, for 1406 
information on business sector is not available
representativeness of those sectors, which have seen large numbers 
of infiltration cases in recent years but have been targeted by confis-
cation measures only recently (e.g. VLT, gambling, betting agencies).
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Table 20 – Companies confiscated from mafia-type OC by sector (NACE divisions)
First 7 NACE divisions by number and ratio. 1984-2015
Rank Number confiscated companies Ratio confiscated/registered companies
1 F 41 – Construction of buildings C 19 – Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
2 G 47 – Retail trade, except for motor vehicles and motorcycles B 08 – Other mining and quarrying
3 I 56 – Food and beverage service activities C 23 – Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
4 G 46 – Wholesale trade, except for motor vehicles and motorcycles R 92 – Gambling and betting activities
5 L 68 – Real estate activities J 60 – Programming and broadcasting activities
6 A 01 – Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
E 38 – Waste collection, treatment and disposal 
activities; materials recovery
7 F 43 – Specialised construction activities F 41 – Construction of buildings
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ANBSC data
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F - Construction
I - Hotels & bars
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38. See paragraph 2.2 and (EUROSTAT, 2015) for a definition of under-
ground economy. Data on irregular labour are available only at NACE 
section level, except for manufacturing (Section C) where details at 
division level are provided.
Tax evasion and underground economy
Economic sectors characterised by high levels of 
tax evasion are often those where it is more likely 
that illicit proceeds are generated but also laundered 
(Schneider, Raczkowski, & Mróz, 2015; Tavares, 
2013). Unfortunately, measures on corporate tax eva-
sion at business sector level are not available for the 
purpose of this study. The only available data is the % 
of irregular labour over the total workforce per sec-
tor, which is also related to tax evasion, in particular 
to labour taxes and contributions.38 The selection of 
this variable is also justified by the fact that black sal-
aries are a well acknowledged laundering meth-
od, especially in certain areas and economic activ-
ities (Williams & Schneider, 2013; Schneider, 2012; 
Dell’Anno, Gomez-Antonio & Pardo, 2007).
On average, ISTAT estimates that 4% of workers in 
Italy are irregular (average 2001-2013), a percentage 
which has been increasing in recent years due to 
the economic crisis (ISTAT, 2016a). NACE sections 
I (Food and accommodation), R (Entertainment), S 
(Other service activities), H (Transportation and stor-
age), A (Agriculture, forest and fishing), F (Construc-
tion) record the highest levels. In particular, more 
than one-fourth of total workers in bars, restaurants 
and hotels are estimated to be irregular (Figure 21).
Figure 21 - % of Irregular labour on total working 
units by NACE business sector 
Average 2001-2013. NACE Sections excluding O, T, U 
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of ISTAT data
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39. As mentioned in section 2.2 on the analysis at area level, although 
the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) ORBIS database covers almost the entire 
universe of the 6 million Italian companies, financial and ownership 
Money laundering vulnerabilities
ML vulnerabilities at business sector level are identi-
fied by mirroring those at area level. However, in this 
case the operationalisation is harder because of 
the lack of previous literature in the ML field. Prox-
ies are developed by looking at other domains, such 
as accounting, corporate finance or corporate gover-
nance. For all three of the vulnerabilities identified, 
data are collected from the Bureau van Dijk ORBIS 
database, which provides ownership and financial 
information at individual company level, and they 
are then aggregated by economic sector.39  
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Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
* Variables ending with “w” are weighted for the average company size in the business sector as a proxy for the presence of multinational companies 
(see below and Methodological Annex for details)
information is available only for a subset of respectively 3,527,143 and 
3,669,902 companies, i.e. those legal forms (like limited companies) 
which are required to file this information with the business registry. 
See the Annex for details.
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Cash-intensiveness 
As stressed in Chapter 1, cash-intensive business-
es ease the concealment and integration of illicit pro-
ceeds in the legitimate economy and are therefore 
helpful for money laundering purposes (FATF, 2010a; 
Riccardi & Levi, 2017; Gilmour & Ridley, 2015; Gilm-
our, 2014; Transcrime, 2013). But measuring the lev-
el of cash intensity at economic sector level is not 
easy. One option is to consider the extent to which 
two companies in a certain sector detain assets in 
cash or liquidity, and therefore to measure: 
• the average cash/total assets ratio of the com-
panies operating in a certain sector;
• the average current assets/total assets ratio, 
which with respect to the previous one also takes 
into account trade receivables, inventory, and 
other current assets.40  
There is a large amount of empirical evidence that com-
panies involved in money-laundering schemes (espe-
cially those related to mafia infiltration) register not only 
higher liquidity but also higher levels of current assets, 
which may be easy to manipulate from an accounting 
point of view and may conceal illicit inflows/outflows 
(see e.g. Di Bono et al, 2015; Transcrime, 2013).
The figure below shows that, as expected, sectors F 
(Construction) and G (Wholesale and retail trade) 
are those with the highest levels of current assets in 
the total. More surprisingly, sectors P (Education) and 
C (Manufacturing) also show high ratios. In particular, 
P is the sector with the largest share of cash in total 
assets, followed by Section J (Information and commu-
nication), R (Arts, entertainment and recreation) and Q 
(Health and social work activities) Section R (Arts, en-
tertainment and recreation) includes very high cash-in-
tensive businesses, such as gambling and betting ac-
tivities (R 92), gaming rooms or night clubs (R 93). 
The disaggregation at NACE division level shows 
more heterogeneous patterns. In terms of current as-
sets/total assets ratio, those divisions with the high-
est levels are S 95 (Repair of computer and house-
hold goods), M 73 (advertising and market research) 
and two sectors related to the construction industry, 
namely N 81 (services to buildings and landscape 
activities) and F 43 (specialised construction), all of 
which, on average, have more that 75% of the total 
assets detained in current assets. Also other divisions 
of the building industry record ratios higher than 70%. 
In terms of cash/total assets, J 59 (TV and video pro-
duction) is followed by E 39 (waste & remediation), R 
90 (creative, arts and entertainment) and S 94 (Activ-
ities of membership organisations). 
40. These proxies have been preferred to other fundamental analysis ra-
tios due to greater data availability. Other measures of liquidity are, 
for example, receivables days (or debtors days) which measure the 
average length of time taken by a company’s customers to pay their 
debts (O’Regan, 2006, p. 223). It can be assumed that the lower the 
receivables days, the more liquid the payments received by a com-
pany. Unfortunately, details on debtors and payables are not largely 
available in the source used for analysis, so that this ratio cannot be 
calculated in a systematic way.
Figure 22 – Cash & Current assets. Average % on total assets
NACE Sections excluding O, T, U. Last available year
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data
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Opacity of business ownership
As in the analysis at area level, the complexity of cor-
porate structures at industry level is analysed with re-
spect to two sub-dimensions:
• The level of complexity of businesses’ owner-
ship structure as such;
• The volume of business ownership connections 
with shareholders and BOs from risky jurisdic-
tions;
Complexity of business ownership structure
The proxy for the first dimension is the so-called BO 
distance, which has been already used for the analy-
sis across provinces and measures the average num-
ber of ‘steps’ separating a company from its benefi-
cial owner(s).41 The higher the BO distance, the more 
complex the ownership structure, and the greater the 
ML risk.
Electricity, water supply and waste management, the 
financial industry, and mining and quarrying (respec-
tively NACE sections D, E, K and B) are character-
ized by higher BO distance. This may be due to the 
larger number of multinational companies operat-
ing in those industries. The divisions with the highest 
BO distance are, in particular, D 35 (Electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply, with on average 
2.1 steps between companies and their beneficial 
owner(s)), E 36 and E 37 (Water supply and sewer-
age, with respectively 1.9 and 1.8), K 65 (Insurance, 
1.9) and C 21 (pharmaceuticals).
However, in order to identify the actual anomalies and 
control for the presence of multinational enterprises, 
the BO distance in each business sector is weighted 
by the average company size in the sector (as done 
in the analysis at provincial level - see 2.2 and Annex 
for details). In this scenario, sections S (Other ser-
vices), A (Agriculture), P (Education) and I (Bars, 
restaurants and hotels) rank highest. 
41.  See footnote 24
Figure 23 – Average BO distance per business 
sector
Average distance and average distance weighted 
by average company size (scale 0-100). Excluding 
NACE sections O, T, U      
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data 
Business ownership connections with risky 
jurisdictions
At business sector level, the industries with the 
highest percentages of foreign shareholders are, 
again, those with the largest number of multinational 
companies and volume of FDI: energy (section D), 
financial companies (K), mining (B) and some man-
ufacturing sectors, such as pharmaceuticals (C 21) 
and oil & gas (C 19). The sectors with the highest 
percentages of foreign BOs are almost the same as 
shareholders, with the exception of R 92 (gambling 
and betting activities): a result which would require 
further investigation given the abundant evidence of 
OC infiltration of this industry in recent years. 
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Figure 24 – Foreign shareholders and foreign 
BOs. % on total shareholders and BOs per sector 
NACE sections, excluding O, T, U
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data
 
However, as said, not all foreign nationalities encom-
pass the same ML risk. As in the analysis at area lev-
el, it is necessary to calculate the volume of business 
ownership connections with ‘risky’ jurisdictions. 
The same methodology is adopted here, i.e. the % of 
foreign shareholders and BOs per each nationality in 
each business sector is multiplied by the relevant val-
ue of the FSS - Financial Secrecy Score (Tax Jus-
tice Network, 2015b).42 The value is then weighted by 
a measure of company size (in this case, the average 
total assets) in order to offset the incidence of multi-
national companies (see Annex). 
42.  As described earlier, the Financial Secrecy Score (FSS) is a composite 
indicator which condenses into a national score different dimensions of 
secrecy related to: A) access to beneficial ownership information; B) 
corporate transparency; C) efficiency of tax and financial regulation; D) 
compliance with international standards; E) international cooperation 
(Tax Justice Network, 2015). For further detailed see Annex. 
At NACE section level, after controlling for company 
size, bars, restaurants and hotels (I), education 
(P), other services (S) record the highest value with 
respect to shareholders from “risky” jurisdictions. 
Bars, restaurants, hotels rank first also with respect to 
beneficial owners, where section R (entertainment) 
scores second (Figure 25).
At the NACE division level, I 56 (Food and bever-
age service activities) is the division with the highest 
value for both Shareholders and BOs. Divisions S 95 
(Repair of computers and personal and household 
goods) and M 74 (Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities) also present a high score for the 
shareholder indicator while controlling for the average 
company size within the sector, while N 79 (Travel 
agency, tour operator reservation service and related 
activities) and R 92 (Gambling and betting activities) 
score high in relation to risky BOs. 
Figure 25 – Business ownership connections with 
risky jurisdictions (NACE sections)
Scale 0-100 (100 = highest risk). Weighted by sec-
tor’s average company size. Excluding sections 
O,T,U. Last available year
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD and TJN data
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43.  EBITDA stands for “Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization”, and represents the gross profit after subtracting oper-
ational costs from revenues (O’Regan, 2016). High EBITDA margins 
mean that companies are able to generate high revenues and min-
imize operational expenses such as personnel costs, costs for ser-
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Figure 26 – Business ownership connections with risky jurisdictions (NACE divisions)
First 5 NACE divisions. Last available year
Rank Shareholders’ risk score Beneficial owners’ risk score
1 I 56. Food and beverage service activities I 56. Food and beverage service activities
2 S 95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods
N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and 
related activities
3 M 74. Other professional, scientific and technical activities R 92. Gambling and betting activities
4 N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities M 74. Other professional, scientific and technical activities
5 M 73. Advertising and market research P 85. Education
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD and TJN data
Business profitability
This is operationalised through a measure of gross 
profitability, namely the EBITDA/Turnover ratio 
(O’Regan, 2006). Some literature stresses the role 
that business profitability may have in attracting in-
vestments by criminal organisations and there-
fore money laundering activities (Kruisbergen et al., 
2015; Masciandaro et al., 2007, p. 7; Unger & Rawl-
ings, 2008; Williams, 2001). For example, it has been 
noted that mafia groups in Italy have in recent years 
infiltrated companies active in the renewable energy 
sector – especially windpower – characterized by 
high subsidies and increasing profits (Caneppele, 
Riccardi & Standridge, 2014) or the VLT and gaming 
industry, which is growing rapidly (Poto, 2012; Riccar-
di, Milani,et al., 2016). 
However, some other empirical research shows that 
no clear correlation can be found between the level 
of criminal infiltration and business sector profitabili-
ty in Italy (Riccardi, 2014; Donato et al, 2013; Tran-
scrime, 2013): mafia groups are rent-seeking rather 
than profit-maximising organisations and aim at in-
creasing, not economic profit, but utility in a broader 
sense – power, control of the territory, social consen-
sus (Riccardi, Soriani et al., 2016, p. 121). 
And, moreover, analysis of financial information from 
the income statement may be strongly affected by ac-
counting manipulations (Di Bono et al, 2015). 
For this reason, two models are presented in the PCA 
analysis: one including the profitability proxy, and one 
excluding this risk factor. 
Figure 27 – Business gross profitability
Average % EBITDA margin by NACE section, exclud-
ing O, T, U. Last available year 
vices and materials. A measure of gross profitability is preferred than 
measures of net profitability (e.g. profit margin) in order to minimize 
the influence of different financial management and tax management 
strategies across businesses and sectors. 
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration of BvD data
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STEP 3 – DATA COLLECTION 
AND NORMALISATION
As said, data are collected at NACE section (1-digit), 
division (2-digits) or at the individual company level 
and then aggregated by business sector (e.g. in the 
case of financial and ownership information). The 
sources used are:
• Database provided by ANBSC – Agenzia Na-
zionale Beni Sequestrati and Confiscati, for 
data on seized and confiscated companies;
• ISTAT, for data on irregular labour;
• Bureau van Dijk ORBIS, for ownership and fi-
nancial information. In particular two datasets 
are used: one for financial data (useful for com-
puting cash-intensiveness and profitability prox-
ies, covering 3.5 million companies) and one for 
shareholders and beneficial owners (covering 
3.7 million companies, 5 million shareholders 
and 4.5 million BOs). 
Time coverage varies depending on data availability. 
Data available for multiple years (e.g. ISTAT data on 
irregular labour – 2001 to 2013; and ANBSC data on 
confiscated companies – 1984 to 2015) are averaged. 
For BvD information, the last available year is consid-
ered. As a result of the data collection, two datasets 
are produced, respectively on the 21 NACE sections 
and 88 NACE divisions. In order to avoid biases de-
riving from the low number of businesses, the analy-
sis has considered only those sections and divisions 
with more than 500 registered companies. As a re-
sult, the analysis covers 18 NACE sections (i.e. ex-
cluding sections O, T and U) and 77 NACE divisions 
(excluding divisions B 05, B 06, B 07, B 09, C 12, H 
51, M 75, O 84, T 97, T 98 and U 99). 
STEP 4 – DATA EXPLORATION AND 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Once the data are collected, they are analysed 
through descriptive statistics and inference tests. The 
corrplot below presents the linear Pearson correla-
tion among the proxies identified and other control 
variables on company size (number of employees, 
revenues and total assets per company) at the NACE 
division level (77 NACE divisions). 
Mafia infiltration (CONFISCATED_COMPANIES) 
is positively correlated with measures of turnover. 
As pointed out by MONEYVAL, “OCGs invest the 
proceeds in preferred economic sectors with high 
turnover as OCG assets can be laundered through 
high value transactions consistent with the relevant 
business; for example the construction and real es-
tate sectors” (MONEYVAL, 2015, p. 20). Despite ev-
idence from the literature and case studies, no cor-
relation could be found between OC infiltration and 
irregular labour (but this proxy is available only at 
the NACE section level – it would be interesting to 
repeat the analysis with higher disaggregation detail).
On the other hand, irregular labour is negatively 
correlated with company size variables (e.g. em-
ployees per company). This is consistent with the lit-
erature highlighting that “very small firms offer larger 
room for underground work” (De Gregorio & Giorda-
no, 2015, p. 16).  
The measures of the opacity of business owner-
ship (i.e. BO_DISTANCE, RISKY_SHAREHOLD-
ERS AND RISKY_BOs) are, as expected, positively 
correlated with measures of company size: industries 
with bigger companies at a higher capitalisation are 
also those with the highest number of foreign share-
holders and multinational corporate schemes. How-
ever, when weighted by company size, the correla-
tion becomes negative, while positive becomes the 
correlation with irregular labour and with measures 
of cash intensiveness (CASH_ASSETS and CUR-
RENT_ASSETS).
Future analysis would certainly benefit from the inclu-
sion of further proxies (e.g. tax gap, receivable days) 
and from the adoption of a higher disaggregation level.
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Figure 28 – Pearson correlation among identified proxy variables at business sector level in Italy
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
STEP 5 - PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
(PCA)
As in the analysis across provinces, the approach 
adopted to downsize the variety of risk factors into a 
single composite indicator at the business sector lev-
el is the PCA – Principal component analysis (see 
2.2). The PCA is here performed on the 77 NACE 
divisions. 7 variables are included (see Table 22 
below). Variables used as controls (e.g. average em-
ployees, total assets and revenues per company) are 
excluded. As regards the proxies for business opaci-
ty, those weighted by company size are taken. 
A second model, with 6 variables (excluding busi-
ness profitability – i.e. Model 2) is also developed and 
a second risk score is produced. They are both pre-
sented in table 24 and table 25.
 
According to generally accepted criteria (eigenvalues 
>=1, each component >10% of the overall variance 
and cumulative variance >60%), the PCA identifies 
four components which capture more than 84% of the 
overall data variance. The results support, with empiri-
cal evidence, the system of ML risk factors, dimensions 
and sub-dimensions discussed in previous sections.
Table 22 – Principal component analysis. Matrix of rotated components
Model including business profitability. Varimax rotation
Variables PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
RISKY_BO_w 0.89 0.24 -0.11 0.00
RISKY_SHAREHOLDERS_w 0.85 0.34 -0.17 -0.10
BO_DISTANCE_w 0.80 0.02 -0.25 -0.10
IRREGULAR_LABOUR 0.79 -0.24 0.11 0.00
CURRENT_ASSETS 0.00 0.89 -0.23 -0.12
CASH_ASSETS 0.21 0.79 0.45 0.06
PROFIT -0.24 -0.02 0.91 -0.02
CONFISCATED_COMPANIES -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.99
SS loadings 3.2 1.5 1.1 1.0
Proportion Var. 39.77 19.29 13.18 12.08
Cumulative Var. 39.77 59.05 72.23 84.31
Proportion Explained 0.47 0.23 0.16 0.14
Cumulative Proportion 0.47 0.70 0.86 1.00
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
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Principal component 1 (PC1) – 
Opacity and irregular labour
The first component accounts for most of the variabil-
ity in the model (47%), and it is strongly associated 
with proxies for business ownership opacity and 
with the volume of irregular labourers. When ex-
tracting the scores for this component, the divisions 
with highest values are bars and restaurants (I 56), 
some divisions of section S (repair of computers – 
S 95, personal service activities – S 96) and others 
related to entertainment (e.g. R 92 – Gambling and 
gaming and R 93 – Sport and leisure associations) 
(see the table below and the Annex for full results).
Principal component 2 (PC2) – 
Cash-intensiveness
The second component groups together the two mea-
sures of cash-intensive businesses: current assets 
and cash on total assets. It contributes to 23% of 
overall variability in the model. The top ranked sectors 
according to the PCA scores are motion picture, vid-
eo and TV production (J 59), travel agencies (N 78). 
Some divisions pertaining to professional, scientific 
and technical activities can be identified (section M).
Principal component 3 (PC3) – 
Business profitability and cash
The third component explains 16% of the overall vari-
ability in the model, and it is associated with proxies for 
gross profitability and cash-intensiveness. The top 
NACE divisions with respect to this component score 
are still in the ICT sector, especially J 59 (Motion pic-
ture, video and television programmes) and J 61 (Tele-
communications). Divisions N 77 (Rental and leasing 
activities), E 36 (Water collection treatment and sup-
ply), H 52 (warehousing and support activities for trans-
portation) and R 92 (Gambling and betting activities). 
Principal component 4 (PC4) – 
OC infiltration   
The fourth and last component is related to mafia-OC 
infiltration. It accounts for 14% of the variability of 
the model. The business sectors ranking highest are 
those which also frequently appear in mafia investi-
gations and asset recovery operations: e.g. divisions 
C 19 (Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products) and C 23 (Manufacture of other non-metal-
lic mineral products) – both related to the production 
of cement – B 08 (other mining and quarrying) and R 
92 (Gambling and betting activities).
The table below presents, for each PC, the 10 NACE 
divisions with highest extracted values. 
Table 23 – PC scores by business sector 
Top 10 NACE divisions per each PC




Business profitability and cash
PC4 
OC infiltration
1 I 56 J 59 J 59 C 19
2 S 95 N 79 J 61 B 08
3 S 96 P 85 N 77 C 23
4 A 03 E 39 E 36 R 92
5 R 90 M 73 H 52 J 60
6 R 93 M 74 R 92 E 38
7 R 92 C 28 J 60 F 41
8 A 01 Q 88 H 50 R 93
9 A 02 S 94 I 55 I 56
10 M 74 N 81 K 64 H 52
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
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44. There are specific NACE divisions for these business sectors, respec-
tively N 80 and K 66 / K65. However, the review of all Italian com-
panies registered in S 96 revealed a very high number of security 
companies and of fiduciary services. It is difficult to understand why 
STEP 6 – AGGREGATION AND COMPOSITE 
INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION
The principal components, identified through the 
PCA, are then combined into a synthetic composite 
indicator of ML risk at business sector level. As in the 
analysis at provincial level (see 2.2), they are aggre-
gated using as weights the proportion of variance 
(of the model) explained by each PC, and then nor-
malised to the scale 0-100 according to a min-max 
criterion, where 100 = highest ML risk. In other words 
(see Annex for details):
where i = 1, .., I  business sectors at NACE division 
level (in our case I = 77), j = 1, … , J component (J 
= 4) and wj = proportion of variance (out of the total 
variance explained by the model) explained by each 
of the four components. Sij is the relevant value ex-
tracted by the PCA for each sector and for each com-
ponent.
Table 24 below presents the top 10 and lowest 10 
NACE divisions of the Italian economy ranked ac-
cording to the overall ML risk. The top four belong 
to sections I (Accommodation), S (Other service 
activities), R (Entertainment) and J (ICT). In partic-
ular, the hypothesis that bars and restaurants (I 56) 
could be exposed to the risk of money laundering is 
confirmed. Sector S is characterised by high levels 
of irregular labour, cash-intensiveness and opacity of 
the ownership structure: it includes both repair ser-
vices (S 95) and activities related to associations 
and organisations (S 94) which have attracted at-
tention for possible ML and TF uses (FATF, 2013a). 
But it also includes personal services businesses (S 
96) which is a very broad category including mas-
sage parlours, hair-dressers, laundromats, funer-
al parlours – but also security companies and fidu-
ciary services.44
Gambling and betting agencies (R 92) also rank 
high, as well as R 93, which includes a variety of vul-
nerable activities (with past OC infiltration evidence) 
such as VLT (video-lottery) or beach facilities (sta-
bilimenti balneari). Among other business divisions 
to be highlighted is N 79: the risk of travel agencies 
may be related to their close relationship with touristic 
industry and also to the possibility that they can pro-
vide money transfer services and therefore be vul-
nerable to ML purposes. Finally, divisions F 43, C 19, 
N 81, M 74 are all related to the construction supply 
chain, from the extraction of sand to the establish-
ment and management of building sites (professional 
activities such as landscaping, architecture and civil 
engineering professionals and intermediaries). 
Sector J ranks high only when a measure of business 
profitability is included in the model (Model 1). If this 
proxy is dropped (Model 2), it ranks much lower (see 
Table 25). Under Model 2 the PCA identifies three 
components (instead of 4), and as expected the vari-
ability explained by the PC related to mafia infiltra-
tion increases. Some divisions, like Manufacturing 
of coke (C 19) and Gambling (R 92), score higher 
than in the previous table. Apart from this, the results 
seem quite consistent because divisions belonging to 
sections I (Accommodation) and section S (Other 
service activities) still rank highest.
Among the sectors ranking lowest in both the models 
are K (Financial sector) and C (Manufacturing). 
It is interesting to note that Section K includes AML 
obliged entities such as banks, financial institutions or 
insurance companies. On the other hand, the manu-
facturing sector is usually a capital-intensive industry 
characterized by high barriers to entry which make 
organised crime infiltration and money laundering 
through cash injection both unlikely (except for some 
divisions).  
these businesses preferred registering in such class of economic ac-
tivity than in their ‘proper’ ones. But this represents a weakness of the 
current economic activity nomenclature – which also reflects on IARM 
methodology.
ML RISK INDICATOR_SCOREi = ∑
J    (Sij x wj )=
=(S1i x w1 )+(S2i x w2 )+(S3i x w3 )+(S4i x w4 )
j=1
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Table 24 – ML risk composite indicator across NACE divisions in Italy 
Top 10 and least 10 risky divisions. Model 1 including business profitability
















I 56. Food and beverage 
service activities 100.0 48.2 17.3 20.4 100.0
J 59. Motion picture, video 
and television programme 
production 
15.3 100.0 100.0 8.3 79.0
S 95. Repair of computers 
and personal and 
household goods
75.2 62.1 6.0 4.8 77.6
R 92. Gambling and betting 
activities 50.2 44.2 37.2 37.3 73.2
R 90. Creative arts and 
entertainment activities 53.9 60.2 27.7 10.3 69.9
S 96. Other personal 
service activities 71.7 34.2 13.1 6.6 67.5
N 79. Travel agency tour 
operator reservation service 44.3 82.1 14.4 11.9 66.9
M 74. Other professional 
scientific and technical 
activities
44.4 75.1 22.9 7.8 65.9
P 85. Education 41.8 81.2 16.1 10.0 64.7
R 93. Sports activities and 
amusement and recreation 
activities
50.7 27.2 25.1 23.1 58.5
 
D 35. Electricity gas steam 
and air conditioning supply 4.6 38.9 27.1 6.4 23.3
C 30. Manufacture of other 
transport equipment 0.8 50.0 9.4 18.9 22.9
E 36. Water collection 
treatment and supply 3.5 31.4 38.9 0.0 21.5
C 20. Manufacture of chem-
icals and chemical products 1.3 56.1 9.0 5.0 20.8
C 16. Manufacture of wood 
and of products of wood 
and cork 
7.4 44.8 6.1 3.3 19.7
C 24. Manufacture of basic 
metals 0.0 47.9 4.9 2.4 14.6
C 29. Manufacture of 
motor vehicles trailers and 
semi-trailers
1.7 41.6 1.2 6.3 13.5
H 53. Postal and courier 
activities 15.5 6.8 6.8 3.2 11.7
K 66. Activities auxiliary to 
financial services and insur-
ance activities
7.1 5.1 9.8 3.8 5.9
K 65. Insurance, reinsur-
ance and pension funding 5.3 0.0 2.9 2.8 0.0
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
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Table 25 – ML risk composite indicator across NACE divisions in Italy
10 most and 10 least risky divisions. Model 2 excluding business profitability
Business Sector (NACE division)










I 56. Food and beverage service 
activities
100.0 47.0 21.0 100.0
S 95. Repair of computers and 
personal and household goods
77.4 57.0 3.2 80.4
S 96. Other personal service activities 72.6 32.8 6.5 67.3
N 79. Travel agency tour operator res-
ervation service and related activities
42.3 76.6 11.2 64.4
R 92. Gambling and betting activities 44.8 45.8 40.5 63.5
R 90. Creative arts and entertainment 
activities
48.2 59.7 12.2 62.1
P 85. Education 40.2 75.5 9.2 61.6
A 03. Fishing and aquaculture 58.5 42.9 6.9 61.0
M 74. Other professional scientific and 
technical activities
42.1 70.5 7.7 60.4
C 19. Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products
3.4 61.2 100.0 59.1
 
H 50. Water transport 15.3 18.0 5.3 16.0
K 64. Financial service activities 
except insurance and pension funding
3.8 25.1 19.7 15.3
J 61. Telecommunications 8.3 24.3 9.8 14.9
C 29. Manufacture of motor vehicles 
trailers and semi-trailers
3.6 36.8 4.1 14.6
D 35. Electricity gas steam and air 
conditioning supply
2.1 37.1 7.0 14.6
C 24. Manufacture of basic metals 0.9 42.9 0.5 13.9
H 53. Postal and courier activities 15.3 7.2 3.1 10.6
E 36. Water collection treatment and 
supply
1.4 30.2 1.1 9.0
K 66. Activities auxiliary to financial 
services and insurance activities
7.2 5.1 3.6 3.6
K 65. Insurance, reinsurance and 
pension funding except compulsory 
social security
6.2 0.0 2.0 0.0
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
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45. See 2.2 (and in particular Table 18) and the Annex for details. Each 
of the parameters corresponds to a letter: V (Varimax), O (Oblimin), 
P (Weights based on the proportion of variance explained), E (Equal 
weights), S (Weighted arithmetic mean),  T (Components standardised 
Z-scores), D (Components normalised Min – Max), M (Risk indicator 
normalised Min – Max), Z (Risk indicator standardised Z-scores).
STEP 7 – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND 
VALIDATION
The composite score developed at business sec-
tor level cannot be validated, like the provincial one, 
against alternative measures of money laundering 
such as suspicious transaction reports or ML of-
fences because data on STRs are not available by 
industry (it is not mandatory information to be given in 
the STR form). 
For this reason, the validation process is limited to 
only the sensitivity analysis. As in the PCA at pro-
vincial level, two types of changes are taken into ac-
count:
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• variations in the parameters used to compute the 
final composite indicator45 
• modifications in the variables selected for the 
PCA, dropping one variable at a time from the 
final model (Model 1). 
All the indicators’ scores resulting from changes to 
PCA parameters or variables are highly correlated, 
with an average r = 0.94 excluding Model 11. Mod-
el 11 (which includes business opacity proxies not 
weighted by average company size) has instead a 
weak positive correlation with the other models. The 
correlation matrix suggests that changes in the meth-
odology do not significantly affect the overall result, 
and that the IARM ML composite indicator remains 
solid and robust even after the sensitivity analysis.
Figure 29 – Correlation among ML risk composite indicators after applying different methodological options 
(left) or using different proxy variables (right)
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
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This chapter carried out an exploratory analysis of ML 
threats and vulnerabilities in Italy. It developed two 
composite indicators of ML risk:
• at sub-national area level, across the 110 Ital-
ian provinces
• at business sector level, across 77 NACE divi-
sions. 
What is the added value of this analysis?
IARM complements existing ML/TF risk assess-
ments conducted in Italy in recent years such as the 
NRA 2014 (CSF, 2014b). It stresses the quantitative 
approach and incorporates some innovative elements:
• A higher disaggregation detail: IARM car-
ries out a sub-national analysis, while the NRA 
adopts a national perspective. 
• Coverage of all business sectors, while the 
NRA does not adopt a sectorial perspective.
• A synthetic measure: the composite indicators 
developed by IARM condense into one value a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon such as 
ML risk, while it is difficult to summarise the re-
sults of existing NRA in a ‘snapshot’.  
• An innovative analysis of Italian businesses’ 
ownership: IARM has carried out the first large-
scale investigation of where the shareholders 
and BOs of Italian companies come from and of 
how complex their ownership structure is across 
regions and business sectors.   
Despite the innovative contribution, the approach ad-
opted by IARM has various weaknesses:
• It does not take into account ML threats important 
for the Italian context such as corruption, extor-
tion and usury – for which reliable measures at 
regional and business sector level do not exist.
• It does not fully take into account emerging 
threats and vulnerabilities, which, by defini-
tion, are characterised by lack of data and esti-
mates: for example, the use of virtual currencies 
and new payment methods (e.g. prepaid cards, 
mobile or internet based payments).  
2.4  Research and policy implications
• It does not consider the vulnerabilities in the Ital-
ian AML regulation, because it is assumed that 
they are the same across regions and sectors, on 
which the analysis is focused.
• It does not analyse the consequences of ML in 
Italy, despite the large body of evidence of the 
negative impact of money laundering (especially 
of mafia groups) on market competition and eco-
nomic growth. 
Who can benefit from this analysis?
Supervisory authorities
The first to benefit from IARM results are supervisory 
bodies at the national level (e.g. MEF, Banca d’Italia), 
at industry level (e.g. national banking association, 
Ordine dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti Con-
tabili, etc) and other public authorities (e.g. Agenzia 
delle Entrate, CONSOB, Camere di Commercio, etc.). 
IARM supports the design of more evidence-based 
policies because it makes it possible to disentangle, 
for each province and business sector, the factors that 
contribute most to the overall ML risk. This can lead to 
better area- or sector-specific interventions.
For example, the scatterplot below compares two 
risk components stemming from the analysis at 
province level: PC1 (OC infiltration) and PC2 (un-
derground and cash-intensive economy). It shows 
how the 110 Italian provinces distribute along the 
two axes. Provinces like Vibo Valentia or Catanza-
ro have high ML risk because of high values of both 
PC1 and PC2. Provinces like Ogliastra or Benevento, 
instead, have high ML risk determined by high levels 
of cash-use and of underground economy, but they 
have low ML risks related to OC and mafia. Provinc-
es like Naples are characterised by high PC1 values 
(mafia component) but relatively lower values of cash 
use. This would help policy-makers to understand 
better where to intervene and what threats and vul-
nerabilities should be targeted specifically in order to 

































Figure 30 – Scatterplot - OC infiltration vs. Underground and cash-based economy
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
Figure 31 – STRs and ML risk














































From a policy-maker’s perspective, this approach 
would also help in identifying the under- or over-re-
porting provinces according to their estimated level 
of ML risk. The figure below plots on the horizontal 
axis the ML risk composite indicator values, and on 
the vertical one, the STRs/banks ratio. Those prov-
inces lying below the diagonal report fewer STRs 
than expected on the basis of their estimated level of 
ML risk, while those above the diagonal report more 
STRs than expected. Such a chart would help poli-
cy-makers and competent authorities to understand 
the reasons for the different behaviour of differ-
ent areas in terms of reporting to FIUs, and facili-
tate the monitoring of obliged entities’ activities.46
Investigative authorities
On the basis of the IARM analysis, investigators in 
the AML field (e.g. UIF, DIA, Guardia di Finanza, etc.) 
could improve the detection of the risky areas and 
sectors on which to focus investigative efforts. 
Moreover, the analysis of the ownership structure 
of Italian firms makes it possible to detect links with 
risky jurisdictions and anomalies which would warrant 
further investigation – above all, the high number of 
foreign beneficial owners (in particular from Spain) in 
sectors like R 92 (gambling and betting) character-
ised by growing criminal infiltration by organisations 
such as the Camorra and the ‘Ndrangheta. 
Obliged entities
Obliged entities subject to L. 231/2007 – like banks, 
professionals, real estate agencies and gaming/gam-
bling companies – could use the IARM analysis to 
enrich the set of anomaly indicators for CDD pur-
poses: for example, they may be useful to determine 
the risk related to the client’s geographic area (“area 
geografica di residenza o sede del cliente e della con-
troparte”) and to its business activity (“prevalente at-
tività svolta”) (L. 231/2007, Art. 20, 1). IARM ML risk 
composite indicators could be easily adopted in the 
everyday work of AML practitioners and incorporated 
into proprietary AML risk models and software. 
What future research directions? 
Future research on Italian ML risk assessment would 
benefit greatly from the following measures:
• Improving the availability and quality of data:
- related to those ML predicate offences which 
are particularly relevant to the Italian context, 
like corruption, extortion and usury, for which 
reliable sub-national measures are lacking;
- related to tax evasion, especially at the busi-
ness sector level;
- on cash, in terms of use by both individuals 
and by businesses: surveys on this topic 
would be very helpful;
- on STRs, especially improving the amount of 
information on business sectors involved in 
suspicious transactions;
- related to business ownership, by integrating 
BvD data with information from the national 
Italian business register.
• Integrating public statistics with private sec-
tor data, e.g. with proprietary information of the 
banking industry or information held by sectorial 
supervisory authorities;
• Integrating qualitative and quantitative ap-
proach: the methodological approach experiment-
ed by IARM could be combined with the approach 
of the Italian NRA, and it could be enriched with a 
higher number of interviews and questionnaires in 
order to assist the selection of risk factors and to 
validate the results of the statistical analysis.  
• Extending the analysis to further risk factors, such 
as vulnerabilities in the AML regulation, which 
become crucial when conducting cross-national 
comparative analysis.
• Exploring the possibility to analyse and assess 
also impact/consequences of ML activities, 
at least in selected areas of the country or busi-
ness sectors.
If repeated over time, the IARM exercise could help 
to identify emerging ML trends and to monitor how ML 
risks vary, over time, across areas and sectors. For 
this reason, it is recommended to take account of the 
IARM methodology in the future update of the Italian 
NRA to be carried out in 2017.
46. Figure 31 assumes a linear relationship between ML risk score and 
STRs which in fact is not proven. Moreover, it does not consider im-
portant variables which could explain the different attitudes in reporting 
ML suspicious operations, such as the different nature and concen-
tration of banks and professionals, the different reporting culture, the 
different guidelines issued by regional bodies. However, it serves only 
to provide policy-makers with a clearer idea of how this analysis could 
be used for AML monitoring purposes.
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The Netherlands has been a pioneer in money laundering 
research (FATF, 2013a, pp. 54-55). The official National Risk 
Assessment has not yet been finished (it is expected in 2017), 
but a pilot study for the National Risk Assessment (NRA) was 
recently published (van der Veen and Ferwerda, 2016). 
This chapter presents an analysis of the main ML risk factors 
in the country, providing details of how threats and vulnera-
bilities vary across business sectors (83 divisions).
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 provides an 
introduction on ML risk assessment in the country; Section 
3.2 illustrates the analysis at business sector level and the 
development of a ML risk composite indicator; Section 3.3 
discusses briefly research and policy implications.
Joras Ferwerda   Edward Kleemans 
VU Amsterdam, the Netherlands
3. 
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• IARM has carried out an exploratory assessment 
of ML risk in the Netherlands, developing a com-
posite indicator at business sector level, across 
83 NACE divisions
• The analysis provides possible inputs for the 
NRA that is developed in 2017 
Money laundering risk assessment 
across 83 NACE divisions
• IARM has identified and collected data for two 
threat factors of money laundering risk with 
four proxy threat variables:
1. Organised crime infiltration
a. Organised Crime Monitor cases
b. Evidence reported in the EU-project Organ-
ised Crime Portfolio
c. Administrative measures to prevent organ-
ised crime infiltration
2. Corporate fraud
a. Corporate tax anomalies
• IARM has identified and collected data for three 
vulnerability factors of money laundering risk 
with five proxy threat variables:
1. Cash intensiveness
a. Cash / total assets
2. Opacity of business ownership
a. Distance between company and beneficial 
owners
b. Risk score for shareholders
c. Risk score for beneficial owners
4. Business profitability (the more profitable, the 
more vulnerable to ML)
a. EBITDA margin
• These nine risk factors are combined in a com-
posite indicator of ML risk using a principle 
component analysis
• According to the model, the economic sector in 
the Netherlands with the highest ML risk are ca-
sinos and other gambling and gaming busi-
nesses (NACE division R 92). They can be an 
interesting target for organised crime invest-
ments but can also be used to launder money 
itself. While casinos were already part of EU AML 
regulations in the Third EU directive, the Fourth 
EU directive extended obligations also to other 
gaming and gambling activities. The FATF pub-
lished a report in 2009 about the vulnerabilities of 
casinos and the gaming sector. The related sec-
tor R 93 – Sport, amusement and recreation ac-
tivities, which includes also prostitution services 
– is slightly lower in the list, but still in the top 10.
• Hotels (accommodation, I 55) come second. 
They score particularly high on the principal 
component of OC infiltration, indicating that crim-
inals see them as interesting investments. Bars 
and restaurants (I 56) are slightly lower on the 
list, but still in the top 10 for the same reason.
• Third is the art and entertainment sector (R 
90), for which the confidentiality (of the custom-
ers) is especially mentioned in the literature as a 
ML risk factor. Here, this sector is also associat-
ed with a high level of opacity of the businesses’ 
ownership structure.
• Security and investigation agencies (N 80) 
are fourth in terms of ML risk index for the Neth-
erlands. The Dutch police published a report 
in 2014 with several indications that organised 
crime groups (among them, outlaw motorcycle 
gangs) are active in this sector.
• Sectors which are usually under the lens of AML 
investigators – like financial institutions, real 
estate agencies and trust and company ser-
vice providers – do not rank very high accord-
ing to the IARM estimate: but their exposure to 
ML is usually related to their role as gatekeepers 
(i.e. in the placement phase of the ML process), 
while IARM is somehow focusing on the integra-
tion phase of the ML cycle.
Main findings - The Netherlands
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Research and policy implications 
• The indicators and results produced by IARM 
respond to the need, stressed by regulatory de-
velopments at the EU level and the pilot study for 
the Dutch NRA ML, to develop more objective 
and solid methodologies for ML risk assess-
ment
• In particular they can be used by, for example:
- Policy-makers, to design more evidence-based 
and specific interventions
-Investigators, to identify anomalies and emerg-
ing ML trends more easily (if the exercise is re-
peated over time)
-Obliged entities (e.g. banks or professionals), 
to facilitate customer due diligence (CDD) and 
assessment of clients’ risks
• However, the IARM quantitative assessment 
cannot completely replace the qualitative ap-
proach proposed in the pilot study for the Dutch 
NRA ML; rather it should be seen as supplemen-
tary. A combination of the two approaches is 
suggested to fully appreciate overall ML risks in 
the country.
• Future developments should improve data avail-
ability and quality, refine proxies for risk factors 
and explore alternative variables and measure-
ment approaches.
Table 2 – ML risk across business sectors in the Netherlands
Top 10 NACE divisions according to ML risk composite indicator
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration 
Business sector (NACE division)
 
R 92. Gambling and betting activities
I 55. Accommodation
R 90. Creative, arts and entertainment activities
N 80. Security and investigation activities
S 95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods
N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities
S 96. Other personal service activities
O 84. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
R 93. Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
I 56. Food and beverage service activities














Although an official NRA is still to be published in 
2017, references can be made to four relevant stud-
ies on money laundering risk in the Netherlands:
1) The National Threat Overview by the National Po-
lice Services Agency (Soudijn & Akse, 2012)
2) A Policy Effectiveness Evaluation by the Court of 
Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2014)
3) The FATF Mutual Evaluation of the Netherlands 
(FATF, 2014b)
4) The first National AML Policy Monitor published 
in October 2015 (Decide, 2015)
National Threat Overview
The National Police Services Agency provides 
an overview of organised crime threats in the 
Netherlands, including a specific report on mon-
ey laundering (Soudijn & Akse, 2012). The re-
port describes money laundering methods 
(primarily in qualitative terms but including - as 
far as possible - some figures and indicators), 
characteristics of persons involved in ML cas-
es, consequences for Dutch society, relevant 
factors (the abuse of the 500 Euro notes), and 
some specific conclusions about the near fu-
ture, including the prediction that the basic ML 
methods will remain the same and that only the 
specific ways in which these methods are used 
will change, due to changes in society and reg-
ulation. The report concludes that traditional 
methods such as loan back and feigning a higher 
turnover are still frequently used, and that meth-
ods such as ABC-transactions are particularly 
suited to laundering larger sums of money. Po-
tential new trends may include trade based mon-
ey laundering (TBML), the use of specific Dutch 
legal entities (e.g. ‘Stichtingen’), new payment 
methods (such as prepaid debit cards), and leas-
ing cars (whereas leasing companies are not part 
of the obliged entities in Dutch AML legislation). 
According to the report, the consequences for 
Dutch society as a whole are hard to estimate, 
but on a local level clear examples of risky situa-
tions exist, such as monopoly positions (shops), 
important local positions through investments in 
real estate, and criminals as negative role mod-
els for adolescents in local neighbourhoods. 
Transfer of illegal proceeds to other countries 
is mentioned as well, but it was not part of the 
Dutch National Threat Overview. 
Policy Effectiveness Evaluation
The Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2014) 
conducted a policy evaluation on the anti-mon-
ey laundering policies in the Netherlands, fol-
lowing up on an earlier, very critical, report (2008) 
concluding that the prevention of money launder-
ing was insufficient, that the chance that money 
laundering was detected and punished was low, 
and that investigating agencies and authorities 
made too little use of the opportunities to seize 
illegal assets. The report concludes that invest-
ments have been made into capacity, expertise, 
and exchange of information, but that the respon-
sible Ministers are unable to provide insight into 
the predominant money laundering risks and 
the results of anti-money laundering policies. 
Furthermore, feedback to obliged entities about 
what investigating agencies do with reported 
suspicious transactions has not improved. Final-
ly, the insight of the Dutch FIU into this matter 
has even decreased, according to the Court of 
Audit. The advice of the report is to gain insight 
into the predominant money laundering risks in 
the Netherlands and to start collecting and an-
alysing quantitative and qualitative data on the 
activities of agencies involved in anti-money 
laundering. The Ministers agreed to follow up on 
this advice, but stated that the report gives a too 
limited view of all the activities that are carried 
out in the fight against money laundering in the 
Netherlands (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2014). 
3.1 Introduction and background
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FATF Mutual Evaluation of the Netherlands
The FATF 2nd Follow-up report (FATF, 2014b) of 
the 2011 Mutual Evaluation of the Netherlands 
provides an evaluation of the policies and activi-
ties implemented in the Netherlands in response 
to the recommendations of this Mutual Evalu-
ation. The amendments of preventive AML/
CFT legislation have (largely) addressed the 
majority of the shortcomings, including those 
on beneficial ownership requirements. Further-
more, the report concludes that the Netherlands 
has made important progress by criminalising 
terrorist financing as an autonomous offence. 
The key recommendation of the report is that the 
Netherlands has made sufficient progress in ad-
dressing the deficiencies identified in the earlier 
Mutual Evaluation Report, so that its overall level 
of compliance can be assessed at a level essen-
tially equivalent to ‘Largely Compliant’.
National AML Policy Monitor
The National AML Policy Monitor (Decide, 2015) 
was partly developed as a response to the criti-
cal reports of the Court of Audit. This AML Pol-
icy Monitor will contribute to the establishment 
of (performance) indicators of AML activities 
that are achievable, measurable, and ade-
quate. The first step includes an inventory and 
interpretation of the AML activities and exchange 
of information between the actors involved. Sev-
en processes are distinguished: (collection) of 
evidence on money laundering; investigation and 
tracing; prosecution and trial; Dutch FIU: detec-
tion of suspicious financial transactions; report-
ing unusual transactions and identifying clients 
by institutions (in compliance with the WWFT, 
the law on money laundering and terrorist financ-
ing); supervision of institutions for compliance 
with AML requirements; and directing and coor-
dinating of the AML activities. The second step 
involves measuring these activities against the 
FATF criteria for an effective AML policy. After 
this first report (Decide, 2015), the next version 
of the monitor intends to specify the performance 
indicators further, which will improve the function-
ality of this National AML Policy Monitor.
IARM builds on these four studies (and further ones). 
But it provides an added value by incorporating some 
innovative elements:
• IARM focuses on the relative ML risk in different 
business sectors in the Netherlands, while these 
studies focus on the overall policies and threats
• IARM covers the ML risk of all the economic sec-
tors, while the four former studies focus mainly 
on regulated sectors (i.e. financial intermediaries, 
DNFBPs and other entities);
• IARM adopts a quantitative approach which ulti-
mately produces a composite indicator of ML risk. 
This could become an operational instrument not 
only for policy-makers, but also for LEAs in AML in-
vestigations, supervisors and obliged entities during 
CDD activities. Eventually it could also be used to 
increase the effectiveness of money laundering de-
tection by various institutions, such as the police, 
the financial police (FIOD) and the Tax Office.
As a result, IARM is fully complementary to the 
previous exercises and their future updates. The 
combination of the findings of IARM and the previ-
ous studies should contribute to a more in-depth un-
derstanding of the ML risks in the different business 
sectors.
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The composite risk indicator is calculated for 83 busi-
ness sectors47 (level 2 NACE-classification, i.e. 
NACE divisions). This disaggregation level is the best 
compromise in terms of guaranteeing statistical signif-
icance and data availability (e.g. each sector should 
have sufficient companies for which data is available).
STEP 1 – ML RISK FACTORS IDENTIFICATION
After a review of academic literature, institutional re-
ports, investigative and judicial evidence, and valida-
tion by experts, IARM has identified a number of ML 
Figure 32 – Money laundering risk factors at business sector level in the Netherlands 
47. Those business sectors that include on average fewer than 10 regis-
tered companies according to the company data from the Statistics Bu-
reau Netherlands (CBS) in the quartiles of 2014 and 2015 have been 
removed. In particular, four sectors have been removed (NACE Rev. 
2 Divisions): B 05. Mining of coal and lignite, T 97. Activities of house-
holds as employers of domestic personnel, T 98. Undifferentiated 
3.2  Analysis at business sector level
risk factors for business sectors in the Netherlands 
that can be operationalised. They are grouped into 
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences in line 
with the FATF taxonomy (CSF, 2014a; FATF, 2013a; 
Dawe, 2013).48 
For each risk dimension, a variety of risk factors is 
identified. They are presented in the following chart 
and discussed in detail below. For the purpose of 
measurement, each risk factor is operationalised into 
one or more proxy variables. These variables are 
then used to produce the ML risk composite indicator.
goods- and services-producing activities of private households for own 
use and U 99. Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies. 
48. In line with the 2014 NRA and on the on-going EU SNRA, the main 
focus is on threats and vulnerabilities, while consequences are only 
briefly discussed (see Section 1.4).





















STEP 2 – ML RISK FACTORS 
OPERATIONALISATION
Each dimension, and in particular each risk factor, is 
operationalised into multiple proxy variables in order 
to allow for their measurement and analysis. Proxies 
are identified according to previous literature and data 
availability and applicability (see Chapter 1 and An-
nex). The chart below illustrates the selected proxies. 
For the purpose of the PCA presented in this sec-
tion, only those risk factors that could be operation-
alised with available and applicable data and prox-
ies at business sector level are considered. For this 
reason, the statistical analysis does not cover some 
risk factors that are deemed important in the liter-
ature (such as irregular labour), because in the Neth-
erlands there are no good measures available at the 
business sector level.49 
Annex A3 lists for each variable, the relevant source, 
the time coverage and any other relevant comments. 
The rationale behind the selection of each proxy vari-
able was already briefly mentioned above and will be 
detailed in the Annex, and is therefore not discussed 
here. Mainly due to data availability, the selected 
proxies differ slightly between the analysis for Italy, 
the UK and the Netherlands. 
49.   We focus on the level 2 NACE classification.
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration







































































Organised Crime Monitor in the 
Netherlands
Kruisbergen, Kleemans and Kouwenberg 
(2015) discuss national and international stud-
ies on investments of organised crime offend-
ers and use empirical data from the Dutch Or-
ganised Crime Monitor to give empirical insight 
into the choices that organised crime offenders 
make when they invest their money in the legal 
economy.
50. Obviously, some crimes do happen in a specific sector, like stealing 
from the company assets or like specific types of fraud. But these 
crimes are not the money laundering threats for the business sectors 
investigated here; they are merely the sources of crime money that can 
later threaten other business sectors. 
Money laundering threats
Focus is posed on the ML threats for business sec-
tors in the Netherlands that can be measured with 
available data. For an analysis on business sectors, 
the threat variables are particularly hard to find, 
since crime data cannot be used as in a geographi-
cal analysis. Crimes happen in a certain region, but 
not always in a specific sector.50 Eventually 4 proxies 
were found for ML threats. Data are available from re-
search reports on organised crime investments in the 
legitimate economy (Kruisbergen, van de Bunt, & Kl-
eemans, 2012; Savona & Riccardi, 2015) and inves-
tigations for administrative laws specifically designed 
to limit the threat of crime money being invested in 
the regular economy. With respect to indications for 
corporate tax anomalies we have unique and confi-
dential data from the tax office on anomalies in the 
financial/tax administrations of companies detected 
by tax officers during a tax inspection.
Organised crime infiltration
Cases of OC investments/infiltration
One of the most important sources for insights into 
organised crime infiltration in the Netherlands is the 
so-called ‘organised crime monitor’ (Kruisbergen et 
al., 2012). See the box below for a description and 
the main results of this study. 
The data consist of a dataset of 1,196 indi-
vidual assets of (suspected) participants 
in organised crime. This dataset covers var-
ious crimes, such as different sorts of drug 
trafficking/production, human smuggling, hu-
man trafficking and illegal arms trade, but also 
(large scale) fraud and money laundering. Fur-
thermore, the dataset includes information on 
foreign assets. To build this dataset, use was 
made of all 150 cases that were analysed by the 
research team of the Dutch Organised Crime 
Monitor (Kruisbergen et al., 2012), a long-run-
ning research project on organised crime in the 
Netherlands. The main sources of information 
are closed Dutch criminal investigations into 
criminal groups (period: 1996-2011), containing 
information on many hundreds of suspects.
Using this dataset of 1,196 individual assets, the 
study sheds light on the kind of assets that of-
fenders purchase and where these assets are 
located. The results are used to assess the ten-
ability of different theoretical approaches and 
assumptions that are present in the literature: 
the standard economic approach (‘profit’), the 
criminal infiltration approach (‘power’) and social 
opportunity structure (‘proximity’). The results of 
this study show that offenders primarily invest 
in their country of origin or in their country 
of residence. Furthermore, their investments 
consist of tangible, familiar assets such as 
residences and other real estate and (small) 
companies in well-known sectors: wholesale 
and retail (e.g. import/export companies, car 
companies, clothing firms, and ‘coffee shops’ – 
i.e. condoned Dutch cannabis outlets), hotels, 
bars and restaurants, transportation companies, 
brothels, and ‘financial intermediation’ (manage-
ment or investment companies which main pur-
pose is to hold other assets, such as real estate).
Investments such as bonds, options, and stocks 
in companies in which offenders are not per-
sonally (or indirectly) involved, such as stocks 
listed on the stock exchange, were only found 
in a small number of cases. In other words: of-
fenders usually stay close to home with their 
investments. Hence, instead of profitability and 
power, proximity seems to be a better descrip-
tion of their investment choices. 
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54. By definition, these data only apply to a limited number of business 
sectors: sectors that are eligible for a BIBOB investigation. Which 
sectors are eligible for a BIBOB investigation is not nationally pre-
scribed, but differs from city to city.
55. We would like to thank the Dutch Tax Office for providing the data 
and Jan Glimmerveen for his help in acquiring the data.
56. The official term in Dutch for such an investigation is a “boekenonderzoek”.
57. It was not possible to know which corrections were made and whether 
it was to the advantage or disadvantage of the checked company, but 
only the mere amount of corrections was available. To construct a com-
parable proxy variable across sectors, the numbers of corrections in 
each sector for the five years 2011-2015 were added up and then divid-
ed by the total number of inspections in that sector in the same period.
58. Obviously, it is not possible to know whether these corrections are 
(part of) corporate fraud: this is only the best indicator available for 
such a complex and multifaceted phenomenon as corporate tax fraud.
The IARM project gained access to the data of the 
Organised Crime Monitor.51 It is known for all the 
150 organised crime cases whether they invested in 
companies and to which business sectors these com-
panies belong.52 These data are used as one of the 
proxy variables for organised crime infiltration.
Another proxy variable for organised crime infiltration 
comes from data of an international EU co-funded 
research project called Organised Crime Portfolio 
(OCP) (see Savona & Riccardi, 2015). The OCP project 
based its conclusions on a database built by collecting 
information on organised crime investments from pub-
licly available sources (research reports, newspapers, 
etc.). This means that there is some overlap of the data 
with the Organised Crime Monitor in the Netherlands, 
which are also covered by the OCP project.53
Given the concerns about overlap, the correlation be-
tween the OCP data and the Organised Crime Moni-
tor data is calculated to indicate whether the data are 
too similar. The correlation of 0.26 makes us conclude 
that the data sources are sufficiently different and that 
therefore both can be included in the analysis. 
Administrative law and background checks
Especially in Amsterdam in the 1990s, there were 
concerns in the Netherlands about criminals taking 
over (parts of) the city centre (Commission Van Traa, 
1996). Consequently, to limit criminal investments in 
businesses such as bars and restaurants, the Nether-
lands implemented the so-called BIBOB Act that gives 
administrative institutions the opportunity to revoke or 
reject licences when there is suspicion of criminal 
involvement. Since the BIBOB Act came into effect, the 
Netherlands has become the second European coun-
try, after Italy, with administrative regulations against 
organsed crime (Ferwerda & Unger, 2016). An internal 
evaluation of the BIBOB Act showed that the possibility 
of being screened discouraged several applicants from 
continuing the application process for a licence and pos-
sible effects of displacement (Huisman & Nelen, 2007). 
As a proxy for organised crime infiltration, use is made 
of data on the number of BIBOB investigations in differ-
ent business sectors. Ideally, data on the results of these 
investigations (how often in each business sector licenc-
es are revoked or rejected) would be preferred but un-
fortunately they are not available because confidential. 
Therefore, data on how often a BIBOB advice is given in 
each business sector is used as a proxy for potential OC 
infiltration (see Landelijk Bureau Bibob, 2014).54  
Corporate tax anomalies
Money launderers using a company for their money 
laundering operations have an objective different from 
that of normal business owners, who generally aim 
to maximize profits or the size of the company. This 
difference should somehow be reflected in their be-
haviour, which may trickle down into the administra-
tion of a company. A money launderer may use some 
dirty funds – to pay employees with black salaries, for 
example, or add cash to the register – and must find a 
way to account for them; some accounting manipu-
lations (or ‘cooking of books’) might therefore be 
necessary. In an attempt to capture this behaviour, 
we use data on financial inspections by the Tax Office.
 
It was possible to acquire55 confidential data from the 
Dutch Tax Office on how many companies have been 
subject to a financial inspection56 and how often cor-
rections to the financial statements were made in 
each business sector (at division level) for the years 
2011-2015. If a tax inspector finds a mistake in the 
financial administration of a company, a correction of 
the tax declaration is made.57 These data are used as 
a proxy for potential corporate fraud. 58
51. We thank Edwin Kruisbergen and the scientific research and documen-
tation centre of the Dutch ministry of security and justice (WODC) for 
providing us with the detailed data and allowing us to use them for this 
research project.
52. To make the data comparable across sectors, we divide the count by 
the total number of registered companies in that business division. In 
some cases we did not have data specified at business division level, 
but only at the business section level. In those cases we divide the 
number of invested companies by the sum of all the registered compa-
nies in all the different divisions belonging to that section and applied 
that result to all the divisions belonging to that section.
  53. However, these cases are reclassified by the authors of OCP based 
on the short descriptions of all cases included in the Organised Crime 
Monitor (in an appendix), since they did not have access to the (unpub-




As described in Chapter 1, cash-based economies 
are more vulnerable to money laundering. Cash is a 
facilitator for committing crimes (first of all tax eva-
sion) and for laundering the proceeds of crime. It is 
hard to trace and therefore it helps to disguise the 
criminal sources of profits, making financial investi-
gations and asset seizures harder (Riccardi & Levi, 
2017; Europol, 2015; U.S. Department of the Trea-
sury, 2015; Soudijn & Reuter, 2016). 
The cash intensity in the Dutch economy as a whole 
is relatively low when compared to other European 
countries - according to a 2011 household survey 
conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB, 
2011), as can be seen in the table below. After 2011, 
the amount of cash payments decreased even fur-
ther, from 4.13 billion payments in 2011 to 3.19 billion 
payments in 2015 (DNB, 2015).











Europe 87% 55% 20% 4%
Belgium 84% 48% 18% 5%
Germany 91% 69% 21% 4%
Spain 90% 64% 30% 6%
France 80% 15% 3% 0%
Italy 91% 77% 31% 4%
Luxembourg 77% 27% 10% 3%
Netherlands 65% 20% 8% 4%
Austria 82% 60% 29% 10%
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of ECB, 2011 
Van der Cruijsen, Hernandez and Jonker (2015) mea-
sured whether the use of cash differs per sector in 
their study titled In love with the debit card, but still 
married to cash. Mainly street vendors, recreation and 
catering providers are paid in cash. The graph below 
shows the results of their study on payment methods 
in the Netherlands. Unfortunately, their study does 
not use the standard NACE business sector classifi-
cation that we used in the IARM project and we could 
therefore not use their research results.
Figure 34 – Payment methods across Dutch busi-
ness sectors
% per type of payment method on total payments. 
DNB/DPA payment survey. 2013
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of van der Cruijsen et al., 2015, p. 13
Cash-intensiveness across Dutch business sectors
As stressed in Chapter 1, cash-intensive business-
es are attractive to criminals because they ease the 
concealment and integration of illicit proceeds (FATF, 
2010a; Gilmour & Ridley, 2015; Gilmour, 2014; Tran-
scrime, 2013). But measuring the level of cash inten-
sity at business sector level is not easy. The proxy 
adopted here is an indirect measure of the extent to 
which companies in a certain sector detain assets 
in cash: the average cash/total assets ratio of the 
companies operating in a certain sector. This proxy is 
preferred to other fundamental analysis ratios due to 
data availability and for other reasons.59 
59. Other measures of liquidity are, for example, current assets / total 
assets or receivable days. It has been found that current assets / 
total assets is a meaningful proxy for cash intensiveness in Italy 
(see Chapter 2), but in the Netherlands the same patterns cannot 
be found (most of the evidence on current assets is limited to Italian 
mafias); we may therefore conclude that cash/total assets is a bet-
ter proxy. Receivables days (or debtors days) measure the average 
length of time taken by a company’s customers to pay their debts 
(O’Regan, 2006). It can be assumed that the lower the receivables 
days ratio, the more liquid the payments received by a company. 
Unfortunately, details on debtors and payables are not largely avail-
able in the source used for analysis (see also Chapter 2 and Annex).
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 60. One should consider that this can also be the result of the so-called 
‘denominator effect’: It could be that the total of assets registered in 
the data is relatively low for these sectors, therefore giving the cash 
intensity measured as cash over total assets a high score.
The figure below shows this ratio in the various busi-
ness sectors of the Dutch legitimate economy. Most 
striking is the cash-intensiveness of the public sec-
tor (which is not analysed in Italy because public bodies 
are not registered in the business register, while in the 
Netherlands they are). In the Netherlands the ‘compa-
nies’ that are registered in sector O (public sector) are 
public bodies of different governance levels (munici-
palities, provinces and water authorities can have their 
own ‘company number’), police (regions), ministries, 
fire departments, and other institutions. It is not clear 
why these organisations would have such a high cash 
ratio according to our data (the same holds for the ed-
ucation sector, which, however, ranks high also in Ita-
ly).60 Some other sectors do score high as expected, 
such as the entertainment industry (which includes 
gambling, but also prostitution in the Netherlands) 
and hotels and bars. These sectors are relatively 
popular for criminals to invest in (see e.g. Ferwerda 
& Unger, 2016; Kruisbergen et al., 2012; Levi, 2015). 
The cash-intensiveness may be among the factors ex-
plaining such high levels of criminal investments. 
In terms of NACE divisions, those with the highest 
ratio of current assets are reported in the table below. 
Figure 35 – Cash intensiveness in Dutch NACE 
sections
Cash/total assets (%). Last available year
Table 27 – Cash/Total assets in Dutch sectors (%)
Top 10 NACE divisions. Last available year 
BUSINESS SECTOR (NACE Divisions) Cash/Total Assets
O 84. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 46.4%
R 92. Gambling and betting activities 42.3%
N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and … 34.8%
R 90. Creative, arts and entertainment activities 25.2%
M 75. Veterinary activities 22.4%
H 53. Postal and courier activities 21.4%
E 37. Sewerage 19.9%
E 39. Remediation activities and other waste management services 19.7%
J 60. Programming and broadcasting activities 17.9%
C 26. Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 17.2%
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data
Once again, the division from sector O (public sec-
tor) is surprisingly high, while other divisions, such as 
gambling and betting activities (R 92) and Arts (R 90), 
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61. Beneficial owners in the BVD definition refer to owners who, in the 
ownership chain, hold directly or indirectly a minimum 10% at the first 
level of a company and 10% at further levels of control (see Annex 
for details). When BO distance equals 1, the company is directly con-
trolled by its BO(s) (see Annex for details).
Opacity of business ownership 
As discussed in Chapter 1, complex and extensive 
corporate structures, especially if established in risky 
jurisdictions with low levels of financial transparency, 
are helpful for concealing illicit flows and hiding 
beneficial ownership. (see e.g. FATF, 2016b, 2014a; 
ECOLEF, 2013; Riccardi & Savona, 2013; de Wille-
bois et al., 2011a; Blum et al., 1999; EBOCS Con-
sortium, 2015; EURODAD, 2015; van Koningsveld, 
2015).
The need for more detailed and transparent in-
formation on business ownership (in particular 
on beneficial owners – henceforth BO) has been 
stressed by FATF Recommendations (FATF, 2012) 
and then acknowledged at EU level in the updated 
version of the AML Directive (EU Directive 2015/849). 
However, problems of accessing data on ownership 
across different business registers and jurisdictions 
remain (Riccardi & Savona, 2013; EBOCS Consor-
tium, 2015).
What is the level of ownership complexity of Dutch 
companies? To answer this question, IARM focuses 
on two sub-dimensions:
• The complexity of Dutch businesses’ ownership 
structure as such (operationalised with the dis-
tance between the company and the beneficial 
owner – see below);
• The volume of business ownership connections 
with shareholders and BO from risky jurisdictions.
Level of complexity of Dutch businesses’ owner-
ship structure
Given available company data, measuring ownership 
complexity is not easy. Here it is assessed by con-
sidering the so-called BO distance, i.e. the average 
number of ‘steps’ which separate a company from its 
beneficial owner(s).61
Data on ownership of Dutch businesses is provided 
by Bureau van Dijk (hereafter BvD). Data on share-
holders and beneficial owners for each Dutch com-
pany are collected, and are then aggregated by na-
tionality of shareholder and beneficial owner (when 
available) for each business sector (NACE Rev. 2 
classification) (see Annex for details). The analysis on 
the nationality of shareholders and beneficial owners 
covers 450,000 shareholders and 25,000 BOs.62
The proxies for opacity of business ownership should 
indicate the dubious companies that have an un-
necessarily complex ownership structure. We 
therefore cannot rely on using only indicators of 
complexity, because bigger multinational companies 
have more complex ownership structures in gener-
al. For this reason, proxies are corrected (as in Italy 
and the UK, see Chapters 2 and 4) by weighting the 
BO distance by a measure of company size (specif-
ically, the average total assets). To illustrate this, the 
figures below shows the (unweighted) average BO 
distance and the average company size. Figure 38 
shows instead how the average BO distance per sec-
tor changes when corrected (or weighted) by average 
company size (fig. 38). 
A business sector like agriculture is characterised by di-
rect ownership, since its average BO distance is close to 
one (a BO distance of 1 means direct ownership). The 
sectors where the average BO distance is highest are 
Mining, Finance and Energy, all characterised by a high 
number of multinational companies and FDI (fig. 36).
Turning to the average company size, exactly those 
sectors with the highest BO distance are those char-
acterised by, on average, the biggest companies 
(highest average total assets). This indicates that, 
as expected, largest companies, like multinationals, 
have on average a more complex ownership struc-
ture. Therefore, the BO distance indicator is corrected 
for average company size to gain a better proxy for 
unnecessarily complex ownership structures. The 
graph below shows the results after weighting the BO 
distance (and normalising to scale 0-100) (fig. 38).
62. Initially, also the % of foreign owners of businesses in each sector 
was considered as a proxy for ML vulnerability, because the higher 
the number of foreign shareholders, the more difficult it is to trace 
the beneficial ownership and therefore the higher the risk. However, 
this variable would overlap to a large extent (correlation of 0.97) with 
the number of shareholders and BOs from risky jurisdictions (see 
below). Therefore, it was decided not to include it.
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Figure 36 – Average BO distance per business 
sector 
NACE sections. Last available year 
Figure 38 – Average BO distance per business 
sector
Normalised to scale 0-100. NACE sections. Weighted 
by average company size  
Weighting the BO distance by company size shows 
that the highest levels of ‘unexplained opacity’ are in 
divisions such as entertainment (R), other services 
(S) and hotels and bars (I).63 For the same reason, 
the correction by average company size is also ap-
plied to other measurements of opacity – sharehold-
ers’ risk score and BOs’ risk score. 
Business ownership connections with risky juris-
dictions
Foreign shareholders represent 7.8% of the total 
number of shareholders in the Netherlands. This is 
higher than for instance in Italy (see Chapter 2), indi-
cating that the Netherlands is a relatively open econ-
omy with a high number of foreign investors. The 
table below shows the top 10 origins of foreign share-
holders of Dutch companies. The list consists of the 
big Western economies, neighbouring countries 
and a Caribbean island which is part of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands (Curaçao). The only exception is 
Figure 37 – Average company size (total assets) 
per business sector
Average total assets in thousands of euros. NACE 
sections. Last available year 
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data
63.  A disadvantage of this correction is that the unit of measurement of 
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Cyprus, in place 10, which might have to do with rela-
tions between the offshore businesses that are based 
in Cyprus but have mailbox companies based in the 
Netherlands. Data seem to confirm that the share of 
foreign owners from certain countries can reflect (see 
Ferwerda & Riccardi, 2016):
• geographical proximity (e.g. shareholders from 
Belgium and Germany); 
• volume of FDI and trade exchanges (e.g. United 
States);
• foreign citizens resident in The Netherlands and 
former cultural/political links (e.g. Curaçao); 
• tax incentives (e.g. Luxembourg, Cyprus); 
• reasons related to lack of transparency of certain 
foreign jurisdictions (see below).
Figure 39 – Most prevalent foreign shareholders 
of Dutch companies (%)
Figure 40 – Most prevalent foreign beneficial own-
ers of Dutch companies (%)
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data 
This list consists of European countries (except the US 
in place 10). This strengthens the intuition that geo-
graphical proximity is a factor more important to explain 
foreign beneficial ownership than to explain foreign 
shareholders. Spain ranks on top – as also in Italy and 
the UK. The reason is not very clear and would deserve 
further investigation (see Section 2.3 for some interpre-
tations on Italian data).
At NACE division level, the industries with the highest 
percentages of foreign owners are: C 19 Manufacture 
of coke and refined petroleum products (33%), B 08 
Other mining and quarrying (25%), and B 06 Extraction 
of crude petroleum and natural gas (18%). Since these 
are industries with multinational companies, this might 
not be very surprising. More interesting is when we cor-
rect the percentage of foreign shareholders for average 
company size (as illustrated above for BO distance). 
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In terms of beneficial owners, the top 10 list is slight-
ly different. 
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Table 28 – Foreign Beneficial Owners by business sector weighted by average company size
Top 10 business divisions. Last available year.
Rank NACE division
1 N 80. Security and investigation activities
2 I 55. Accommodation
3 G 47. Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
4 N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities
5 S 95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods
6 R 91. Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities
7 N 78. Employment activities
8 S 96. Other personal service activities
9 C 18. Printing and reproduction of recorded media
10 I 56. Food and beverage service activities
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data
64. Though in the NACE classification printing and reproduction of re-
corded media is classified as a type of manufacturing.
65. The Secrecy Score is a component of the Financial Secrecy Index 
(FSI) developed by the Tax Justice Network and issued every 2 
years. The secrecy score is a composite indicator which evaluates 
different dimensions of secrecy in the financial sector and in the leg-
islation of selected jurisdictions. In particular, it evaluates: A) the level 
Clearly, the business sectors with the highest per-
centage of foreign owners are not simply the big 
multinational industries when corrected for compa-
ny size. We now see some sectors that are gener-
ally more international in nature (such as hotels (I 
55), restaurants (I 56) and travel (N 79)) and not 
the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors.64 
Still, this poses the question of whether simply for-
eign ownership is a good indicator of money launder-
ing risk. It might be necessary to go more into detail 
about where the shareholders specifically come from. 
Not all foreign nationalities in fact encompass the 
same ML risk. A variety of jurisdictions exist which 
use financial and corporate secrecy to attract le-
gitimate and illicit financial flows (Tax Justice Net-
work, 2015b). In order to measure the extent of Dutch 
businesses’ ownership links with these risky juris-
dictions, the % of foreign shareholders and BOs in 
each business sector is multiplied by an indicator of 
opacity and low transparency (the Secrecy Score 
of the FSI - Financial Secrecy Index, FSS).65 This 
approach is used also in previous studies (e.g. Cas-
setta, Pauselli, Rizzica, & Tonello, 2014; Gara & De 
Franceschis, 2015; Riccardi, Milani, et al., 2016). In 
particular, each nationality of shareholders and BO is 
weighted by the relevant value of the FSS, and cor-
rected with a measure of company size in order to 
offset the incidence of multinational companies (the 
same method is used in the analyses of Italy and UK 
– see Chapters 2, 4, 5 and Annex for details). 
of banking secrecy; B) access to beneficial ownership information; 
C) corporate transparency; D) efficiency of tax and financial regu-
lation; E) compliance with international standards; F) international 
cooperation (Tax Justice Network, 2015). For further details see An-
nex. The secrecy score has been preferred to other measures of 
risky jurisdictions (e.g. international or national blacklists) because 
of its independency and transparency of the evaluation methodology. 
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Figure 41 – Level of risky ownership connections 
with risky jurisdictions
Normalised to scale 0-100. NACE sections. Weighted 
by average company size 
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD and TJN data
In terms of opacity of shareholders, the business sec-
tion information and communication technologies (ICT) 
scores surprisingly high. When looking at more detailed 
data (at division level), it seems that this result is mainly 
driven by the division J 63 (Information service activ-
ities) and J 62 (Computer programming activities). 
a sector where (at least for the companies on which we 
have data) the majority of shareholders are foreign. Also 
section I (Accommodation) and R (Entertainment) 
rank high in terms of opacity of shareholders. As expect-
ed, the lowest opacity is found in the public sector.
66. It should also be noted that the amount of BOs in the BvD data is 
sometimes relatively low for certain Dutch sectors, which possibly 
increases the variance of the data. 
The hotel and bar sector (Section I) has the high-
est opacity for beneficial owners, when corrected 
for company size. Although one can imagine that this 
sector is more international in nature, the extent to 
which it stands out is surprising. Most foreign bene-
ficial owners in this sector come from Luxembourg 
and Italy. Italy is not unexpected, given the abun-
dance of Italian restaurants in the Netherlands, but 
the amount of beneficial owners from Luxembourg 
seems more related to tax planning than to food tra-
dition.66 As expected, the public sector has no opacity 
at all in terms of beneficial owners.
Business profitability
According to some scholars, profitable sectors may 
be more prone to ML because the goal is to create 
‘white’ profits and because upcoming markets, with 
increasing profit opportunities and where the regula-
tions are still in development are interesting for crim-
inals (see Chapter 1 for details). To measure sectors’ 
profitability, average gross profit (data from BvD) is 
divided by the total turnover. To make sure that ac-
counting and taxation differences between sectors do 
not skew our results, the standard EBITDA margin67 
measurement for gross profit is preferred.
The most profitable sector in the Netherlands, ac-
cording to our BvD data, is health and social work 
(section Q). We do not see upcoming industries (such 
as renewable energies) in this top 10, although they 
are mentioned in the literature as specifically prone to 
criminal investments (see e.g. Caneppele, Riccardi, 
& Standridge, 2013). Other sectors which are gen-
erally considered at high profit margin, like energy or 
IT, do not appear in this ranking. The reason may be 
due to the use of the EBITDA margin ratio instead of 
other return on investment ratios like ROE or ROA 
(for which there is some problem of data availability 
and reliability).
In truth, some scholars also question a direct rela-
tionship between profitability and money laundering 
(see Chapters 1 and 2). In the IARM analysis of Italy, 
for example, two models at business sector level are 
presented, one including profitability and one exclud-
ing it. The sensitivity analysis (see step 7) shows that 
excluding profitability from the analysis does not alter 
the results significantly for the Netherlands.
67. EBITDA stands for Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
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Table 29 – Most profitable Dutch sectors (%)
NACE divisions. Last available year
 NACE division Average EBITDA margin (%)
Q 87. Residential care activities 63%
Q 88. Social work activities without accommodation 45%
Q 86. Human health activities 33%
P 85. Education 30%
E 39. Remediation activities and other waste management services 21%
N 77. Rental and leasing activities 20%
C 11. Manufacture of beverages 20%
A 03. Fishing and aquaculture 16%
J 58. Publishing activities 16%
E 37. Sewerage 15%
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration of BvD data
68. As an example, data on OC investments (from the OC monitor as 
well as from the EU-project OCP) list the number of OC investments 
divided by the number of companies in each sector. Otherwise if OC 
investments were randomly distributed across sectors the bigger 
sectors would have more investments, falsely indicating more risk.
69. This min-max normalisation is done with the following formula: Nor-
malised value = (value – lowest value of proxy) / (highest value of 
proxy – lowest value of proxy). Using other normalisation methods 
do not alter the results significantly.
STEP 3 – DATA COLLECTION AND 
NORMALISATION
Data collection, cleaning, imputation of missing 
value, validation
For each identified proxy variable, data are collected 
from the relevant sources. When not publicly avail-
able, information was requested from the relevant 
authority, institution or data provider. Due to a lack of 
data availability, different variables are covered with 
different time spans (see Annex for details). 
The number of companies in the various business 
sectors in the Netherlands varies greatly. We use 
relative values to make sure that this does not influ-
ence the PCA; but to prevent outliers and missing 
variables, those business sectors that include on 
average fewer than 10 registered companies accord-
ing to the company data from the Statistics Bureau 
Netherlands (CBS) in the quartiles of 2014 and 2015 
were excluded from the dataset. This means that four 
sectors (NACE divisions) were removed: B 05 Min-
ing of coal and lignite, T 97 Activities of households 
as employers of domestic personnel, T 98 Undiffer-
entiated goods- and services-producing activities of 
private households for own use, and U 99 Activities of 
extraterritorial organisations and bodies. As a result, 
ML risk is assessed across 83 NACE divisions of the 
Dutch legal economy.
Data transformation and normalisation
The IARM methodological approach relies on the 
concept of relative risk (see Chapters 1 and 2), 
which means that the money laundering threats or 
vulnerabilities should be weighted for the size of the 
business sector if the risk factors are not yet a rela-
tive measure (such as cash intensity or profitability). 
Therefore these variables are transformed into ratios 
on relevant control variables (e.g. number of com-
panies or total assets).68 Consequently, a min-max 
normalisation is applied, making all values between 
0 and 1, with 0 for the lowest relative value and 1 for 
the highest.69 
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STEP 4 – DATA EXPLORATION AND 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
First, the distribution of variables is explored (through 
descriptive statistics and basic inference tests) to iden-
tify specific data patterns. To provide an overview of the 
interdependence of the variables – and to test whether 
the overlap of variables is not too strong – the linear 
Pearson correlation is calculated (see corrplot below).
The table shows that the correlations between the 
variables are not particularly strong if compared, for 
70.   Principal component analysis is a multivariate data analysis tech-
nique used, in a similar way to other approaches (e.g. factor anal-
ysis), to reduce the information contained in large datasets into a 
smaller number of components (or factors, in factor analysis), each 
of them able to summarise a specific phenomenon explained by a 
range of correlated variables. For this purpose, PCA uses an orthog-
instance, with the regional analysis of Italy. Although 
the correlations between the different proxies for or-
ganised crime investments are relatively high, the 
correlation among vulnerability proxies are much low-
er. This indicates that the power of explanation of 
ML risk should come from the combination of all 
these factors. The correlations show that variables 
do not measure exactly the same thing. It is decided 
not to let the correlation be a decisive factor for inclu-
sion of variables, because a good external variable is 
not available to test the usefulness of inclusion (con-
trary to the regional analysis in Italy – see Chapter 2).
Table 30 – Correlation matrix of the variables used in the PCA
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. OC infiltration OCM 1.00
2. OC infiltration OCP 0.21 1.00
3. Administrative denials 0.28* 0.72* 1.00
4. Corporate tax anomalies -0.16 -0.04 0.02 1.00
5. Cash intensity -0.14 0.21 0.18 0.17 1.00
6. BO distance -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.17 0.24* 1.00
7. Shareholders’ risk score -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 0.13 0.24* 0.37* 1.00
8. BOs’ risk score 0.17 0.25* 0.42* 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.50* 1.00
9. Profitability -0.19 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.14 -0.09 1.00
*values are different from 0 with a significance level alpha of 0.05.
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration
STEP 5 - PRINCIPAL COMPONENT 
ANALYSIS (PCA)
To develop the composite indicator of ML risk, a prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA) approach is adopt-
ed.70 This approach helps to downsize the number of 
variables into a smaller number of components (Kab-
acoff, 2015; OECD & JRC, 2008; Jolliffe, 2002; Ren-
cher, 2002), which would correspond to sub-dimen-
sions of ML risk. The PCA is carried out as follows:
1. The number of principal components (PC) is 
selected on the basis of generally accepted stan-
dards such as the so-called Kaiser-Harris criterion 
(see Kabacoff, 2015; Jolliffe, 2002; OECD & JRC, 
2008);
2. The three extracted principal components are 
identified, ‘labelled’ and discussed; 
3. Principal components are then aggregated using 
non-discretionary weights extracted from the 
PCA to construct the final composite indicator (see 
STEP 6).
The results of the PCA are summarised in table 31. 
onal transformation of the correlated variables into a set of principal 
components which are uncorrelated with each other. Specifically in 
the analysis of ML risk in the Netherlands, a Pearson (n) principal 
component analysis with varimax rotation is performed. See also 
Chapter 1 and Annex for details.
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71. All the principal components with eigenvalue above 1 are selected, 
in line with Kaiser (1960).
Table 31 – Relevant components calculated with principal component analysis 
 PC1 PC2 PC3
OC infiltration OCM 0.35 0.04 -0.64
OC infiltration OCP 0.89 -0.07 -0.02
Administrative denials 0.92 0.06 -0.02
Corporate tax anomalies 0.00 0.25 0.47
Cash intensity 0.31 0.31 0.55
BO distance -0.05 0.55 0.39
Shareholders’ risk score -0.11 0.89 0.03
BOs’ risk score 0.42 0.68 -0.16
Profitability 0.01 -0.31 0.59
 
Eigenvalue 2.22 1.83 1.26
Variability (%) 24.62 20.35 14.02
Cumulative % 24.62 44.97 58.99
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration
* the selected principal components (with an eigenvalue > 1) are shown 
Three principal components are selected71, which 
together explain about 60% of the variability. For each 
of the principal components we highlight the variables 
with a non-discretionary weight of more than 0.5 (and 
those between 0.3 and 0.5 with a lighter colour). 
Based on these, the four principal components are 
labelled72 as follows:
• PC1 – OC infiltration and BO secrecy
• PC2 – Opacity of business ownership
• PC3 – Cooking the books 
The PCA shows that the risk factors on the threat of 
organised crime investments are distinct from those 
on the threat of corporate tax anomalies in the sense 
that they do not appear in the same components. The 
combination of OC infiltration threat with beneficial 
ownership secrecy is shown to be the main compo-
nent of money laundering risk. 
Opacity in the corporate structure is indicated as 
the second most important component of money 
laundering risk. The third component of ML risk points 
to cash intensive and profitable companies with tax 
anomalies. We label this component ‘cooking the 
books’. Interestingly, this component is negatively re-
lated to OC investments (based on Organised Crime 
Monitor data), indicating that the sectors related to 
cooking the books are not the same in which the 
police more often find organised crime investments. 
This cooking the books component could refer to a 
very traditional method of money laundering, i.e. add-
ing cash to the register (see e.g. Ferwerda, 2012). 
Adding cash to the register is a) harder to detect in 
cash-intensive sectors, b) creates extra profits, and c) 
creates a difference between the actual business of 
the company and its financial statements which can 
be labelled a tax anomaly when detected. This PCA 
may therefore encompass different money launder-
ing aspects, modi operandi or typologies.
Although we are eventually interested in the overall 
ML risk per sector, it is interesting to gain some in-
sights into how these different risk components vary 
across sectors. 
72. Note that these labels are the interpretation of the researchers. We 
cannot prove claims like ‘cooking the books’; we merely have indi-
cators that on average indicate the phenomenon at relatively higher 
proportions in some sectors rather than others.
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Table 32 – Top 10 sectors for each principal component 
PC1 – OC infiltration and 
BO secrecy
PC2 – Opacity of business 
ownership
PC3 – Cooking the books
I 55. Accommodation
N 80. Security and investigation 
activities
Q 87. Residential care activities
R 92. Gambling and betting
S 95. Repair of computers and 
personal ...
R 90. Creative, arts and entertain-
ment
H 51. Air transport
R 90. Creative, arts and 
entertainment
Q 88. Social work activities ...
I 56. Food and beverage service
N 79. Travel agency, 
tour operator ...
R 92. Gambling and betting
E 38. Waste collection, treatment …
S 96. Other personal service 
activities
O 84. Public administration and 
defence..
C 23. Manufacture of other 
non-metallic .. 
N 81. Services to buildings 
and landscape..
Q 86. Human health
G 47. Retail trade, except motor 
vehicles..
C 31. Manufacture of furniture P 85. Education
O 84. Public administration and de-
fence..
J 63. Information service activities
E 39. Remediation activities and 
other..
N 80. Security and investigation 
G 47. Retail trade, 
except motor vehicles ..
A 01. Crop and animal production, 
hunting
N 79. Travel agency, tour operator …
M 74. professional, 
scientific and technical..
R 93. Sports, amusement and 
recreation
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration
Once again, the results seem to indicate that the 
extracted principal components capture different as-
pects of ML risk: there is not a single sector that ap-
pears in the top 10 of each component. The most 
important PC – OC infiltration and BO secrecy – has, 
as expected, in its top 10 many sectors that are also 
mentioned in the literature on OC investments in the 
Netherlands (Ferwerda & Unger, 2016; Kruisbergen 
et al., 2012) but also some unexpected ones (such 
as C 23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products – which however is related to the extraction 
and treatment of cement, which is a crucial step in the 
building industry - and O 84 Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social security). For the other 
PCs we have less knowledge on what the expected 
sectors would be. It is remarkable that the arts sector 
(R 90) scores high for both principal component 2 and 
3, indicating that the arts sector consists of relatively 
profitable and cash-intensive businesses with more 
tax anomalies and more opacity.
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73. The choice of using the proportion of variance as weight for compo-
nents’ combination makes it possible to address the weakness of 
most composite indicators currently available in the literature, i.e. 
the fact that factors are aggregated attributing almost discretionary 
weights which heavily impact on the final result and ranking. In this 
case the weight of each component is the one resulting from the 
statistical analysis.
STEP 6 – AGGREGATION AND COMPOSITE 
INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION
The principal components, identified through the 
PCA, can then be combined in order to construct a 
synthetic composite indicator of ML risk. To do so, 
they are aggregated using as weight the propor-
tion of variance (of the model) explained by each 
component, and then normalised to the scale 0-100 
according to a min-max criterion, where 100 = highest 
ML risk.73 In other words (see Annex for details):
where i = 1, ..,I business sectors (in this case I = 83), j 
= 1, … , J component (in our case J = 3) and wj = pro-
portion of variance (out of the total variance explained 
by the model) explained by each of the three compo-
nents. Sij is the relevant value extracted by the PCA 
for each sector and for each component. The com-
posite score is normalised on a 0-100 scale (where 
100 = highest risk).74
The table below presents the top 10 business sec-
tors ranked according to the overall ML risk. The gam-
bling sector (R 92) scores the highest in our ML risk 
calculations. Casinos (and other gambling and gaming 
businesses, including video lottery and slot-machine 
rooms) fall under (inter)national anti-money laundering 
regulations, which means that they have to report un-
usual transactions and identify their customers. Even 
though this was not an obligation under the third AML di-
rective, many countries in the EU have extended these 
requirements to other gaming and gambling activities, 
because these activities are considered to bear a cer-
tain risk of money laundering (Unger, Ferwerda, Broek, 
& Deleanu, 2014, p. 23). The vulnerability of casinos 
to money laundering was recognised in the revision of 
the FATF 40 Recommendations, with obligations on 
casinos being significantly enhanced, and further ac-
knowledged in the fourth EU AML directive. To back 
this up, the FATF published a report on these vulnera-
bilities of casinos and gaming sector (see FATF, 2009). 
The sector ranking second is accommodation, i.e. 
hotels (I 55). This is not surprising considering some 
recent literature and evidence (see e.g. Emergo, 2011 
for a study on the relation between crime and hotels 
in the Netherlands, more specifically in Amsterdam). 
Third on the list is the art and entertainment sector 
(R 90). Arnoud Boot indicated already in 1994 that 
the art sector is almost perfect for money laundering, 
because it is one of the only sectors with a duty of 
confidentiality (see Boot & Wolde, 1997, p. 32). This 
is confirmed by the fact that the art sector scores 
high on business ownership opacity (see STEP 5), 
although Boot refers to the confidentiality of the cus-
tomers, while our principal component 2 refers to the 
‘confidentiality’ (or opacity) of owners. Sector R 93 - 
Sports activities and amusement and recreation 
activities, which includes also prostitution services, 
is slightly lower in the list. 
The business sector of security and investigation 
agencies (N 80) is fourth on our ML risk index. There 
have been several indications that outlaw motorcy-
cle gangs are active in this sector (e.g. KLPD, 2014, 
pp. 30, 34, 44, 66). Further down the list is another 
business sector that has been mentioned in studies 
on money laundering cases in the Netherlands: bars 
and restaurants (see e.g. Ferwerda, 2012; Emergo, 
2011; Savona & Riccardi, 2015). 
See Annex for an analysis of whence the composite 
risk derives (which principal components) for these 
top 10 sectors. As could be seen already at STEP 5, 
the sector with the highest risk – gambling – scores 
high in terms of OC infiltration as well as cooking the 
books indicators. Accommodation mainly scores high 
on OC infiltration, and the art sector scores high on 
opacity and cooking the books.
74. Risk score = (Composite score – lowest Composite score) / (highest 





J    (Sij x wj )=(Si1x w1 )+(Si2 x w2 )+(Si3 x w3 )
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The 10 least risky sectors are shown in the table 
below. Sectors which do not directly deal with custom-
ers seem to score low (such as manufacturing, ware-
housing, fishing and logging). A further analysis of the 
results shows that many manufacturing sectors are 
among the least risky sectors (ten divisions of C sec-
tion have a risk score below twenty). High barriers 
to entry, high capitalisations, and the requirement of 
high (technical and human) skills might not be ap-
pealing to criminals wanting to launder their mon-
ey. This result is in line with what found in Italy, where 
also manufacturing scores low (see Chapter 2).
Table 33 – Business sectors in the Netherlands with the highest money laundering risk
Top 10 NACE divisions according to ML risk composite indicator 
Sector ML composite indicator
R 92. Gambling and betting activities 100.0
I 55. Accommodation 97.9
R 90. Creative, arts and entertainment activities 72.9
N 80. Security and investigation activities 69.8
S 95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods 54,4
N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation service and related activities 54.1
S 96. Other personal service activities 48.7
O 84. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 46.6
R 93. Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 44.0
I 56. Food and beverage service activities 43.8
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration 
Table 34 – Business sectors in the Netherlands with the lowest money laundering risk
Least 10 NACE divisions according to ML risk composite indicator 
 ML composite indicator
C 20. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 10.7
C 11. Manufacture of beverages 10.3
A 03. Fishing and aquaculture 9.9
H 52. Warehousing and support activities for transportation 9.8
A 02. Forestry and logging 5.8
C 33. Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 5.0
K 64. Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 4.8
C 19. Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 3.2
K 65. Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, excl. compulsory social security 1.0
C 12. Manufacture of tobacco products 0.0
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration
A result that may be somewhat surprising is that in-
surance and financial sectors (K 65 and K 64) have 
a low ML risk. Both are among the regulated sectors 
under the AML policy regime. It cannot be determined 
whether these regulations are targeted on the wrong 
sectors or whether the AML efforts have been suc-
cessful in lowering the money laundering risk in these 
industries. A third – and more likely – explanation 
could be that the money laundering modi operandi 
which are most relevant and frequent for this sector 
are not captured by the proxies of this analysis. The 
same could be said as regards sectors like real estate 
agencies (NACE Section L) and trust and company 
service providers which, despite being pointed out 
by the literature as vulnerable to money laundering, 
do not rank among the most risky business sectors.  
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STEP 7 – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND 
VALIDATION
In the Netherlands, no good alternative external 
measure of money laundering risk is available as it 
is among Italian provinces (where the ML risk indi-
cator is compared to STRs distribution, see Chapter 
2). Therefore the validation of the robustness of the 
results is carried out at three levels:
a) Testing the extent to which the results are driven 
by using a PCA. To do so, the results of the PCA 
are compared against a theoretical model in 
which the various (normalised) proxy variables for 
ML risk factors, based on the literature (see STEP 
1), are simply combined together without any fur-
ther statistical elaboration.
b) Testing the extent to which the results are driven 
by the selection of variables. To do so, proxy vari-
ables are dropped, one-by-one, from the PCA 
model. This produces nine new composite scores 
which are compared with the baseline model pre-
sented in STEP 6. 
c) Testing to the extent to which the results are driv-
en by specific methodological choices adopted 
in the PCA process, such as normalisation tech-
niques, varimax rotation and weighting of the prin-
cipal components.
Comparison with a theoretical model
Instead of using a PCA approach, one can also 
simply assume that all the different risk factors (or 
proxy variables) that are mentioned in the literature 
are equally important. By applying this simple theo-
retical approach and comparing its results with our 
PCA method, we try to determine whether our results 
are driven by the PCA itself or whether a theoretical 
approach would confirm our results. To calculate the 
ML risk for our more theoretical approach with equal 
weights, we apply the following formula:
where i = 1, ..,I are the business sectors (in this case 
I = 83) and j = 1, … , J are the (normalised) proxy 
variables for risk factors (in our case J = 9). The com-
posite scores are then normalised to the 0-100 scale 
in the same way done for the PCA approach (see the 
former step for the exact formula used). 
Below, the top 10 and bottom 10 business sectors 
stemming from the PCA and the theoretical approach 
are listed and compared side by side.
Table 35 – Business sectors in the Netherlands with the highest money laundering risk
Top 10 NACE divisions. PCA approach (left) vs. theoretical model (right)
PCA approach - Sector Theoretical model - Sector
R 92. Gambling and betting activities 100.0 I 55. Accommodation 100.0
I 55. Accommodation 97.9 N 80. Security and investigation activities 77.6
R 90. Creative, arts and entertainment activities 73.0 R 92. Gambling and betting activities 77.0
N 80. Security and investigation activities 69.8 R 90. Creative, arts and entertainment activities 67.4
S 95. Repair of computers and personal and 
household goods
54.4 I 56. Food and beverage service activities 59.2
N 79. Travel agency, tour operator reservation 
service ...
54.1 S 95. Repair of computers and personal and ... 56.3
S 96. Other personal service activities 48.7 G 47. Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
...
52.7
O 84. Public administration and defence; ... 46.6 H 53. Postal and courier activities 50.9
R 93. Sports activities and amusement and rec-
reation ..
44.0 N 81. Services to buildings and landscape ... 47.7
I 56. Food and beverage service activities 43.8 S 96. Other personal service activities 47.0
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration 
ML RISK COMPOSITE INDICATORi = j=1 ∑
J    (proxy variableij )
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Table 36 – Business sectors in the Netherlands with the lowest money laundering risk
Lowest 10 NACE divisions. PCA approach (left) vs theoretical model (right)
PCA approach - Sector Theoretical model - Sector
C 20. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 10.7 E 36. Water collection, treatment and supply 14.3
C 11. Manufacture of beverages 10.3 D 35. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning ... 14.2
A 03. Fishing and aquaculture 9.9 C 11. Manufacture of beverages 13.8
H 52. Warehousing and support activities for transportation 9.8 B 09. Mining support service activities 13.4
A 02. Forestry and logging 5.8 C 20. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical ... 12.6
C 33. Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 5.0 A 03. Fishing and aquaculture 8.2
K 64. Financial service activities, excl insurance and 
pension
4.8 C 33. Repair and installation of machinery and 
...
4.9
C 19. Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products
3.2 C 19. Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum ...
3.1
K 65. Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, excl ... 1.0 A 02. Forestry and logging 2.2
C 12. Manufacture of tobacco products 0.0 C 12. Manufacture of tobacco products 0.0
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration 
75. For example, one can first make a score for the threat variables (by 
adding them up and dividing by the number of threat variables) and 
adding them to a score for the vulnerability variables (by adding them 
According to the theoretical model, the hotel sector 
appears as the most risky. The table above shows 
that 7 out of the top 10 sectors are the same across 
the two approaches, although the ranking is slightly 
different in some cases. The correlation between 
the two risk scores is 0.9. Also after testing other 
ways to add up the variables,75 the results are very 
similar. Because of this high correlation, it can be de-
duced that PCA is not the ‘driving force’ of the specific 
risk scores. The results are therefore quite robust to 
the model specification.
Robustness with respect to the selected variables
A sensitivity analysis is carried out by dropping one 
variable at a time to check the sensitivity of the results 
with respect to variables’ selection. This means that 
nine alternative ML composite risk scores are calculat-
ed and compared with the original (‘complete’) model 
including all nine proxy variables (as presented at STEP 
6). The table below shows all the correlations between 
this model and the others. The minimum is r = 0.92, 
denoting again that the results are robust even after 
controlling for the influence of variables’ identification. 
up and dividing by the number of vulnerability variables). Similarly, 
the opacity proxies can be split from the other vulnerabilities to calcu-
late separate scores and add them to a score for the threat variables.
Table 37 – Correlations between the final model and others where one variable is dropped at a time
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Complete model 1.00
2. no OC infiltration OCM 0.99 1.00
3. no OC infiltration OCP 0.97 0.96 1.00
4. no administrative denials 0.95 0.93 0.95 1.00
5. no corporate tax anomalies 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.93 1.00
6. no cash intensity 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.85 0.90 1.00
7. no BO distance 0.97 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.89 1.00
8. no shareholders’ risk 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.93 0.87 0.89 1.00
9. no BOs’ risk 0.94 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.97 1.00
10. no profitability 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.87 0.90 1.00
*all values different from 0 at 0.05 level
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration
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Robustness with respect to specific methodologi-
cal choices
To test the sensitivity of the model with respect to 
changes in the parameters adopted in the statistical 
analysis (e.g. weighting, rotation, normalisation), al-
ternative models are calculated, looking at how the 
results change depending on the adoption of other 
criteria. Four alternative choices are tested (see also 
what done in Italy and the UK – Chapters 2 and 4 – 
and see Annex):
• Rotation: using an Oblimin rotation (O) instead of 
a Varimax rotation (V)
• Weighting: equal weights (E) instead of weights 
based on the proportion of variance explained (P)
• Aggregation: Weighted arithmetic mean (S)
• Standardisation of the components: standardi-
sation or Z-scores (T) instead of Min-Max normali-
sation (D)
• Standardisation of the final indicator: standard-
isation or Z-scores (Z) instead of Min-Max normal-
isation (M)
Since these 4 choices are independent of each oth-
er, 15 alternative PCAs are calculated – besides the 
original model that we applied in STEP 6 (MODEL 
VPSTM) and the theoretical model that is presented 
in the beginning of STEP 7. We code these models 
based on the capital letters that are shown in brackets 
above. This sensitivity analysis shows that these meth-
odological choices made in IARM do not significantly 
affect the results. The correlation matrix below indi-
cates clearly that virtually the same results are found 
when different (combinations of) choices are made. 


































VPSDM 0.99 0.99 1.00
VPSDZ 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
VESTM 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
VESTZ 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
VESDM 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
VESDZ 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
OPSTM 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.96 1.00
OPSTZ 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00
OPSDM 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
OPSDZ 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
OESTM 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
OESTZ 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
OESDM 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
OESDZ 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
Source: VU Amsterdam elaboration
*all values different from 0 at 0.05 level
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76. This list is not uniform across the Netherlands, since each municipal-
ity can determine its own list. In this sense, the IARM approach could 
be useful for determining more systematically the list of economic 
activities to be monitored according for BIBOB.
The composite indicator at business sector level de-
veloped in this section is helpful to gain better un-
derstanding of how the ML risk varies across differ-
ent business sectors in the Netherlands. On the one 
hand, it condenses a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon such as ML risk into a single measure. 
It can be used by policy makers, LEAs, supervisors 
and FIUs to identify the most vulnerable business 
sectors. This methodology can also supplement na-
tional risk assessments that have to be conducted to 
comply with the forty recommendations of the FATF 
(FATF, 2012). 
The sector with the most ML risk is the gambling and 
betting sector (R 92). Other risky economic activi-
ties are, according to the IARM model, hotels, arts, 
security agencies, repair of computers and bars and 
restaurants. 
Except gambling and betting, the most risky sectors 
stemming from the IARM analysis are generally not 
the ones that are at the moment specifically targeted 
with AML regulations (like financial institutions, real 
estate agencies, trust and company service provid-
ers, etc). But it must be noted that AML regulation 
is focused mainly on the placement phase of the 
ML process, while the risk factors considered by the 
IARM model seem to mainly focus on the integration 
phase (Reuter & Truman, 2004). 
3.3  Research and policy implications
Even though the current AML regulation focuses pri-
marily on the gatekeepers of the financial system, 
this analysis can be used as a basis to strengthen 
the policies for the riskier sectors in a broader sense. 
For instance, the current administrative measure 
BIBOB is restricted to a list of economic activities,76 
which could be extended/revised according to the 
IARM results. Indeed, some of the sectors that are 
generally selected for BIBOB procedures (hotels, 
bars and restaurants) also score high in our analy-
sis, though this may be due the fact that the BIBOB 
measures are included as one of the proxy variables 
in our methodology.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to verify 
whether the results of the analysis remain robust 
even after making different assumptions and statisti-
cal choices. The results appear solid with respect to 
a) the decision to use a PCA instead of simply add-
ing up the identified proxies; b) the selection of risk 
factors and c) the choice of specific methodological 
parameters (e.g. related to the weighting, aggrega-
tion, rotation, etc.). All the alternative risk calculation 
methodologies tested give virtually the same results, 
and the correlation among all these alternative mod-
els is generally above 0.9. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to assess the risk of money
laundering (ML) in the UK. This assessment, in line with FATF 
risk assessment guidelines, analyses ML threats and
vulnerabilities at police area level in England and Wales.
The assessment of ML risk in Scotland, Northern Ireland and at 
business sector level was not conducted due to paucity of data.
The chapter is structured as follows: first, it provides some
background information on ML risk assessment and the AML
landscape in the UK (Section 4.1). Second, it develops the ML
risk indicator at sub-national area level across the 43 police
territories of England and Wales (Section 4.2). Finally it
presents problems encountered when trying to develop a
business sector composite indicator for the UK (Section 4.3)
and it discusses research and policy implications (Section 4.4).
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Main findings - United Kingdom
• This pilot suggests that a methodology which 
uses a risk-based approach where money laun-
dering (ML) threats and vulnerabilities are mea-
sured could be adopted in relation to ‘area’ or 
‘territory’ level ML risks in the UK. 
• The paucity of data in relation to UK threats and 
vulnerabilities remains a significant issue. This is 
particularly problematic when trying to identify 
threats at business sector level.   
• The UK is at obvious risk of money laundering 
due to its position as a major world financial cen-
tre. Nationally, a number of threats can be mea-
sured – such as the number of organised crime 
groups operating and the volume of predicate 
offences.  
• A number of vulnerabilities can also be identi-
fied – such as the cash intensiveness of much of 
the economy and the opaque shareholding and 
beneficial ownership structures of businesses.
Analysis at territory level: ML risk across 
the 43 police force territories of England 
& Wales77
• Threats and vulnerabilities measures are close-
ly correlated – e.g. the presence of organised 
crime, the presence of shareholders and bene-
ficial owners with connections to risky jurisdic-
tions and cash-intensive businesses.
• The average distance to beneficial owners78 of 
UK businesses is 1.5 – with businesses located 
in the Channel Islands and Isle of Man having 
the highest average at 3.7 and 3.4 respectively. 
• London is the area that has the highest risk score 
for connections to shareholders from ‘risky’ ju-
risdictions. 
• Businesses in the mining, financial, energy and 
manufacturing sectors are most likely to have 
links to shareholders or beneficial owners from 
risky jurisdictions.  
• Principal component analysis suggests that lo-
cations that are most exposed to serious and 
organised crime, where business have connec-
tions to risky jurisdictions and where there are 
cash intensive businesses may have the high-
est risk of money laundering.     
• According to the threats and vulnerabilities data 
available, the City of London emerges as the 
area with the highest ML risk. Conurbations such 
as the Metropolitan Police area, Greater Man-
chester and the West Midlands also emerge as 
high risk areas. 
77.   A full list of the 43 police forces of England and Wales is available on 
the POLICE.UK website: https://www.police.uk/forces/. Due to lack 
of workable data, it was not possible to extend the analysis to Scot-
land and Northern Ireland.
78.  As described in chapters 2 (Italy) and 3 (the Netherlands), the ben-
eficial ownership distance measures the average number of ‘steps’ 
which separate a company from its beneficial owner(s).  The high-
er the BO distance, the more complex the ownership structure, the 
higher the ML risk.
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Source: University of Leicester elaboration
Research and policy implications
• Although the approach outlined here is a pilot, it 
could be used to help support future National 
Risk Assessments. 
• The risk-based framework could allow for a more 
transparent methodology to be developed to 
measure territorial and business level risks.  
• Owing to the lack of threats data across busi-
ness sectors it was not possible to develop a 
risk-based model across business sectors 
(as done in Italy and the Netherlands). A lack of 
threats data across geographical areas was also 
a limitation. This is a significant issue that needs 
to be addressed for future risk assessments.  
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Money laundering (ML) – and the criminal activity 
that creates the need to launder funds – represents a 
significant risk to the United Kingdom (HM Treasury, 
2015).  Money laundering is identified as a key en-
abler of serious and organised crime, the social and 
economic effects of which cost the UK an estimated 
£24 billion per year (Mills, Skodbo, & Blyth, 2013). 
Money laundered into or via the UK financial system 
is also linked to grand corruption (the bribery and 
theft of public funds) in other countries (Home Office/
HM Treasury, 2016).
The UK is widely recognised as facing a broad range 
of threats from money laundering, and it is consid-
ered particularly vulnerable due to its position as a 
world financial centre (Home Office/HM Treasury, 
2016, p. 7): 
• The UK is currently the largest cross-border 
banking centre; 
• It accounts for 17% of the total global value of in-
ternational bank lending;  
• It accounts for 41% of global foreign exchange 
trading. 
There are a number of key reasons why the UK, and 
its financial system in particular, is an attractive option 
for money launderers, which are summarised below 
in Table 39.
4.1  Introduction and background
Table 39 – Factors making UK and attractive option for money laundering
Global financial hub The high volume of financial transactions makes it easier to hide suspicious activity.
Offshore jurisdictions
The UK has unparalleled links with offshore jurisdictions, whose secrecy enables money 
to be hidden more easily. The key British offshore financial centres are the three Crown 
Dependencies (Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey); and, as a legacy of its colonial 
history, the UK has ties with 14 Overseas Territories, the most notable in terms of ML risk 
being: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Turks 
and Caicos Islands (Foot, 2009).
Stability and security
The UK represents a safe investment opportunity for both legitimate and illegitimate/




The UK has a vast network of well-qualified professionals who can facilitate transac-
tions of any type.
Lifestyle
The UK enables individuals to merge easily into a global élite, cleansing their reputa-
tions and buying respectability for the next generation.
Property market
High property prices allow corrupt individuals to launder large sums of money within a 
single purchase, and there are currently loopholes in buyers’ source of wealth checks.
Weaknesses in the UK 
anti-money laundering 
(AML) system
The UK has 27 supervisory bodies, resulting in an AML system that is inconsistent, 
unclear and “structurally unsound” (Goodrich & Cowdock, 2016, p. 6); and vulnera-
ble to conflicts of interest for supervisory bodies that are both lobbying and promotional 
agents for their sector, as well as the AML enforcement authority.
Ineffective asset 
recovery*
The UK’s confiscation system has been criticised for its low impact on recovering 
criminal assets (National Audit Office, 2013).  Major changes are needed if the UK is 
to improve its capability to detect, freeze, seize and, where appropriate, accountably 
repatriate criminal assets that are invested in the UK from overseas.
* This issue has been recognised by the UK government, and the confiscation order system is currently undergoing a programme of 
reform – see Annex A4
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of TI-UK Report, Paradise Lost (Goodrich & Cowdock, 2016, pp. 5–9)
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The National Crime Agency (2015) asserts that mon-
ey laundered in or via the UK includes the illicit pro-
ceeds of almost all serious and organised crime in 
the UK; plus the criminal proceeds of a substantial 
proportion of international serious and organised 
crime – including illicit funds and assets derived from 
corrupt Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).  Howev-
er, in terms of scale, the true extent and value of 
money laundering into and through the UK is not 
known. Estimates vary considerably, but all indicate 
that the sums are substantial.  For example, it has 
been reported that the amount of money laundered 
in or through the UK annually is likely to be at least 
£100 billion (Barrington,79 cited in House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee, 2016, p. 21); whereas, the 
National Crime Agency (2015, p. 21) assesses that 
hundreds of billions of US dollars of criminal pro-
ceeds are “almost certainly” laundered through UK 
banks and their subsidiaries, per annum.
Additionally, there is a clear overlap between ML 
and terrorist financing because similar methods 
are used by criminals and terrorist to move and store 
funds.  As such, money laundering is recognised as a 
strategic threat to the UK’s economy and reputation, 
and a significant threat to the UK’s national security 
(HM Treasury, 2015; National Crime Agency, 2015a). 
The UK has a comprehensive AML regime in place, 
and it is committed to ensuring that the UK financial 
system is an increasingly hostile environment for ML 
(an overview of the UK anti-money laundering frame-
work is presented at Annex A4) (HM Treasury, 2016b).
In order to try to understand the risk of money laun-
dering, the first UK National Risk Assessment 
(NRA) of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
was jointly produced by the UK Home Office and HM 
Treasury, and was published in October 2015. Below, 
some of the main findings and limitations of the NRA 
are outlined. In addition, the key policy implications 
which have been developed through the UK an-
ti-money laundering action plan are outlined.   
The 2015 UK National Risk Assessment
The FATF Recommendations stipulate that “coun-
tries should identify, assess, and understand the 
money laundering and terrorist financing risks for the 
country” and that, based on this assessment, “coun-
tries should apply a risk-based approach (RBA)” to 
ensure that they implement AML/CTF measures that 
are commensurate with the identified risks (Recom-
mendation 1 - FATF, 2012, p. 11 - see also Chapter 1). 
The first UK National Risk Assessment (NRA) was 
based on extensive consultation with UK intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies, supervisors and pri-
vate sector representatives. The NRA’s aims and 
objectives are to identify, understand and assess the 
money laundering and terrorist financing risks faced 
by the UK; and to use this information to inform the 
appropriate allocation of resources to mitigate these 
risks (HM Treasury, 2015). 
 
In developing the methodology for the UK NRA, the 
UK government considered risk assessment models 
developed and used by others, including the World 
Bank, IMF and other countries, along with the FATF 
guidance and feedback from key stakeholders from 
the UK’s AML/CTF regime (HM Treasury, 2015).  The 
UK NRA approach followed the three stages of as-
sessment set out in the FATF Guidance – identifica-
tion, analysis, and evaluation – with an analytical 
framework based on the key premise that risk is a 
function of three factors: threat, vulnerability and con-
sequence (FATF, 2013a) and was based upon:
(i) Consultation.  This first stage of the assessment 
identified vulnerabilities and threats through con-
sultation with stakeholders from sectors subject to 
AML enforcement, law enforcement, supervisory 
authorities, government departments and NGOs.  
(ii) Data collection and analysis.  During the second 
assessment stage, data collected from stakehold-
ers was analysed to identify the risks present, and 
to understand their impact. 
79. Robert Barrington, the Executive Director of Transparency Interna-
tional UK, reporting to the House of Commons Home Affairs Com-




(iii) Risk rating. This final stage of the UK NRA as-
sessed each sector’s relative exposure to risk 
using the NRA risk rating model, which is an ad-
aptation of the UK National Crime Agency’s draft 
Management of Risk in Law Enforcement model 
(MoRiLE). This adaptation decreased the reliance 
on quantitative data and allowed qualitative factors 
to be included in the assessment. The assessment 
of structural risk within each sector was based on 
a series of sector-specific vulnerability factors and 
the relative likelihood that the threat of money 
laundering will materialise in that particular sector.
The measure of vulnerability of each sector80 was 
based upon: 
• Business complexity (and international reach);
• Volume and speed of cash flow; 
• AML compliance in sector. 
The likelihood that a threat will materialise was based 
upon:
• Size of sector/ area; 
• Likelihood of Suspicious activity reports (SARs) sub-
mission; 
• Law enforcement knowledge of ML through the 
sector. 
The NRA assumed the consequences of successful 
ML through any particular sector to be ‘severe’ (see 
HM Treasury, 2015, pp. 9–11).
The assessment of the above factors produced a risk 
score for each regulated sector, which was then cat-
egorised as Low, Medium or High risk, as detailed in 
the Table 40, below:


















Banks 34 6 211 High 158 High
Accountancy service 
providers 14 9 120 High 90 High
Legal service providers 17 7 112 High 84 High
Money service businesses 18 7 119 High 71 Medium
Trust or company service 
providers 11 6 64 Medium 64 Medium
Estate agents 11 7 77 Medium 58 Medium
High value dealers 10 6 56 Low 42 Low
Retail betting (unregulated 
gambling) 10 5 48 Low 36 Low
Casinos (regulated 
gambling) 10 3 32 Low 24 Low
Cash 21 7 147 High 88 High
New payment methods 
(e-money) 10 6 60 Medium 45 Medium
Digital currencies 5 3 15 Low 11 Low
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of (HM Treasury, 2015, p. 12)
80. Each sector within the regulated sector, which relates to individu-
als and firms that are subject to requirements under the UK Money 
Laundering Regulations 2007 (HM Treasury, 2015).  See Annex A4.a 
for a list of the regulated sectors.
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The key findings from the NRA are outlined in the 
box below. 
81. ‘High end’ money laundering is particularly associated with major 
fraud and overseas corruption. It usually involves electronic trans-
actions of substantial value (as opposed to cash).  It also usually 
involves the abuse of the financial sector and the use of ‘profession-
al enablers’ to facilitate the complex processes that are needed to 
ensure anonymity for the criminal (National Crime Agency, 2014a).
82. A list of regulated sectors, as set out in the UK Money Laundering 
Regulations (2007) is provided in Annex A4.  A non-exhaustive list 
of individual sectors/entities examples is provided in Annex II of the 
FATF National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk As-
sessment Guidance (FATF, 2013a, pp. 46–49).
83. HM Government (2014) UK Anti-Corruption Plan, Action 43.
Key findings of the UK NRA
In addition to identifying and producing an as-
sessment of risk in the key sectors, or thematic 
areas, outlined above, the NRA presents a num-
ber of key findings:
• The UK’s law enforcement agencies’ intelli-
gence appears to be best in regard to cash-
based laundering, especially in relation to cash 
collection networks, international controllers 
and money service businesses, but acknowl-
edge that there are some knowledge gaps. 
• Because of its size and complexity, the UK 
financial sector is at more risk of ML than 
the financial sector in many other countries.
• Little is known about ‘high-end’ laundering,81 
and risks at a local level.  
• More research/intelligence is required in re-
lation to the role of the financial and profes-
sional services sectors in ML – particularly 
professional enablers.  
• Intelligence in relation to high value dealers, 
gambling and new payment methods is 
mixed.
• The effectiveness of the UK’s supervisory re-
gime is inconsistent, but improvement is required 
to a greater or lesser degree across all sectors.
• The report is also critical of the UK’s suspi-
cious activity reports (SARs) regime.
1. The level and spread of government engagement 
with the stakeholder groups during the consulta-
tion phase is uncertain. It is clearly stated in the 
NRA that the conclusions “draw heavily on ex-
pert judgement from law enforcement agencies, 
supervisory authorities and those responsible for 
AML/CFT within firms” (Home Office/HM Treasury, 
2016, p. 10). However, nowhere is it made clear 
how many individuals were spoken to, in which 
specific organisations, and what they were asked. 
2. In terms of the nature of the consultations, the NRA 
methodology states that “workshops were held 
with some sectors and questionnaires with others” 
(HM Treasury, 2015, p. 10). However, it does not 
state what was in the questionnaire or covered in 
the workshops. 
3. There is a lack of clarity about how the risk rat-
ings applied to the regulated sectors are calculat-
ed and applied (see Table 40 above).   
4. There is no geographical analysis of the risks of 
money laundering.
5. The analysis of businesses covers regulated sectors. 
However, given that businesses in both regulated 
and non-regulated sectors82 are potentially at risk of 
ML, the scope of future NRAs could be broadened 
to include sectors that are currently unregulated.
More details about some of the limitations of the NRA can 
be found at Section 4.3 of this report and also at Annex 
A4. However, notwithstanding the above concerns and 
issues, the NRA report has been viewed as a welcome 
acknowledgement that the UK must ”raise its game” if 
it is to realise the government’s promise that “there is 
no place for dirty money in Britain” (BBC News, 2015; 
Wood, 2015, p. 2).  Indeed, it is stated in the report that 
the NRA will be used to shape the UK government’s re-
sponse to ML, and the NRA also sets out the priorities for 
the risk-based AML Action Plan that the UK government 
had committed itself to produce83 (HM Treasury, 2015, p. 
6). An overview of the action plan is set out at Annex A4. 
The Action Plan is a demonstration of the UK govern-
ment’s commitment to tackling both money launder-
ing and terrorist financing, and it represents the most 
significant reform of the UK’s AML and CTF regime in 
over a decade (Home Office, 2016a). 
The publication of the UK NRA has been commended 
for its clear and frank recognition of the high lev-
el of the UK’s international and domestic ML risk 
(Transparency International UK, 2015; Wood, 2015). 
However, it is of note that the NRA has not been par-
ticularly well-received by AML supervisors in the reg-
ulated sectors (Chartered Institute of Taxation, 2015; 
The Law Society, 2015), and several contentious ar-
eas have been identified relating to methodological 
issues, inconsistencies and limitations:
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The approach presented in this section aims to build 
upon the UK NRA in several ways: 
• It develops a methodological framework (based 
upon the approach to measuring threats and vul-
nerabilities as outlined by the FATF) for analysing 
the risk of money laundering;
• It identifies sources of data that can populate the 
methodological framework and operationalises 
them; 
• It develops an analytical approach that allows 
identification of the most ‘risky’ territories (in this 
case police areas) for money laundering.  
 
The approach is presented in seven methodological 
steps (see Chapter 1) which are also followed in the 
analysis in Italy and the Netherlands, and that outline:
1. How risk factors (threats and vulnerabilities) are 
identified;
2. How these risk factors are operationalised into 
proxy measures;
3. How the variables were normalised/the control 
measures that are used;
4. Initial analysis and exploration of the links between 
threats and vulnerabilities;
5. Identification of principal components that consti-
tute ML risk across each territory;
6. Development of a ML risk composite indicator at 
area level;
7. Validation of the composite indicator    
STEP 1 – ML RISK FACTORS 
IDENTIFICATION
Identifying quantitative measures of national level 
risk factors (RFs) in relation to money laundering is 
obviously essential to any risk-based approach. This 
study has identified a number of threats and vulnera-
bilities from both academic and policy sources. These 
identified threats and vulnerabilities have (where pos-
sible) been operationalised in to sub-national level 
proxy measures.
The list of RFs suggested by FATF and relevant liter-
ature (see Chapter 1 and Annex) is very broad. How-
ever, the focus here is on RFs that:
• are particularly relevant in the UK context;
• allow for in-depth analysis because of data avail-
ability.
Identified RFs where some data were available are 
classified according to FATF taxonomy (Threats, Vul-
nerabilities and Consequences – see Chapter 1) and 
grouped into a tree-structure (risk dimensions, risk 
factors, etc.) which is depicted in the chart below. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the focus here is on 
threats and vulnerabilities.  As with the analyses 
presented in the Italy and Netherlands (see Chap-
ters 2 and 3), and in line with most NRAs conducted 
across EU countries, consequences are not covered 
by the model. Here, they are only discussed briefly 
but not included in the analysis.
4.2  Analysis at sub-national area level
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STEP 2 – ML RISK FACTORS 
OPERATIONALISATION
This section outlines how the identified threats and 
vulnerabilities, and in particular each risk factor, are 
(where possible) operationalised into one or more 
proxy variables in order to allow for their measure-
ment and analysis. Proxies are identified according 
to previous literature and data availability, and are il-
lustrated in the tables below (see Annex A4 for more 
details). 
Money laundering threats
The sub-national threats variables that are developed 
fell into two main groups. 
• First, the number of organised crime groups 
(OCGs) operating per area; and 
• Second, the money flows generated from predi-
cate offences across each area. 
As said, most of identified variables apply only to En-
gland & Wales, while the availability of data as re-
gards Scotland and Northern Ireland remains weak 
and does not allow in-depth analysis. An overview of 
the proxy measures of threats is presented in Table 
41 below. In relation to the first, the hypothesis is that 
the higher the number of OCGs in an area, the more 
money that is generated through OC activity across 
a range of predicate offences, then the greater the 
amount of proceeds that one would expect to be laun-
dered into the licit system. Indeed, the HM Treasury 
notes that serious and organised crime are seen as 
a key money laundering threat to the UK (See HM 
Treasury, 2016: AML and CTF Supervision Report 
2014-15).  
The list of predicate offences developed for this 
analysis is informed by the FATF (FATF, 2013a), as 
reported in the 4th AMLD (Directive 2015/849, Art. 3), 
those presented in the UK NRA (HM Treasury, 2015) 
and also from the predicate offences used by Mills et al 
(2013) in their estimate of the costs of organised crime. 
Figure 42 - ML risk factors and proxy variables at sub-national area level 
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gration crime per 
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Human trafficking, 
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IMMIGRATION Police area 2013 - 2015
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of Mills et al., 2013.
Data in relation to the number of known OCGs in 
each area are provided by the National Crime Agen-
cy. Here estimates of the numbers of groups that are 
(a) located in each area or (b) are known to impact 
across each area are collected. Data protection pro-
tocol means that it is not possible to reveal the identity 
of areas with the highest numbers of organised crime 
groups, or where organised crime groups impact on 
the area. However, analysis reveals that, when con-
sidered as a rate per population the highest numbers 
of organised crime groups tend to concentrate in the 
larger urban areas. 
The proxy measures of predicate crimes are devel-
oped by identifying (a) in what types of crime activ-
ities organised crime groups engage, and (b) what 
proportion of these crimes might be attributed to 
organised crime groups. Estimates of the propor-
tion of crime thought to be committed by OCGs are 
largely based upon Mills et al (2013) estimates of 
the scale and the social/economic costs of organised 
crime. Mills et al. identify several crime types that are 
commonly committed by organised crime groups and 
then estimate the proportion of crimes across several 
categories that are directly related to organised crime. 
Column one of Table 42 presents these crime types 
with the estimate of the proportion that are linked 
to organised crime groups.  The second column in-
dicates if area-level data in relation to the predicate 
offences are available for analysis for the IARM study 
(the source of data is outlined at Annex A4).  
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Table 42 – Potential predicate offences as identified by Mills et al., 2013 and data available for UK area analysis
Predicate offences identified by Mills et al., 2013 
(rate attributable to organised crime in brackets)
Data available for UK area 
analysis
Grouped acquisitive crimes, i.e.
Distraction burglary – 100%; Yes
Metal theft – 20%; Yes
Theft of motor vehicle – 58%; Yes
Cash and valuables in transit robbery – 100%; Yes
Plant theft – 100%; Yes
Fraud/forgery – 80%; Yes
Road Freight crime – 100%; No
Counterfeit currency – 100%; No
Drugs supply/trafficking – 100%; Yes84
Firearms supply – 100%; No
Immigration crime (abuse of legitimate entry - 75%); human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation (100%); organised people smuggling (75%);
Yes: Human trafficking, kidnap, 
blackmail, modern slavery, 
child sexual exploitation.
Intellectual property crime and counterfeiting – 80%. No
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of Mills et al., 2013
Although a number of predicate offences are iden-
tified, not all are included in the final analysis for 
several reasons. As outlined at Annex A4, data on 
predicate offences are collected from a variety 
of sources, and this raises issues concerning the 
quality and validity of data in many cases. The ma-
jority are collected from official recorded crime data 
sources, whereas others are collected from a number 
of agencies affiliated to police or government depart-
ments. Obviously, some care has to be taken in terms 
of interpreting these crime figures as they are based 
upon official statistics. While the problems with official 
crime statistics have been noted in previous litera-
ture (e.g. Maguire, 2012) it should be underlined that 
these statistics are based upon crimes that come to 
the attention of the police or other official bodies and 
may not be representative of the actual total extent of 
predicate offences across each area.
From the data available, it appears that the most val-
id proxy measures of predicate offences (and hence 
ML threats) is that represented by acquisitive and 
drug related crimes. Therefore, variables labelled 
‘grouped acquisitive crimes’ (including distraction 
burglary; metal theft; organised theft of motor vehicle; 
cash in transit robbery and plant theft) and ‘grouped 
drugs crimes’ (including drugs trafficked and drugs 
seizures) are developed and used in the analysis 
(see Table 41). 
In addition to using a measure of the numbers of 
crimes that occur in an area, where possible, a mon-
etary value is also applied to give a proxy measure 
of the potential amount of money that might be laun-
dered in relation to each crime type. This is problem-
atic because monetary estimates are only avail-
able for some acquisitive crime types and not 
for drug-related offences.  Here, estimates of the 
costs of crime are available in relation to average val-
ues of stolen property for the offences of distraction 
burglary, vehicle crime, metal theft, cash in vehicle 
transit robbery and plant theft.85 The revenues gen-
erated by these crimes are developed into a variable 
that measured them as a percentage of GDP per each 
police area.
84. Fraud/ forgery are eventually omitted from the analysis due to prob-
lems in accessing area level data for a period of at least 12 months. 
Some area level data are available http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/
fraud-statistics though not for all areas. 
85. The average costs applied to these crime types was £2,040 for dis-
traction burglary (Mills, Skodbo, & Blyth, 2013, p. 56); £2,500 for 
vehicle crime (Mills et al., 2013, p. 60); £2000 for metal theft (Home 
Office, 2013); £15,000 for CIVT (SaferCash –data supplied), and 
£17,000 for plant theft (Paniu –data supplied). 
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Other potential indicators of threats are considered - 
such as tax gaps data and asset confiscation. The 
UK tax gap for 2014-15 is estimated to be £36 billion, 
which equates to 6.5% of tax that should, in theory, 
have been collected by HMRC for that year (theoreti-
cal tax liabilities). This is a reduction from 6.9% of the-
oretical tax liabilities for the previous year 2013/14. 
Over the longer term, there has been a downward 
trend in the tax gap, from 8.3% of theoretical tax lia-
bilities in 2005/06 to 6.5% in 2014/15 (HMRC, 2016) 
see Annex A4 for further details). Unfortunately, tax 
gap data are not available at a sub-national level 
in the UK or by business sectors, and therefore could 
not be included in the analysis.  
Confiscated assets could also be an alternative 
measure of organised crime infiltration (see Chapter 
2 on Italy). Asset confiscation is the main means 
by which the government seeks to deprive criminals 
of their illicit gains (National Audit Office, 2013). In 
2014/15, 5,924 confiscation orders were issued, and 
1,203 restraint orders were used to freeze offend-
ers’ assets. In terms of monetary values for 2014/15, 
£155 million was collected by enforcement agencies 
from confiscation orders. However, the total debt out-
standing from confiscation orders (as at September 
2015) was £1.61 billion, of which only around £203 
million was estimated by HM Courts and Tribunals 
Service to be realistically collectable (National Audit 
Office, 2016).
  
The confiscation orders system has been criticised by 
the National Audit Office and the Committee of Pub-
lic Accounts for being ineffectively implemented and 
poor value for money, and it is currently in a process 
of reform (Home Office, 2017; National Audit Office, 
2016 - see Annex A4 for further details). As a potential 
threat variable at geographical or business level, it 
is also identified that confiscation orders are limited 
because it is difficult to obtain data disaggregat-
ed to area or business sector level. Therefore, this 
measure could not be included in the sub-national 
analysis.  
Overview of threat variables at UK sub-national 
level 
Below, a descriptive spatial analysis for the threats 
variables is presented. 
Figure 43 presents the rate (per 100,000 population, 
per year) of grouped acquisitive organised crimes per 
area. The average number per area is 188 crimes 
per 100,000 inhabitants per year. Overall, the highest 
rate is 1,721 as observed for the City of London, 248 
for Leicestershire and 224 for Nottinghamshire.
Figure 43 – Organised acquisitive crime per 
100,000 population per area  
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of Home Office data
Figure 44, provides a geographical illustration of ‘or-
ganised’ acquisitive crime revenues as a proportion 
of local GDP. This shows that as a % of GDP the 
areas that generate the highest potential proceeds 
from organised acquisitive crime are the City of Lon-
don, Leicestershire, the Metropolitan Police area and 
South Yorkshire.     
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Figure 44 – Organised acquisitive crime revenues 
per % of GDP per area  
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of Home Office data
Finally, Figure 45 presents the average rate of drug 
trafficking and seizures per area. The national aver-
age is 561 crimes per 100,000 population, with the 
highest rates observed for the City of London, fol-
lowed by Avon and then Dyfed-Powys.   
A final threat variable that is constructed related to 
organised immigration crime. Here there tends to be 
a concentration within large urban areas. The aver-
age per area is 31 per 100,000, with the highest rates 
in the Metropolitan police area (322 per 100,000), 
Greater Manchester (143 per 100,000) and West 
Yorkshire (117 per 100,000).
Figure 45 – Organised drug crimes per 100,000 
population per area.
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of Home Office data
Money laundering vulnerabilities
A number of vulnerabilities variables are identified in 
the previous literature, although (as with the threats 
variables) problems are encountered in terms of ac-
cessing appropriate measures that could then be oper-
ationalized for analysis at area level (see Chapter 1 and 
Annex). A list of variables that are used in the analysis 
and brief description of each is presented in Table 43. 
The vulnerabilities proxy measures fell into three broad 
groups – those related to cash-intensiveness, opac-
ity of business ownership, and further variables that 
are grouped as ‘other vulnerabilities’ (such as real 
estate costs/values, presence of international transit 
hubs, and measures of business profitability). A full de-
scription of the variables is presented at Annex A4 and 
the sources of data are outlined. The majority of data 
in relation to vulnerabilities are collected from Bureau 
van Dijk (BvD). BvD data are based upon a sample of 
3,741,300 businesses in the UK. It is recognized that 
this number is lower than the total UK business pop-
ulation, which is over 5 million.86 A comparison of the 
coverage of BvD to the whole UK business population 
(by business sector) is presented at Annex A4.
86. The lower number depends on the fact that BvD databases do not 
include all types of businesses and legal forms. For example, individ-
ual enterprises and unlimited companies are not fully covered, while 
limited companies are comprehensively mapped.
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sub-dimension Proxy variable / description Variable labels
Cash
intensiveness
Presence of cash 
intensive businesses
Business cash intensiveness 
measure 1
Average ratio Cash / 
Total assets CASH_ASSETS
Business cash intensiveness 
measure 2
Average ratio Current 
assets / Total assets
CURRENT_
ASSETS
Availability of cash in 






% non-UK beneficial owners in UK business FOREIGN_BO
% non-UK shareholders in UK business FOREIGN_SH
BO distance BO_DISTANCE
Ownership links with 
risky jurisdictions
BOs’ risk score RISKY_BO_w 




local area for 
investment
Average real estate value RE_COST
Annual increase in real estate values RE_CHANGE
Presence of transit 
hubs 
Number of transit hubs such as ports and 
international airports TRANSIT_HUB






Proceeds of Crime Act ‘money laundering’ offences 
per 1m population (2012 – 2015)87 POCA 
Regulated 
Businesses % of businesses subject to ML regulations REGULATED
 *Variables ending with “_w” are weighted for the average company size in the area so as to control for the presence of multinational companies
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
An overview of descriptive statistics in relation to the 
vulnerabilities variables is presented below.  
Cash-intensiveness of businesses 
As highlighted elsewhere in this report, ‘cash-inten-
siveness’ has been identified as a facilitator of crime 
and money laundering. While in Italy data on cash 
diffusion among individuals by area level are avail-
able (see Chapter 2), in the UK they are unfortunately 
lacking. Therefore, in order to measure the degree 
of cash-intensiveness across regions, the presence 
of ‘cash rich’ or cash-intensive business is mea-
sured. This is done in two ways (see Table 43). 
The first measure represents the average ratio, per 
area, between local businesses’ cash and cash equiv-
alent on their total assets; the second, the average 
ratio of current assets on total assets (see Chapters 
2 and 3 for details). Using the first measure, the most 
cash intensive businesses are located in the City of 
London, followed by Dyfed Powys and Staffordshire. 
Using the second measure, Northamptonshire, the 
West Midlands and Greater Manchester emerge as 
the areas with the most cash intensive businesses. 
Below a map is presented which compares these two 
measures (Figure 46).
87.  A full overview of how money laundering offences are recorded in the 
UK is presented in Annex A4. 
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Figure 46 – Cash-intensive businesses across UK areas
Area average Cash / total assets ratio (left) and Current assets / total assets ratio (right). Last available year 
Below, these measures of cash intensity are consid-
ered across business sectors (Figure 47). This shows 
a high degree of liquidity (using the first method, i.e. 
the weight of cash and cash equivalents) in sectors 
such as entertainment (Section R - which includes 
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD data
regulated business types such as gambling, betting 
agencies, videolottery), social work, agriculture and 
wholesale/retail. When using method 2 (current as-
sets) administrative support services, wholesale/retail 
trade and construction are the most ‘liquid’ sectors.
Figure 47 – Cash-intensive businesses across business sectors in the UK
NACE 2007 sections - excluding O, T and U. Last available year
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD data
A - Agriculture
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There are other indicators of territorial level risks in 
relation to ‘cash intensiveness’ or ‘ease of payments’ 
that are highlighted in the literature and for which 
some UK data are available. For example, some-
times the cash intensiveness of an economy can be 
measured by the number of cash machines (ATM) 
within a geographical area. Some geographical data 
are available on the use of cash machines across En-
gland and Wales (see UK Payment Statistics - Pay-
ments UK, 2015). On average there are 1,003 cash 
machines per 1m population per police area. Although 
the highest numbers are in Lancashire (1,617 per 1m 
population in Lancashire), the highest ratios tend to 
be in large urban areas such as Greater Manchester 
(1,261 per 1m population) and West Midlands (1,240 
per 1m population). 
Opacity of business ownership 
Of course, business ownership structures where 
beneficial ownership is difficult to identify or 
where shareholding is complex have been identified 
as being a key vulnerability for money laundering 
(ECOLEF, 2013; FATF, 2016b). Within the UK con-
text, identifying these structures is made difficult by 
the paucity of available data. Here the analysis relies 
on BvD data, which in itself provides limited cover-
age (see Annex A4). However, in Table 44 below, an 
overview is presented of: shareholding in companies, 
average distance to beneficial owners, and risk mea-
sures in relation to both shareholders and beneficial 
owners.
Table 44 – Data on ownership of businesses, by nationality, shareholder and BO (by territory)88
UK Foreign Nationality not available TOTAL UK
N. Companies - - - 3,741,330
N. Shareholders (known = 1,084,470) 1,011,248 73,222 5,689,310 6,773,780
N. Beneficial Owners (known = 262,398) 162,884 99,514 7,981,085 8,243,483
Ratio shareholders to companies - - - 1.8
Ratio beneficial owners to companies - - - 2.2
Ratio shareholders to beneficial owners 6.2 0.74 0.71 0.8
Average BO distance89 - - - 1.690
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD data 
Level of complexity of UK businesses’ ownership 
structure
Table 44 indicates that, on average, the 3.7m UK 
companies listed by BvD have an average of 1.8 
shareholders and 2.2 BOs, which suggests that for 
most companies there is direct ownership control (al-
though these numbers are higher than in the other 
countries analysed by IARM – see Chapter 5). How-
ever, this does vary by region and business type. 
For example, Figure 48 presents all of the locations in 
England and Wales where the distance to beneficial 
owner is over the average of 1.5. Of the 16 areas 
above the average, seven are metropolitan areas. 
However, it is worth noting that two areas not includ-
ed in the English and Welsh police area analysis – 
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man – are the 
highest scoring areas overall, the average distance 
to the beneficial owner being 3.7 and 3.4 respectively 
(based on a sample size respectively of 5,416 and 
3,170 beneficial owners across each area).
88. The data presented here use territory as the baseline. If business-
es are used as the baseline, the figures alter. For example, there 
are 883,035 UK shareholders and 87,790 foreign shareholders who 
can be attributed to business types. There are 145,002 UK beneficial 
owners and 81,133 foreign beneficial owners who can be attributed 
to business types.    
89. As described earlier (see Chapter 2 and 3), the beneficial ownership 
distance measures the average number of ‘steps’ which separate a 
company from its beneficial owner(s). The higher the BO distance, the 
more complex the ownership structure, and the higher the ML risk. If BO 
distance equals 1, then a company is directly controlled by its BO(s). 
90. 1.5 excluding Channel Islands (3.7) and Isle of Man (3.4)
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Figure 48 – Average BO distance at sub-national area level
UK areas with average BO distance above 1.5. Last available year
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD data
Figure 49 illustrates the average distance to beneficial 
owner(s) by business sector. While the UK average 
is 1.5, a number of sectors recorded scores above 
this: for example, the energy sector (2.4), mining 
sector (2.1) and financial sector (1.9). The lowest 
average is in the legal sector at 1.2. It can be clearly 
seen – as also observed in Italy and the Netherlands 
(see Chapters 2 and 3) – that the economic activities 
characterised by higher BO distance are those with 
the highest number of multinational companies and 
highest volume of FDI.
Figure 49 – Average BO distance per business sector (ranked high to low)
NACE 2007 Sections excluding O, T, U. Last available year 
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Business ownership connections with risky 
jurisdictions
While distance to beneficial owner is a useful vulner-
ability measure, the connections that specific geo-
graphical areas or business types have to ‘risky 
jurisdictions’ through beneficial owners or share-
holders can be better understood by considering 
the level of ‘risk’ of the national jurisdiction of BOs or 
shareholders. 
The degree of connections with risky jurisdictions is 
calculated by multiplying the relevant Secrecy Score 
of the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI)91 for the weight 
of each nationality of BOs and shareholders by UK 
area (see Chapter 2, 3 and Annex for details). As ex-
plained earlier (see Annex) the values are weighted 
by average company size92 in order to control for the 
presence of multinational companies and in order to 
identify the actual anomalies in business ownership 
structure. As illustrated in Figure 50, the highest aver-
age shareholder risk scores are London, Sussex and 
Cambridgeshire – each of these areas had scores 
that are around twice the average, suggesting more 
connections with risky jurisdictions.
For beneficial owners (see Figure 51 below), the high-
est ranking risk areas are Sussex, North Yorkshire and 
Merseyside – with all of these scoring around double 
the average. It is interesting to note that some loca-
tions – such as Sussex, London, Gwent, Northamp-
tonshire and Gloucestershire – score relatively highly 
in relation to both BOs’ and shareholders’ risk.
Figure 50 – Connections to risky jurisdictions: 
Shareholders’ risk scores
Weighted by average company size 
91. The Secrecy Score is a component of the Financial Secrecy Index 
(FSI) developed by the Tax Justice Network and issued every 2 
years. The secrecy score is a composite indicator which evaluates 
different dimensions of secrecy in the financial sector and in the leg-
islation of selected jurisdictions. In particular, it evaluates: A) the level 
of banking secrecy; B) access to beneficial ownership information; 
C) corporate transparency; D) efficiency of tax and financial regu-
lation; E) compliance with international standards; F) international 
cooperation (Tax Justice Network, 2015). For further detailed see 
Annex. The secrecy score has been preferred to other measures of 
risky jurisdictions (e.g. international or national blacklists) because of 
its independency and transparency of the evaluation methodology. 
92. As a measure of company size, the average ratio per area of employ-
ees/companies was computed. Other methods to weight the data are 
considered – such as by ‘assets/companies’ or ‘turnover/ companies’. 
It has been decided to use ‘employees/companies’ because BvD data 
in relation to the distribution of employees across companies and ter-
ritories are more robust in the UK than those for assets or turnover.
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD and TJN data
Figure 51 – Connections to risky jurisdictions: 
BOs’ risk scores
Weighted for average company size 
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD and TJN data
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The same method is used to consider connections 
to risky jurisdictions by business sector. The ta-
ble below presents the rank order by business sector 
for the respective risk scores for shareholders and 
beneficial owners, both weighted and unweighted by 
average company size. The most risky connections 
in relation to shareholders are in the mining, finan-
cial and energy sectors – which, as said, are also 
characterised by a higher number of multinational 
companies. These sectors also rank high in relation 
to beneficial owners (Pearson correlation of .544).
However, when weighted by the average company 
size, the most risky connections in relation to share-
holders are in sector A (Agriculture), G (Wholesale 
and retail trade) and R (Entertainment), while the 
most risky connections in relation to beneficial own-
ers are section I (Accommodation), G (Wholesale 
and retail trade) and L (Real estate). The score of 
real estate activities remains unchanged after the 
weighting. As before, the rank order shows similari-
ties for both categories (Pearson correlation of .603). 
Table 45 – Connections with risky jurisdictions by business sector:  Shareholders and BOs’ risk score ranks 
Unweighted and weighted by the average company size
NACE Section
Rank
Shareholders’ risk - 
unweighted




BOs’ risk - 
weighted
B - Mining 1 2 15 17
K - Finance 2 5 19 19
D - Energy 3 1 17 12
C - Manufacturing 4 4 7 6
E - Water & waste 5 12 14 16
N - Support services 6 7 12 11
J - ICT 7 6 5 4
H - Transport 8 10 8 9
M - Professional 
activities 9 8 16 13
G - Wholesale & 
retail 10 9 2 2
L - Real estate 11 3 10 3
R - Entertainment  12 15 3 7
S - Other services 13 13 9 10
I - Hotels & bars 14 11 6 1
F - Construction 15 14 11 14
A - Agriculture 16 17 1 8
Q - Health & social 
work
17 16 4 5
P - Education 18 18 13 15
O - Public sector  19 19 18 18
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD and TJN data
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While connections to ‘risky jurisdictions’ have been 
identified as a money laundering vulnerability, the 
point needs to be made that, within the UK, the BvD 
data indicate that the shareholders and beneficial 
owners from the highest risk jurisdictions only form 
a small proportion of the overall shareholder or 
beneficial owner population. Indeed, BvD data 
indicate that at territory level and where nationality 
is known, around 9% of shareholders and 38% of 
beneficial owners in the UK are foreign. Overall, 
BvD data identify over 150 different nationalities of 
shareholders and 75 different nationalities of benefi-
cial owners of UK businesses. 
However, the highest proportion of foreign sharehold-
ers and beneficial owners are from countries that do 
not score highly in relation to the FSS, such as the 
USA, Germany and the Netherlands. Table 46 out-
lines the percentage that each of the top ten listed na-
tionalities contributes to the overall foreign sharehold-
ing and beneficial ownership across UK companies. 
The figures in brackets relate to (a) the FSS rank of 
the nationality (out of 173 nations covered by FSS) 
and (b) the actual FSS score.  
It can also be observed that the highest ‘risk’ nation-
ality (according to the FSS) in the top ten list of UK 
shareholders or beneficial owners is Switzerland, 
which ranks at 33 out of the 173 nations with an FSS 
score. If one considers the nations with the highest 
FSS, these tend to make up a very low proportion of 
shareholders or beneficial owners in the UK. For ex-
ample, shareholders and beneficial owners from the 
top ten FSS scoring nationals make up less than 1% 
of UK shareholders and 1% of beneficial owners.
Table 46 – Shareholders and beneficial owners nationality in the UK First ten nationalities. % of all non-UK 
In brackets: FSS rank/FSS score
Shareholders Beneficial Owners
Country % (FSS rank/score) Country % (FSS rank/ score)
United States 24.3% (61/60) Spain 28.7% (99/33)
Germany 8.8% (63/56) Italy 21.4% (97/35)
the Netherlands 6.4% (75/48) Germany 12.5% (63/56)
Ireland 5.6% (88/40) United States 6.0% (61/60)
France 5.3% (84/43) Switzerland 4.0% (33/72)
Switzerland 4.1% (33/72) Saud Arabia 3.5% (59/61)
Australia 3.2% (83/43) South Africa 2.4% (85/42)
Italy 3.2% (97/35) Ireland 2.1% (88/40)
Luxemburg 3.0% (64/55) the Netherlands 2.0% (75/48)
Sweden 2.1% (94/36) France 1.8% (84/43)
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of BvD data 
93. As indicated previously, this depends on what baseline measure 
is used. If the proportion is calculated based on the cases where 
the nationality of the SH or BO is known for business sectors, 
then the calculation is (for SH) 87,790/970,825 = 9% and (for BO) 
81,133/226,135=36%
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94. Companies House is an executive agency sponsored by the UK Gov-
ernment Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 
Companies House is responsible for incorporating and dissolving 
limited companies, registering the information that companies are 
legally required to supply, and making that information available to 
the public (Gov.UK, 2016).
95. Based upon UK Office for National statistics House Price Index Data: 
see https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/uk-house-
price-index-data-downloads-november-2016
It should, however, be borne in mind that from 6 April 
2016, it became a legal requirement in the UK that all 
companies keep a register of ‘people with signifi-
cant control’ (PSC) – or ‘beneficial owners’ – of the 
company, and that all companies will be required to file 
this information with Companies House94 annually in 
a ‘confirmation statement’ from 30 June 2016 (Lloyd, 
2016).  A PSC is a person in the company who (Com-
panies House, 2016):
• owns more than 25% of the company’s shares;
• holds more than 25% of the company’s voting 
rights;
• holds the right to appoint or remove the majority of 
directors;
• has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, sig-
nificant influence or control;
• holds the right to exercise, or actually exercises, 
significant control over a trust or company that 
meets any of the other 4 conditions.
Companies will be required to provide detailed infor-
mation about PSCs relating to (Companies House, 
2016):
• the date that the individual became a registrable 
person;
• their name, country/state of residence and nation-
ality;
• their service address;
• their usual residential address (this is not shown 
on the public register);
• their full date of birth (this is not shown on the pub-
lic register);
• the nature of their control over the company.
It will take up to a year before PSC records at Com-
panies House are complete because company filing 
dates for the confirmation statement are based on the 
anniversary of individual companies’ incorporation 
(Lloyd, 2016).  Nevertheless, the PSC data that will 
be held by Companies House harbours the potential 
to be a valuable source of information regarding ben-
eficial owners from high risk jurisdictions for future ML 
risk assessments. 
Other measures of vulnerabilities 
Other vulnerability measures are also developed 
around real estate values, international connections/
transit hubs and business profitability. 
Real estate values have often been considered a 
money laundering risk factor (see, for example, Fer-
werda & Unger, 2013), especially in the UK, where 
the property market has been highlighted by numer-
ous sources as a potential factor of attractiveness 
for illicit inflows. Therefore, consideration is given for 
identifying areas that might be most attractive for in-
ward investment by using real estate value as a proxy 
measure of the sector attractiveness. This is primarily 
done by considering average real estate values and 
increases in real estate values per year from UK BEIS 
data. In relation to the average cost of real estate, the 
mean value in 2015 was £250,000, with the highest 
(£537,000) in the City of London and the Metropolitan 
area and the lowest (£157,000) in the North East.95 
The disparities in average real estate costs are also 
reflected in average real estate price increases per 
year (Pearson’s r =.825). In London these are on av-
erage 13% growth as compared to less than 5% in 
the North East and North West of England. 
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International connections/transit hubs are identi-
fied as a potential vulnerability to money laundering. 
Indeed, areas that have an abundance of internation-
al connections – via for example, transit hubs – are 
often characterized by higher volumes of illicit flows of 
cash (e.g. cash-smuggling – see Chapter 1). A mea-
sure of these connections is created by giving each 
police area a risk rating based upon the presence of 
international transit hubs – such as international air-
ports, international railway stations, passenger ferry 
terminals and cargo ports. This shows that areas that 
can be described as possibly vulnerable due to the 
presence of transit hubs include port areas, such as 
Humberside, and areas with major international air-
ports, such as London. 
Finally, some data are available from BvD in relation 
to business gross profitability: namely the EBIT-
DA/Turnover ratio. There is a (debated) hypothesis 
that profitable businesses may act as an attractor of 
inward investments for criminal groups and are thus a 
good indicator of where money laundering may occur. 
In the UK, it is revealed that the business sectors with 
highest gross profitability are:
• Real estate (20% EBITDA margin);
• ICT (15%);
• Mining, energy and water (14%);
• Professional services (12%).
However, questions have been asked about the cor-
relation between business profitability and money 
laundering (see Riccardi, 2014). Therefore this proxy 
measure is omitted from the principal component 
analysis presented in step 5 below.  
Alternative measures of money laundering 
The data presented above are all indirect measures 
of ML threats or vulnerabilities. Attempts are also 
made to collect data in relation to a number of more 
direct measures of money laundering risk – such as 
suspicious activity reports (SARs) data and pro-
ceeds of crime data.    
The volume of SARs submitted to the UK Financial 
Intelligence Unit (UK FIU) each year is substantial 
and continues to rise annually.  For example, for the 
year 2014/15, the total number of SARs received is 
381,882, an increase of 7.82% on the previous year 
(2013/14) (National Crime Agency, 2015b). Further 
information about the volume of SARs submitted in 
total and by sector is provided in the box below. 
In recent years, however, increasing concerns have 
been raised about the effectiveness of the SARs 
regime – particularly in terms of the volume of SARs 
being submitted, and the capabilities of the SARs 
database (the ELMER IT system) to conduct useful 
analysis of SARs. Therefore this variable is limited 
as a potential measure of money laundering for two 
reasons. First, at present, no geographical analysis 
of SARs has been completed or could be completed 
using the current ELMER system. Second, because 
the overwhelming majority of SARs are made via the 
banking sector as part of their compliance with ML 
regulations, it tells us little about the distribution of 
threats across business sectors.
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A Suspicious Activity Report alerts law enforcement 
that a particular client – or their activity – is suspi-
cious in some way that may indicate money laun-
dering or terrorist financing.  Table 47 below shows 
the steady increase in the volume of SARs submit-
ted between October 2012 and September 2015:
Table 47 - SARs submitted to the UKFIU





Total SARs 316,527 354,186 381,882
Consent SARs 14,103 14,155 14,672
Consent SARs refused (and %) 1,387 (9.8%) 1,632 (11.5%) 1,374 (9.4%)
Breaches of confidentiality 2 2 3
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of National Crime Agency (2013, 2014, 2015) 
The NCA SARs annual reports (National Crime 
Agency, 2014b, 2015b) also present SARs sub-
mission breakdowns by sector.  A summary for 
the year 2014-2015 is provided below in Table 48, 
which shows that the vast majority of SARs are 
submitted by the banking sector.  Information re-
lating to the value of seizures, restrains and arrest 
figures arising from consent SARS is provided at 
Annex A4.
Table 48 - SARs submission by sector 2014/2015
Oct 2014 to Sept 2015 Volumes % of total % comparison to 2013-2014
Credit institution – Banks 318,445 83.39% +9.41%
Credit institution – Building societies 15,806 4.14% +23.16%
Credit institution – Others 11,828 3.10% +17.18%
Financial institution – Money service businesses 11,120 2.91% -25.82%
Financial institution – Others 6,835 1.79% -0.48%
Accountants and tax advisers 4,618 1.21% -6.33%
Independent legal professionals 3,827 1.00% +6.01%
Trust or company service providers 101 0.03% -42.94%
Estate agents 355 0.09% +98.32%
High value dealers 135 0.04% -59.21%
Gaming (including casinos) / Leisure 
(including some not under ML Regulations ) 1,431 0.37% +52.40%
Not under ML Regulations 7,381 1.93% -9.76%
Total 381,882 100% +7.82%
Source: University of Leicester elaboration of (National Crime Agency, 2015b, p. 10)
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) in the United Kingdom
140
Data are also collected on numbers of proceeds of 
crime offences. Here data recorded under sections 
327, 328, 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) 
that are collected through Home Office statistics (la-
belled as ‘profit or conceal proceeds of crime’ offenc-
es) are collected. This is potentially a useful indicator 
of where money laundering activity might be occur-
ring. For this reason, it is used in the analysis as a 
validation measure of the statistical model presented 
below (see STEP 6). Thus, if the model has any utility 
in predicting ML risk by territory, then a correlation be-
tween area ML risk as observed in the model and the 
distribution of POCA offences should be seen. 
However, there are two main problems with this data 
source. First, low numbers of prosecutions are re-
corded across many areas and, where offences are 
recorded, this might be an indication of police in-
vestigative activity rather than the actual extent 
of money laundering. In order to increase the num-
bers, an average number per area is taken over a 
three year period. The highest actual numbers of ML 
offences (three year average) are in the Metropoli-
tan police area (219 per year), West Yorkshire (175 
per year) and Greater Manchester (94 per year). 
The mean area rate is 79 per 1m population with the 
highest rate per 1m population in the City of London 
(2,271 per million), West Yorkshire (77 per million) 
and Hertfordshire (76 per million).  
In addition to proceeds of crime data, the types of 
business that are subjected to money laundering 
regulations (i.e. obliged entities) is also used as a 
validation measure. In the UK, as in other EU coun-
tries and also outside Europe, several business sec-
tors are ‘regulated’ as they fall under AML obligations 
set by European Directive 849/2015 and correspond-
ing national implementing measures (see Chapter 
1). The analysis of the BvD data (see Figure 52)98 
indicated that the regulated sector businesses tend 
to concentrate in larger urban areas. For example, 
in total, 15% of businesses located in the City of 
London fell into these categories, followed by 10% 
in the wider Metropolitan police area, 8% in West 
Yorkshire and Merseyside respectively. 
Figure 52 – Location of AML regulated business 
sectors
% of regulated businesses on total per area
98. The proxy variable for regulated businesses included financial ser-
vices (business sub-sector K64), real estate (sub-sector L68), legal/
accounting (sub-sector M69) and gambling (sub-sector R92).
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
STEP 3 – DATA COLLECTION AND 
NORMALISATION
Similar to the threats variables, data relating to the 
vulnerabilities are also collected from a number of 
sources (see Annex A4). However, due to the paucity 
of data on business vulnerabilities, there is a reliance 
here on BvD data.
When conducting geographical analysis, the highest 
numbers of organised crime groups and predicate of-
fences are most likely to be observed in the larger 
metropolitan areas. Therefore, control variables – 
such as resident area population, numbers of busi-
nesses and local rates of GDP – are used to control 
for differences in area size (see Annex A4 for details). 
While this allowed for meaningful area comparisons 
to be conducted across 42 police areas, it is problem-
atic to compare predicate offences in the City of Lon-
don to other police areas. The main reasons for this is 
that the City of London has a small population (of less 
than 10,000 residents), compared to an average of 
1.2m across all other areas. Therefore, care has to be 
taken when interpreting data for the City of London to 
other areas. This is taken into account below as two 
area risk models are developed – one that includes 
the City of London and one that excludes this area. 
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STEP 4 – DATA EXPLORATION AND 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
All the risk factors discussed above are helpful in terms 
of understanding ML risk in the UK. However, if taken 
alone they do not give a very meaningful overview 
of the overall likely risk per area: therefore, it is nec-
essary to compare and combine them in order to 
have a proper measure of the overall ML risk. This 
is the aim of the next steps (steps 4-7), where a com-
posite indicator of ML risk, condensing all ML threats 
and vulnerabilities discussed so far, is constructed 
and validated. However, due to data limitations the 
model is only presented for England and Wales.  
In order to begin to tease out where threats and vul-
nerabilities converge, some initial bivariate analysis 
is conducted. Figure 53 presents the strength and 
direction of the correlations between the variables 
for all 43 English and Welsh police areas. The linear 
Pearson correlation among the variables is iden-
tified in the correlogram below.  Here, some strong 
correlations are observed between several variables 
with a number of the threats measures correlated with 
vulnerabilities measures. For example, the threats 
variables, organised crime groups per 100,000 popu-
lation, organised acquisitive crime and drug seizures 
are all strongly correlated and these, in turn, are also 
correlated with vulnerability measures such as real 
estate costs and other control variables like the pres-
ence of regulated businesses. Other vulnerability 
variables such as transit hubs and risky shareholders 
are correlated with many variables including real es-
tate costs and risky beneficial owners. 
Figure 53 – Corrplot of proxies of ML risk factors at UK police area level
Pearson correlation – All 43 police areas 











































Source: University of Leicester elaboration
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There is, of course, one area in the City of London that 
is considered to be an outlier. 
Figure 54 presents the same linear Pearson correla-
tion among the variables in the correlogram below with 
the City of London removed. The City of London is 
merged with the Metropolitan Police Service area, 
thus basing the analysis on 42 and not 43 areas. Here 
there are still a number of correlations between threat 
and vulnerabilities variables, although they are not as 
strong as before. For example, the number of organ-
ised crime groups per 100,000 population is correlated 
with the other threat variable of organised acquisitive 
crime and vulnerabilities variables such as the num-
ber of ATMs per population. Other variables, such as 
percentage of businesses in regulated sectors, is cor-
related with real estate costs and numbers of organ-
ised crime groups. The variable ‘risky shareholders’ is 
also correlated with real estate costs and percentage 
of businesses in regulated sectors.
Figure 54 – Corrplot of proxies of ML risk factors at UK police area level
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Source: University of Leicester elaboration 
STEP 5 – PRINCIPAL COMPONENT 
ANALYSIS (PCA)
To develop a composite indicator of ML risk, princi-
pal component analysis (PCA) is conducted. The 
main reasons for selecting PCA are these: (a) there 
are several indicators of threats/vulnerabilities in the 
dataset and (b) PCA allows these indicators to be 
grouped to understand what the main components of 
risk are. The following process is used:
1. For some variables, although they are identified 
as proxy measures of vulnerabilities in some liter-
ature, it is not entirely clear what the relationship 
is between the ‘vulnerability’ and the ‘threat’ – for 
example ATM population and business profit-
ability – so these are therefore dropped. 
2. Variables showing non-significant linear cor-
relation with all other variables are dropped (such 
as organised immigration crime). 
3. The variables of money laundering offences per 
population (POCA offences) and regulated busi-
nesses are also dropped because they are used to 
validate the final composite indicator (see STEP 7). 
99. Principal component analysis is a multivariate data analysis technique 
used, in a similar way of other approaches (e.g. factor analysis), to 
reduce the information contained in large datasets into a smaller num-
ber of components (or factors, in factor analysis), each of them able to 
summarise a specific phenomenon explained by a range of correlated 
variables. For doing so, PCA uses an orthogonal transformation of 
the correlated variables into a set of principal components which are 
uncorrelated each other (OECD & JRC, 2008; Jolliffe, 2002).
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This left a total of nine variables included in the mod-
el. Due to this low number of variables, three com-
ponents are extracted. Table 49 presents the initial 
rotated component output from the model.   
Table 49 – Principal component analysis. Matrix of rotated components
Varimax rotation. All 43 police areas in England/Wales
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3
OCG .983 -.091 -.003
DRUG .985 -.062 .011
ACQUISITIVE_GDP .984 -.087 .012
CASH_ASSETS .799 -.082 .204
CURRENT_ASSETS .105 .097 .737
BO_DISTANCE -.031 -.087 .764
TRANSIT_HUB .441 .408 .420
RISKY_SH_w -.001 .893 -.134
RISKY_BO_w -.273 .667 .153
SS Loadings 3.8 1.5 1.4
Proportion variance 0.44 0.18 0.15
Cumulative variance 0.44 0.62 0.77
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
The three principal components altogether explain 
around 77% of the variance observed in the dataset. 
Principal component 1 explained 44%, with principal 
component 2 and 3 explaining 18% and 15% respec-
tively. The key components identified are:
• Principal component 1 (PC1) – Serious and 
organised crime: correlated to this component 
are the presence of organised crime groups (per 
100,000 population), total acquisitive crime (per 
GDP), drug trafficking and seizures (per 100,000 
population), cash intensive businesses and transit 
hubs. Overall, this component explains 44% of the 
variance in the model, and as is seen in the bivar-
iate analysis, these variables are strongly correlat-
ed.
• Principal component 2 (PC2) – Connections 
to risky jurisdictions: The second main principal 
component relates to connections to risky share-
holders, beneficial owners and transit hubs, which 
accounts for 18% of the variance in the model. As 
is observed in the bivariate analysis, the variables 
of risky shareholders and beneficial owners are 
correlated (Pearsons r=0.363), as are transit hubs 
and risk shareholders (r=0.391).  
• Principal component 3 (PC3) – Business opac-
ity and cash-intensiveness: The third principal 
component relates to cash intensity of businesses, 
average distance to beneficial owners and transit 
hubs. Thus, a connection is suggested between 
the ‘cash intensity’ of a business, business own-
ership structures, and being located in areas with 
international transit hubs. As is observed in the 
bivariate analysis, the variables of cash intensity 
2 and ‘average distance to beneficial owners’ are 
correlated (Pearson’s r=0.320) as are transit hubs 
and ‘average distance to beneficial owners’ (Pear-
son’s r=0.301).
The same variables are then included in a model in 
which City of London is merged with the Metropoli-
tan Police Service area. This model is also set to ex-
plain three principal components. The initial rotated 
component outputs from the model are presented in 
Table 50.
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Table 50 – Principal component analysis: Matrix of rotated components
Varimax rotation. 42 Police areas. Model grouping City of London and Metropolitan Police
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3
OCG .221 .535 -.039
DRUG .521 .313 -.006
ACQUISITIVE_GDP .812 .056 -.148
TRANSIT_HUB .731 .260 .038
CASH_ASSETS -.156 -.009 .821
CURRENT_ASSETS .263 .016 .796
RISKY_SH_w .132 .810 -.137
RISKY_BO_w -.171 .709 .394
BO_DISTANCE .391 -.200 .256
SS Loadings 2.2 1.6 1.4
Proportion variance 0.27 0.19 0.15
Cumulative variance 0.27 0.46 0.61
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
It can be seen that when the City of London is grouped 
with Metropolitan Police, the three principal compo-
nents combined explain around 61% of the variance 
observed in the dataset (from 77% in the previous 
model). Principal component 1 explains 27%, with 
principal component 2 and 3 explaining 19% and 
15% respectively.  The key variables can be grouped 
together to identify the key factors that explain the 
variation observed for each principal component. 
Therefore, the key components are:
• PC1 (City of London grouped with Metropoli-
tan Police) – Serious organised crime and tran-
sit hubs: As with the previous model, acquisitive 
crime revenues are an important component in the 
model. Drug trafficking and seizures also remain 
important. However, the presence of international 
transit hubs also emerges as correlated to this PC. 
Indeed, the two variables of organised acquisitive 
crime revenues and drug transit hubs are high-
ly correlated in the bivariate analysis (Pearson’s 
r=.459), as are transit hubs and drug seizures 
(r=.499).
• PC2 (City of London grouped with Metropol-
itan Police) – Connections to risky jurisdic-
tions: As with the previous model, connections to 
risky shareholders and beneficial owners remains 
grouped in a principal component.  These two vari-
ables are highly correlated in the bivariate analysis 
(Pearson’s r=.353).
• PC3 (City of London grouped with Metropolitan 
Police) – Business cash intensity: As with the 
previous model, the two proxies for businesses’ 
cash intensity remain grouped in a principal com-
ponent. Here the two measures of cash intensity 
explain 15% of the variance in the model and are 
correlated (Pearson’s r=.429).  
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STEP 6 – AGGREGATION AND COMPOSITE 
INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION
The principal components identified through the PCA 
are combined to provide a synthetic composite indi-
cator of ML risk. In particular, as in the Italian and 
Dutch analysis, PCs are put together in linear com-
bination using as weights the proportion of the 
model variance explained by each component (see 
Chapter 2, 3 and Annex for more details). This allows 
one of the most frequent gaps of current indicators 
to be addressed - that individual risk dimensions are 
combined using discretionary weights, which ulti-
mately affect the final scores and rankings.
The table below presents the overall composite indi-
cator for the top ten most risky and the ten least risky 
UK areas; and the contribution of each of the three 
principal components to the indictor for the model that 
includes the City of London (Model 1) and the model 
that groups it with Metropolitan Police area (Model 2). 
As Table 51 shows, the composite risk score (right 
hand column), is highest for the City of London, 
followed by the Metropolitan Police area and 
Greater Manchester. The geographical distribution 
is presented at Figure 55. 
Table 51 – Top 10 most risky and 10 least risky areas according to the final ML Risk Composite indictor 
Model 1 – All 43 police areas









London, City of (EC) 100.0 52.4 58.0 100.0
Metropolitan Police 0.0 100.0 87.5 31.4
Greater Manchester 5.8 54.2 97.3 21.2
West Midlands 4.7 57.0 96.5 21.2
Essex 5.9 44.0 89.5 16.6
Leicestershire 6.9 43.8 78.0 15.8
Cambridgeshire 5.1 49.8 61.6 14.3
Northamptonshire 4.1 44.6 80.8 14.0
Sussex 0.5 49.3 91.7 13.9
Dyfed-Powys 15.7 8.3 100.0 13.9
West Mercia 7.2 25.2 62.0 7.3
North Wales 12.7 0.0 92.6 7.1
Cleveland 7.7 25.0 52.2 6.3
Surrey 4.1 47.7 9.8 5.7
Nottinghamshire 6.7 32.8 32.8 5.6
Northumbria 9.3 23.5 35.8 5.0
Suffolk 6.0 30.0 36.3 4.5
North Yorkshire 7.2 15.8 60.1 3.6
Durham 7.4 28.0 19.7 2.8
Gloucestershire 4.6 34.5 0.0 0.0
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
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Figure 55 – ML risk across UK areas (all 43 police 
areas) 
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
Table 52 – Top 10 most risky, and 10 least risky areas according to the final ML Risk Composite indictor 
Model grouping City of London and Metropolitan Police










+ City of London 95.6 40.4 100.0 100.0
Greater Manchester 100.0 43.0 22.4 75.3
Dyfed-Powys 45.3 100.0 12.0 67.9
Leicestershire 91.7 35.5 14.9 64.0
Lancashire 63.9 54.0 31.1 63.0
West Midlands 82.4 35.4 26.6 62.9
Merseyside 67.2 57.5 15.7 60.9
South Yorkshire 79.7 40.7 12.0 58.5
Essex 72.0 42.6 15.8 56.4
Sussex 34.6 56.9 49.9 54.3
Norfolk 14.5 50.6 18.1 27.8
West Mercia 8.9 49.3 26.7 27.1
Warwickshire 23.6 25.6 30.5 25.4
North Yorkshire 25.0 41.6 5.7 25.0
Thames Valley 20.7 17.5 44.7 24.9
Northumbria 22.6 24.1 8.7 16.0
Durham 27.0 14.0 10.5 14.3
Suffolk 2.4 22.3 19.7 7.5
Surrey 0.0 0.0 37.5 1.6
Gloucestershire 0.7 3.4 27.5 0.0
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
Figure 56 – ML risk across UK areas (42 police areas, 
City of London grouped with Metropolitan Police) 
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
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In Table 52 the composite risk scores are presented 
for 42 police areas (City of London grouped with Met-
ropolitan Police). When the City of London is exclud-
ed from the analysis, the Metropolitan police area and 
Greater Manchester become the top two most risky 
locations. The geographical risk is visually presented 
at Figure 56.    
It should be noted that the composite risk scores for 
Models 1 and 2 are significantly correlated (Pear-
son’s r= .901). This suggests that even when the City 
of London is grouped with Metropolitan police, the 
area ranks are similar (this is supported by a Spear-
man rank order score of .734).  
STEP 7 – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND 
VALIDATION
Validation of the risk indicator is performed in two ways 
(as in the Italian provincial analysis – see Chapter 2): 
• on the one side, it is compared with alternative 
measures of money laundering at area level; 
• on the other side, a sensitivity analysis is car-
ried out calculating the composite indicator again 
introducing some changes to the methodological 
parameters (e.g. the type of rotation in the PCA, 
type of normalisation, etc.).
Comparison with alternative ML measures
In Italy the final ML risk indicator is compared with 
the regional distribution of STRs to see how they cor-
relate. Due to the paucity of SARs data at area level 
in the UK, it is difficult to adopt the same approach. 
However, the scores are tested against two other in-
direct measures of ML and ML risk – money launder-
ing offences per 1m population and percentage of 
businesses within the local business population that 
fall under AML obligations (i.e. regulated sectors). 
Theoretically, if the composite score is a good mea-
sure of overall risk, then one might expect to see this 
score correlate with both of these measures – at least 
with the number of POCA offences. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients (Table 53) show 
that for Model 1 (including the City of London) both 
variables are highly correlated – respectively r= .826 
for ML offences and r=.772 for regulated sectors. 
However, once the City of London is omitted, the 
strength of the correlations alter. There is still a cor-
relation (weak but still statistically significant correla-
tion (r=311: sig .045) between high risk businesses 
and the composite indicator. However, the relationship 
between the composite indicator and money launder-
ing offences is no longer statistically significant when 
the City of London is not treated separately.
Table 53 – Validation of models: correlation of composite scores to validation variables
 
Model 1
(all 43 police 
areas)
Model 2
(42 areas - City of London grouped 
with Metropolitan Police)
Money Laundering offences 
average per 1m pop Pearson Correlation .826
** -.026
Regulated businesses Pearson Correlation .772** .311*
** = significant at 99% level (2-tailed); * = significant at 95% level (2-tailed)
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
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Sensitivity analysis
Similar to the analysis conducted at territory level for 
Italy (see Chapter 2), sensitivity analysis is performed 
in order to ascertain if changes in the methodology 
regarding, for example, weighting, aggregation and 
normalisation of the variables in the PCA affect the 
overall result and ranking of risk. The main meth-
odological options used to construct the indicator are 
outlined in Chapter 2 (see also Annex for details). In 
relation to the UK, the methodological approaches 
are run for both the models (including and excluding 
the City of London).  
Figure 57 presents the correlation for the composite 
risk indicators for all areas and then Figure 58 does 
the same for all areas excluding the City of London 
(grouped with Metropolitan police) when these differ-
ent methods are applied.   
Sensitivity analysis is also applied to see whether 
the selection of variables affects the robustness of 
the analysis. Figures 58 show the correlation matrix 
among the composite indicators scores produced af-
ter dropping one selected variable at a time from the 
final models (Model 1 and Model 2).100 
As can be observed above, most of the indicators pro-
duced by the sensitivity analysis are highly and posi-
tively correlated. Indeed, most have Pearson correla-
tions of above 0.9, which suggests that the changes 
in the methodology do not affect the overall result 
and ranking. The risk ranks of the all the police areas 
included in the sensitivity analysis (when the City of 
London is included as compared to when it is not in-


































































Figure 57: Correlation among ML risk composite indicators after applying different methodologies
All 43 police areas (left); 42 areas - City of London grouped with Met Police (right). VPSTM = Final Model
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
100.  In each matrix, the variables that are omitted are: Model 1: all vari-
ables in final model are included; Model 2: Numbers of organised 
crime groups; Model 3: Drugs crimes; Model 4: Acquisitive crimes; 
Model 5: Presence of transit hubs; Model 6: Business cash assets; 
Model 7: Business current assets; Model 8: Business ownership 
links to shareholders in risky jurisdictions; Model 9: Business owner-
ship links to beneficial owners in risky jurisdictions; Model 10: Aver-
age distance to beneficial owners.
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Figure 58: Correlation among ML risk composite indicators after dropping one variable at a time
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Source: University of Leicester elaboration
Concluding remarks
The composite indicator presented in this section 
identifies a potentially useful methodology to develop 
a better understanding of money laundering risk in the 
UK. It attempts to compress a complex issue into a 
composite measure, which might be useful for policy 
makers in terms of identifying risky locations.
 
However, this analysis does offer the potential to be-
gin to understand how each component in the mod-
el contributes to money laundering risk. An illus-
tration of this is presented in the scatterplot (Figure 
59). This plots the relationship between the principal 
component 1 and the principal component 2 as iden-
tified in the area model merging the City of London 
with Metropolitan Police (this is treated as it is an out-
lier). The top ten areas that are identified as having 
the highest composite risk scores as presented in Ta-
ble 52 respectively are labelled. The scatterplot plot 
suggests that:
1. For two areas (Dyfed Powys and Sussex) it is con-
nections to risky jurisdictions that push the areas 
into the high risk group;
2. For six areas (Metropolitan, Greater Manchester, 
South Yorkshire, Essex, Lancashire and Mersey-
side) a combination of serious/organised crime 
threats, transit hubs and connections to risky juris-
dictions push the areas into the high risk group;
3. For two areas (West Midlands and Leicestershire) 
it is predominantly exposure to serious and organ-
ised crime that pushes the area into the high risk 
group. 
Figure 59: A comparison of PC1 v PC2: organised 
crime vs. connections to risky jurisdictions






























Source: University of Leicester elaboration 
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ML risk at business sector level in the 
United Kingdom: problems encountered
In Italy and in the Netherlands, the degree of ML risk 
is also calculated across all the business sectors of 
the legitimate economy (see chapters 2 and 3). Within 
the UK, while proxies for ML vulnerabilities are avail-
able (and are used also in the area level analysis, see 
above) establishing the extent of money laundering 
threats at business sector level is more problem-
atic. Throughout the course of this study, a number of 
potential sources are identified, though none are con-
sidered robust enough to use as the basis for analy-
sis. In the table below the main identified sources are 
presented and their limitations outlined. 
4.3  Analysis at business sector level
A large volume of data are routinely collected in the 
form of the Suspicious Activity Reports that regulat-
ed businesses must issue as part of their compliance 
with ML regulations. However, such data are limited 
for three principal reasons. First, many of the reports 
are made by businesses in order to be compliant 
with the ML regulations and do not represent actual 
attempts to launder money (Home Office, 2016a). 
Second, not all business sectors are covered by the 
regulations. Third, is it difficult to conduct analysis 
using the current SARs system that allows identifi-
cation of the business type that a SAR is made in 
relation to.
 Table 54 – Main Potential UK sources on ML or OC threats to businesses 
Potential 
Source Sector Coverage Methodology Limitations 
Suspicious 
activity reports Regulated sectors
Obliged entities submit 
SARs to FIU
May indicate ‘compliance’ rath-
er than actual money laundering 
activity
Limited number of sectors (only 
those under AML obligations)
Impossible to identify ‘source’ 
business type
National Risk 
Assessment Regulated sectors 
Assessment of threats 
and vulnerabilities using 
MoRiLE*





7 sectors – agriculture, con-
struction, information, whole-





Limited sector coverage 
Based upon business owners’ 
perceptions of being victim of 
organised crime, rather than ML
Organised 
Crime Portfolio All sectors Media Reports
Sample dependent upon media 
reporting and focuses on 
organised crime rather than ML 
* MoRiLE - Management of Risk in Law Enforcement: a risk assessment tool developed by the UK National Crime Agency
Source: University of Leicester elaboration
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The limitations identified with SARs data also im-
pacted upon the robustness of the recent UK Nation-
al Risk Assessment (HM Treasury, 2015). Referenc-
es are made in the NRA to the weakness of SARs 
data, and it is clear that the assessment of threats 
to businesses is hampered by the limited sources 
of data available. Although the NRA calculates risk 
scores, these are only for regulated sector business 
(see NRA: 2015. p 12) and are largely based on ex-
pert opinion and intelligence data, rather than any 
systematic analysis of known threats to businesses 
(the methodology used in the UK NRA is explained 
in detail at Annex A4). The issues with the methodol-
ogy used in the NRA made it difficult to replicate for 
the purpose of this study. Indeed, while not all busi-
ness sectors are included in the risk assessment, it 
is also difficult to establish how risks are calculated 
for those that are included.
Other potential sources of threats are identified, but 
also these had several limitations. In the absence of 
any meaningful data on money laundering, attention 
turned to data in relation to organised crime infiltra-
tion of businesses. Indeed, recent sweeps of the 
Commercial Victimisation Survey (See Home Of-
fice, 2016b), which covers England and Wales, have 
asked business owners about the extent to which 
they feel crimes committed against their businesses 
are the work of organised criminals. While this pro-
vides some potentially useful data, it is questionable 
whether business owners would provide an accurate 
indication of levels of organised crime against their 
business. Also, to date, the CVS has only covered 
seven business sectors – agriculture, construc-
tion, information, wholesale, accommodation/ food, 
arts/entertainment, manufacture and transport. So 
there is no sector coverage of financial/ or other reg-
ulated sectors businesses (except for gambling).  
There has been one other notable attempt to mea-
sure the extent of organised crime infiltration against 
business in the UK. In the recently published Organ-
ised Crime Portfolio (OCP)  report, businesses are 
categorised by Wall & Chistyakova (2015) according 
to levels of OC infiltration (below – in Table 55 – the 
categorisations across business sectors are out-
lined). However, the source data for the categories 
used in the OCP are based upon ‘open sources’ – 
such as media reports. This is problematic because 
it focuses on where there has been media activity, 
rather than systematic reports of organised crime or 
money laundering.
Table 55 – OCG infiltration of businesses in the UK
Business sector References to organised crime infiltration
Wholesale/retail
>26Hotels, bars and restaurants




















Source: University of Leicester elaboration on Project ARIEL report (Savona & Berlusconi, 2015, p. 71)
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While some attempts have been made to count sus-
picious activities across regulated business sectors, 
identify the risks against the regulated sectors or 
identify the types of businesses where there is or-
ganised crime infiltration, most of the data generated 
in the UK are of limited practical use when trying to 
identify threats to businesses. This has clear implica-
tions when trying to develop a risk-based approach 
because no clear measures of threats across all busi-
ness sectors (or ideally business sub-sectors) exist. 
This is something that needs to be considered, and it 
is of particular note that the UK anti-money launder-
ing action plan includes a programme of radical re-
form for the SARs regime, which is projected to be 
completed in October 2018 (Home Office, 2016a).  A 
significant strand of the reforms in terms of identifying 
threats to business from SARs data is the shift from a 
transactions-focused regime to a system targeting in-
dividuals and organisations that pose the highest ML 
risk which, together with the intended development 
of a replacement SARs IT system, may address the 
limitations of the data that are currently available. 
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This chapter has conducted analysis of ML threats 
and vulnerabilities. It has developed a composite in-
dicator of ML risk at sub-national level (across 43 
police areas of England and Wales – it was not pos-
sible to extend the analysis to Scotland and Northern 
Ireland due to lack of workable data). It is identified 
that developing proxy measures for money launder-
ing risks is difficult in the United Kingdom because 
of the paucity of appropriate data. While it is possi-
ble to develop an area level composite indicator, data 
limitations mean this is not possible for the business 
sector.   
What is the added value of this analysis?
While this analysis is not definitive, it provides an il-
lustration of how measures of threats and vulnera-
bilities could potentially be used to identify high risk 
locations. This complements the existing UK NRA 
(HM Treasury, 2015), and the methodology could po-
tentially be used in further national risk assessment 
exercises because the approach:
• is both transparent and easily replicated;  
• adopts a sub-national perspective (across 43 po-
lice force areas), while the current UK NRA only 
has a national perspective. Where possible, anal-
ysis is also conducted across all business sectors, 
whereas the UK NRA focuses only on regulated 
sector businesses; 
• condenses the complex phenomenon of money 
laundering – which compromises multiple threats 
and vulnerabilities – into a single composite indi-
cator; 
• conducts detailed analysis of vulnerabilities to 
money laundering – such as business ownership 
structures (both shareholding and beneficial own-
ership) – that have been hypothesised as vulnera-
bilities, but not, until now, subject to any meaning-
ful empirical analysis.
    
4.4  Research and policy implications
Weaknesses of the UK analysis 
The findings presented here are part of a pilot study. 
Therefore, this is the first time that researchers have 
attempted to assess money laundering risks in the 
UK using the risk-based methodology. This has gen-
erated a number of challenges and issues that any 
researchers attempting a similar exercise in the fu-
ture should bear in mind: 
• the approach is reliant on the availability of data 
that can be developed into proxy measures of 
threats and vulnerabilities.  Indeed, a composite 
indicator of ML risk for business sectors could not 
be developed because there are no reliable mea-
sures of ML threats;
• the methodology cannot account for ‘known 
emerging threats’ – such as virtual currencies – 
where no quantifiable data exist at present; 
• the model is unable to account for other factors – 
such as vulnerabilities in AML regulation – that 
might be key drivers of ML risk, but are difficult to 
measure at sub-national or business level; 
• at the sub-national level, care has to be taken 
when interpreting such a model because there is 
an underlying assumption of a spatial association/
connection between money laundering threats 
and vulnerabilities. It is, of course, plausible that 
money may be laundered in locations that are 
not spatially close to where the proceeds of 
crime are generated;  
•   as mentioned, the model focuses on England and 
Wales only because of the paucity of data on risk 
factors (e.g. organised crime and other predicate 
offences) in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
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Implications of this research 
The risk-based approach is of potential benefit to any 
policy, law enforcement or academic bodies try-
ing to gain better understanding of money risk at a 
national or sub-national level across the UK. Those 
developing future NRAs within the Home Office and 
Treasury might benefit from utilizing the approach 
outlined. There are, of course, also potential ramifi-
cations in relation to the UK AML action plan (Home 
Office, 2016a). A key issue raised in the plan related 
to the reform of the current SARs regime. Indeed, col-
lecting data that might better inform our understand-
ing of the threats at both sub-national level and across 
all business sectors is essential if the risk-based ap-
proach is to be utilised in future.
While the risk-based approach has clear potential to 
help develop evidence-based policies, there are a 
number of clear issues that need to be considered:
1. Improving the availability and quality of data: 
as outlined above, the development of the area 
level and business sector level models are limited 
by the lack of data in relation to threats and vul-
nerabilities. Considering the UK’s commitment to 
evidence-based policy and also its commitment to 
completing regular national ML risk assessments, 
now would be a good time to consider (a) what 
data need to be routinely collected for the purpose 
of these assessments and (b) how they can be col-
lected in a format that can be easily subjected to 
quantitative analysis.      
2. Whether the risk-based approach should be uti-
lised in the UK NRA: consideration might be giv-
en as to whether the risk-based approach should 
be adapted for the UK NRA. At present, the UK 
NRA lacks a transparent methodology and does 
not conduct clear analysis of threats and vulnera-
bilities. The utilisation of the risk-based approach 
might, therefore, provide future NRA’s with a clear-
er methodological and analytical framework.
3. The potential to draw upon and develop inter-
national knowledge about how to complete 
risk-based assessments: as more nations begin 
to utilise the risk-based approach in order to com-
plete ML risk assessments, there will be the poten-
tial to exchange international knowledge about ML 
risk, the development of the risk-based methodol-
ogy and which sources of data can be best devel-
oped and used to populate such a model. Indeed, 
the UK might both benefit from the development of 
international ‘good practice’ in relation to the use of 
the risk-based approach and also be able to inform 
good practice.
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The global debate on business ownership 
transparency
In recent years, an international consensus 
has emerged that the increased transparency 
of business ownership information is of key 
importance for tackling the misuse of compa-
nies to launder the proceeds of crimes (FATF, 
2014a; UK Department for Business Innovation 
& Skills, 2016). This approach is at the basis 
of FATF Recommendation 10, which stimulates 
financial institutions and obliged entities to: 
“Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking 
reasonable measures to verify the identity of 
the beneficial owner, such that the financial in-
stitution is satisfied that it knows who the ben-
eficial owner is. For legal persons and arrange-
ments this should include financial institutions 
understanding the ownership and control struc-
ture of the customer” (FATF, 2012, p. 16).
The approach has found support within the G8 
(G8, 2013) and the G20 (G20, 2014); and it has 
been further acknowledged by the EU Fourth 
AML Directive, which requires MS to set up a 
central public register of beneficial owners ac-
cessible to a variety of stakeholders (EC, 2015).
The problems related to the opacity of business 
ownership have been highlighted by a vast ac-
ademic and institutional literature, in regards to 
money laundering (e.g. Unger, Ferwerda, van 
den Broek, & Deleanu, 2014; Riccardi & Savo-
na, 2013; WEF, 2012; Steinko, 2012; Blum et 
al., 1999), to tax evasion and grand corruption 
(e.g. Reuter, 2012; de Willebois et al., 2011) 
and also by numerous NRAs worldwide (e.g. 
HM Treasury, 2015; U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2015). 
Despite being a central issue at policy-making 
level, the research focus on this topic has been 
weak, first of all due to lack of data. IARM car-
ries out the first large-scale investigation of the 
opacity of business ownership structure in Italy, 
the Netherlands and UK  using a set of innova-
tive proxies and data.
Opacity of business ownership is one of the key ML 
vulnerabilities of the IARM risk assessment model. 
Thanks to the access to the largest available data-
set on business ownership data at global level (pro-
vided by BvD), and to the development of innovative 
proxies for business opacity, IARM has carried out an 
analysis of this issue:
• in Italy (Chapter 2)
• in the Netherlands (Chapter 3)
• in the UK (Chapter 4)
This chapter provides a further in-depth investigation 
of these data, comparing results across countries 
and business sectors and identifying major patterns 
and trends. As in the country analysis, the opacity of 
business ownership is analysed with respect to two 
sub-dimensions:
• The level of complexity of businesses’ ownership 
structure as such;
• The volume of business ownership connections 
with shareholders and BOs from risky jurisdictions. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, a good measure 
of business ownership complexity is the so-called BO 
distance, provided by BvD, which measures the av-
erage number of ‘steps’ which separate a company 
from its BO(s).101 The average BO distances in the 
three IARM countries are the following:102
• Italy 1.3 
• Netherlands 1.7
• United Kingdom 1.6103 
Of the three countries, Italy has the lowest average 
BO distance, suggesting that for most companies 
there is a direct control. As mentioned, Italy has also 
a very high number of individual enterprises, confirm-
ing the direct nature of business ownership. The high-
er values of the Netherlands and the UK could be, as 
mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, proxies for the higher 
number of multinational companies registered in 
those countries – either for tax optimisation purpos-
es or for other reasons.
5.1  Complexity of business ownership structure
However, also within the same country the values 
vary depending on the region or the sector consid-
ered. Table 56 below reports the first 5 areas in Italy 
and in the UK per BO distance.104 In Italy, ranking first 
are areas close to borders (such as Imperia, Savona 
and Bolzano), large urban and economic centres (Mi-
lano). Catanzaro and Imperia are also characterised 
by high levels of underground economy/tax evasion 
and of OC infiltration (see Chapter 2). In the UK, the 
first two areas are Channel Islands and Isle of Man, 
which are well known off-shore financial centres. In 
these areas, it is necessary on average to investigate 
almost four layers of control before identifying the 
relevant beneficial owners(s).
Table 56 – Average BO distance at sub-national area level in Italy and UK
Top 5 areas by value. NUTS 3 classification. Last available year
ITALY BO distance UNITED KINGDOM BO distance
Imperia 1.49 Channel Islands 3.70
Catanzaro 1.45 Isle of Man 3.40
Savona 1.40 South Yorkshire 2.48
Bolzano-Bozen 1.40 Greater Manchester 2.00
Milano 1.39 Norfolk 1.68
  Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration
101.  BOs in BvD definition are the natural person(s) who ultimately own 
or control an entity. They are identified by BvD reconstructing the 
ownership chain until finding natural persons holding above a cer-
tain shareholding. For the purpose of this study it has been decided 
to set the minimum threshold at 10% at the first level of company 
ownership chain and 10% at further levels. The adopted threshold 
is lower than EU Directive definition (25% threshold) but allows for 
a more comprehensive analysis. When BO distance equals 1, the 
company is directly controlled by its BO(s) (see Annex for details).
102.  BO distance at country level is here calculated as the average of the 
BO distances of the business sectors at the NACE division level. 
Please note that it could differ from the BO distance calculated as 
the average BO distance of country regions. It has been decided to 
adopt this approach in order to compare the score among the three 
countries more properly, as the number, size and nature of areas 
could change from country to country, while the sectorial classifica-
tion is the same. In Italy the average BO distance of the 110 provinc-
es is 1.21 and in the UK is 1.59 (see Chapter 2 and 4).
103.  The average BO distance is 1.5 after excluding Channel Islands and 
Isle of Man (see below)
104.  The analysis is not performed at sub-national area level (NUTS 3) 
in the Netherlands because not meaningful given the small country 
size and the administrative nature
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The analysis at business sector level shows that 
NACE sections B (Mining & quarrying), K (Finan-
cial and insurance activities), E (Water supply, 
sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities) and D (Electricity) score highest in all the 
three countries analysed. As mentioned, these busi-
ness sectors are characterized by a high market con-
centration, high barriers to entry, and a larger number 
of large companies. These factors may increase the 
number of multinational enterprises, thus de facto 
increasing the BO distance. In particular the highest 
values are those of mining (which includes also oil & 
gas extraction) and finance in the Netherlands, fol-
lowed by energy in the UK. Energy is also the sec-
tor with the highest BO distance in Italy. Among the 
lowest are the public sector (O), education (P) and 
agriculture (A).
However, as mentioned in previous chapters, in or-
der to identify the actual anomalies in terms of 
business complexity, the presence of multination-
al companies is controlled by weighting the average 
BO distance with a proxy for company size. After this 
operation, sections B, D, E and K rank much lower, 
while other sectors emerge.
In Italy, S (Other Services) and A (Agriculture) rank 
highest. In the Netherlands, Sections R (Entertain-
ment – including also gaming, gambling and other lei-
sure activities), S (Other services), P (Education) and 
I (Accommodation) stand out. In the UK, sections Q 
(Health and social work), A (Agriculture) and I (Accom-
modation) now score high. The analysis also highlights 
some similarities among the three countries: for ex-
ample, division S 95 (Repair of computers and per-
sonal and household goods) and I 56 (Food and 
beverage service activities) appear in the top five in 
each of the three countries. Also S 96 (Other personal 
activities) ranks high in two out of three countries. 
Figure 60 – Average BO distance per business sector by country (Italy, the Netherlands and UK)
Excluding NACE sections T and U (in all the three countries) and O (public sector) in Italy 
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
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Figure 61 – Average BO distance per business sector by country (Italy, the Netherlands and UK)
Weighted by average company size. 0-100 scale. Excluding NACE sections T, U and O (in Italy).  
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
Table 57 – Average BO distance per business sector by country (Italy, the Netherlands and UK)
Weighted by average company size. Top 5 NACE divisions
Rank Italy the Netherlands United Kingdom
1 S 95. Repair of computers and 
personal and household goods
R 90. Creative, arts and 
entertainment activities
A 02. Forestry and logging
2 S 96. Other personal service 
activities
S 96. Other personal 
service activities
S 95. Repair of computers and 
personal and household goods
3 A 01. Crop and animal production, 
hunting and related service activities
S 95. Repair of computers and 
personal and household goods
I 56. Food and beverage 
service activities
4 A 03. Fishing and aquaculture R 93. Sports activities and 
amusement and recreation activities
M 75. Veterinary activities
5 I 56. Food and beverage service 
activities
I 56. Food and beverage 
service activities
Q 86. Human health activities
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
105.  The company size proxy has been calculated using the ratio be-
tween the total number of companies in a certain sector j and the 
total assets within the same sector (see Annex for further details).
106.  The downside of weighting BO distance by company size is that the 
resulting value cannot be read in the same way as before. In the 
chart, it is normalised in the 0-100 scale but it cannot no more be 
interpreted as number of steps separating a company from its BOs
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Although the study of cross-border interlocking own-
erships and directorships is still in its infancy, mainly 
due to the paucity of data, it can be assumed that the 
share of foreign owners of companies registered in a 
certain area (or sector) may depend on a variety of 
drivers (Ferwerda & Riccardi, 2016):
• the presence of foreign citizens resident in that 
area (who may decide to set up a business);
• the role played by that area (or sector) in the inter-
national trade network;
• the capacity to attract foreign direct investments 
(FDI);  
• the efficiency of bureaucracy and institutions, 
as entrepreneurs may decide to incorporate a 
business in a certain country because it is easi-
er, quicker and more convenient (The World Bank, 
2017);
• the presence of lower tax rates and of corporate 
tax incentives (OECD, 2001);
• reasons related to the lack of transparency of 
certain foreign jurisdictions (e.g. off-shore coun-
tries) where investors may decide to set up busi-
nesses in order to conceal their beneficial owner-
ship.
Moreover, the share of owners of a certain national-
ity in a country may depend on opportunities related 
to geographical proximity (e.g. shareholders from 
Belgium may be more frequent in the Netherlands 
than in Portugal because the former is closer) or to 
cultural links or common historical roots (e.g. crown 
dependencies or former colonies). 
Foreign shareholders and BOs in the 
three IARM countries
These factors could potentially help to explain the dif-
ferences among the three countries in terms of foreign 
ownership (see chart below). The Netherlands and the 
5.2  Business ownership connections 
with risky jurisdictions
UK show much higher figures than Italy regarding both 
foreign shareholders and foreign BOs. While only 
1.7% of shareholders and 1.3% of BOs of Italian com-
panies are foreign persons, the share of foreign share-
holders is 6.8% in the UK and 7.8% in the Netherlands, 
and the difference in terms of BOs is even wider (37.9% 
in the UK and 90.0% in the Netherlands).107 
The higher values in the Netherlands and UK may 
be related to the – well acknowledged – lower costs 
and bureaucratic obstacles in starting a business in 
those countries compared with Italy (The World Bank, 
2017)108. Moreover, the presence of international fi-
nancial hubs (in particular the City of London in the 
UK) and of corporate tax incentives (especially in the 
Netherlands - Tromp, van Rossum, Buehn, & van 
Kommer, 2013) may help explain the gap between 
the three countries. The higher ranking of the Neth-
erlands and the UK in terms of FSS – Financial Se-
crecy Score of the Financial Secrecy Index – could 
also suggest that these countries may be preferred 
because of the lower transparency – but this issue will 
be explored further below.
Figure 62 - % of Foreign shareholders and BOs at 
country level (Italy, the Netherlands and UK)
Foreign shareholders: Italy (N=44,971), the Netherlands 
(N=35,953), UK (N=73,222); 
Foreign BOs: Italy (N=26,500), the Netherlands (N=24,603), UK 
(N=99,514);
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
107.  Data in the Netherlands may be affected by the low number of com-
panies for which information on beneficial ownership is available 
(see Chapter 3 for details). 
108.  See e.g. the average time required to start a business as recorded 






















As regards the nationalities of shareholders, US 
American, German and French are most frequent in 
all the three IARM countries. Here the possible expla-
nation may be related to the higher volume of trade 
and financial exchanges between these jurisdictions, 
and to cultural and geographical proximity. Some 
other jurisdictions – Switzerland, Luxembourg, Cy-
prus, the Netherlands and Curaçao – could be also 
related to tax optimisation (and tax avoidance) 
reasons (EURODAD, 2015; Tax Justice Network, 
2015a). This is even more apparent when the nation-
ality of shareholder-legal persons is analysed, a situ-
ation in which jurisdictions characterised by lower tax 
rates and laxer transparency regimes are even more 
frequent (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4). 
 Table 58 – Top 10 nationalities of foreign shareholders (% of total foreign shareholders)
Italy The Netherlands United Kingdom
Shareholders 
from % on tot. Shareholders from % on tot.
Shareholders 
from % on tot.
Switzerland 11.4% United States 20.7% United States 24.3%
Germany 10.2% United Kingdom 10.8% Germany 8.8%
United Kingdom 9.5% Belgium 8.9% The Netherlands 6.4%
United States 7.8% Germany 8.8% Ireland 5.6%
France 7.6% Luxembourg 6.4% France 5.3%
Luxembourg 7.5% France 5.0% Switzerland 4.1%
The Netherlands 4.9% Curaçao 4.3% Australia 3.2%
Spain 4.0% Switzerland 3.4% Italy 3.2%
China 3.6% Italy 2.8% Luxemburg 3.0%
Romania 3.5% Cyprus 2.2% Sweden 2.1%
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
Table 59 – Top 10 nationalities of foreign beneficial owners (% of total foreign BOs)
Italy The Netherlands United Kingdom
BOs from % on tot. BOs from % on tot. BOs from % on tot.
Spain 21.7% Spain 28.7% Spain 28.7%
Germany 15.8% Germany 24.3% Italy 21.4%
Switzerland 13.0% Italy 11.0% Germany 12.5%
China 4.9% Switzerland 7.8% United States 6.0%
Romania 4.4% United Kingdom 4.0% Switzerland 4.0%
United Kingdom 3.9% Austria 3.0% Saudi Arabia 3.5%
France 3.6% Belgium 2.7% South Africa 2.4%
Austria 2.6% France 2.6% Ireland 2.1%
Albania 2.4% Denmark 2.1% The Netherlands 2.0%
United States 2.4% United States 1.9% France 1.8%
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
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Ownership links to risky jurisdictions
However, as mentioned in previous chapters, not all 
foreign nationalities encompass the same level of 
ML risk.  The transparency (or opacity) widely varies 
across countries, and a variety of jurisdictions – tax 
havens, off-shore areas, etc. – exist which use fi-
nancial and corporate secrecy to attract legitimate 
and illicit financial flows (Tavares, 2013; Tax Justice 
Network, 2015a). 
In order to understand, in each of the three countries, 
the level of connections with risky jurisdictions, IARM 
has developed a measure of riskiness combining 
BvD data with Tax Justice Network (TJN) indicators.
How IARM measures the level of business 
ownership connections with risky 
jurisdictions
The opacity of foreign shareholders and BOs’ 
jurisdictions is measured through an index pro-
duced by the Tax Justice Network: the Secrecy 
Score (called FSS in this report) of the FSI - Fi-
nancial Secrecy Index (FSI) (Tax Justice Net-
work, 2015a). 
The FSS is issued every 2 years. It is a com-
posite indicator which evaluates different di-
mensions of secrecy/opacity in the legislation, 
banking and financial sector. In particular: 
• the level of banking secrecy; 
• the access to beneficial ownership informa-
tion; 
• the transparency of corporate information; 
• the efficiency of tax and financial regulation; 
• the compliance with international standards 
(e.g. FATF Recommendations); 
• the level of international cooperation 
All these dimensions are combined into a score 
ranging from 30.87 to 86.64. The FSS is pre-
ferred to other measures of risky jurisdictions 
(e.g. international or national blacklists) be-
cause of the independency and transparency 
of the methodology, as already acknowledged 
by previous academic and institutional studies 
(see e.g. Cassetta et al., 2014; Gara & De Fran-
ceschis, 2015; Riccardi, Milani, et al., 2016).
Under the IARM framework, the share of each 
nationality among shareholders and BOs is 
multiplied by the relevant FSS value in each 
area or sector. In detail, given:
x = number of shareholders or BOs
j = nationality of shareholders or BOs
i = country or region or NACE sector of regis-
tration of companies
FSS = Secrecy Score of the FSI 
For shareholders and BOs resident in the 
country, their FSS is set equivalent to zero. 
The assumption is that for an investigator is 
easier to check natural or legal person resident 
in the country, while it is more difficult to do so 
with non-domestic shareholders or BOs.
Thus, the final ranges from 0 (only domestic 
shareholders or BOs) to 86.6 (highest risk – all 
shareholders or BOs originated from the coun-
try with the highest FSS score – i.e. Vanuatu). 
As regards foreign beneficial owners, Spanish, Ger-
man and Italian BOs are among the top 4 jurisdictions 
in the three countries. US American and French BOs 
also rank high. Other nationalities may be affected by 
the presence of migrants’ communities (e.g. the 
Romanian and Chinese communities in Italy or the 
Irish and South African ones in the UK).  
Spanish are the most frequent foreign BOs (21.7% 
in Italy, 28.7% in the Netherlands and 28.7% in the 
UK). This result is surprising, considering the relative-
ly small Spanish communities in those three coun-
tries and the limited role played by Spain in terms of 
foreign trade and investments (with the exception of 
some business sectors such as energy or finance). In-
depth investigation of this figure in Italy (see Chapter 
2) reveals that Spanish BOs are very present in some 
southern provinces and in some sectors (such as 
R92 – Gambling) which have often recurred in inves-
tigations against Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta OC. This 
anomaly may be then related to potential ML risks, but 














The risk scores calculated at the country level are 
presented in the figure below. Although all the three 
countries have relatively low risk scores, slight differ-
ences are apparent. In particular, Italy seems to re-
cord a lower volume of business ownership con-
nections with risky jurisdictions when considering 
both shareholders (0.46 vs. 0.63 in the UK and 0.77 
in the Netherlands) and BOs (0.29 in Italy vs. 0.37 in 
the Netherlands and 0.58 in the UK). 
Figure 63 – Ownership risk score indicators at 
country level (Italy, the Netherlands, UK)
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
The higher “opacity” for the UK and the Netherlands 
may depend on several factors, including: 
• The higher percentage of foreign shareholders 
and BOs in both the UK and the Netherlands109
• The more favourable corporate tax regime with 
respect to Italy, which in turn may attract a higher 
number of multinational companies with share-
holders and BOs with, on average, a higher FSS
Indeed, UK is facing some issues regarding the pres-
ence of shareholders from tax havens, in particular 
after the Panama Papers in 2016 revealed that UK 
clients of the Mossack Fonseca firm were among the 
most active ones in terms of number of incorpora-
tions of offshore companies.110 Also for this reason, 
the UK recently pushed forward the establishment of 
the open register for BOs as required by the Fourth 
AML EU directive (EC, 2015).111 UK concerns regard 
in particular land and real estate properties owners: 
“The Metropolitan Police this year revealed that Brit-
ish property purchases worth more than £180 million 
were being investigated as the likely proceeds of cor-
ruption — almost all bought through offshore compa-
nies” (Grimwood, 2016) – see also Chapter 4 for fur-
ther discussion on opacity of UK-based businesses. 
The risk scores are also calculated at sub-national 
area (in Italy and the UK) and business sector level. 
They are presented in each country-specific chapter 
(see Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Here, the score at busi-
ness sector level is compared. The first table below 
reports the ‘pure’ score, i.e. not weighted by average 
company size, while the second table presents the 
score after weighting by average company size.112 
109.  see above: given the fact that the FSS of the country of company 
registration is posed as 0, the score overestimates the countries 
with a higher number of foreign shareholders
110.  https://panamapapers.icij.org/graphs/ 
111.  https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/  
112.  For the development of the indicator at sub-national area level and 
business sector level, the final score is eventually weighted by a 
proxy of average company size (specifically, the average total as-
sets) in order to control for the presence of multinational firms with-
in the business sector or area and then to identify actual anomalies 



















Table 60 – Level of connections with risky jurisdictions by sector in Italy, the Netherlands and UK
NACE Sections excluding T and U. Section O excluded in the Italian analysis.
Standardised on 0-100 scale. 100 = highest risk
Italy The Netherlands United Kingdom
Business sectors – 
NACE Section Risky SH Risky BOs Risky SH Risky BOs Risky SH Risky BOs
A - Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.8 0.5
B - Mining 35.7 6.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 39.1
C - Manufacturing 25.1 15.8 14.1 16.2 26.6 20.0
D - Energy 100.0 100.0 12.6 5.1 35.6 100.0
E - Water & waste 5.9 9.8 4.9 6.1 16.2 7.4
F - Construction 7.2 5.5 0.8 0.7 2.1 1.8
G - Wholesale & retail 13.1 9.4 4.6 15.8 9.5 14.2
H - Transport 48.7 10.6 5.9 13.5 12.4 10.2
I - Hotels & bars 9.2 8.6 0.5 9.3 2.5 8.8
J - ICT 25.9 11.0 5.2 2.7 13.1 17.3
K - Finance 32.3 10.0 9.3 7.6 40.9 18.7
L - Real estate 19.7 9.3 4.4 8.2 3.9 20.3
M - Professional activities 27.7 17.9 2.1 2.4 10.6 16.0
N - Support services 17.3 12.3 3.7 6.0 13.1 16.8
O - Public Administration n.a. n.a. 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
P - Education 0.1 7.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
Q - Health & social work 0.0 5.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6
R - Entertainment 0.1 17.8 0.1 0.6 3.0 1.7
S - Other services 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 3.0 2.5
Source: Transcrime – UCSC  elaboration 
• In Italy, section D (Energy) scores highest for both 
indicators of risky shareholders and risky BOs. 
Regarding risky shareholders, also sections H 
(Transport), B (Mining) and K (Finance) are very 
high, while section R (Entertainment), which in-
cludes gambling activities, presents a high score 
as regards BOs.
• In the Netherlands, section B (Mining) shows the 
highest opacity among business sectors, followed 
by Section C (Manufacturing) to a much lower ex-
tent.
• In the United Kingdom, section B (Mining) and D 
(Energy) rank highest. Section K (Finance) pres-
ents a high score in terms of risky shareholders, 
while section L (Real estate) scores high in terms 
of risky BOs.  
As mentioned, most of the sectors ranking high are 
characterised by a larger number of big and multi-
national companies (e.g. in the energy and mining 
sectors, which also include oil and gas, and also in 
some manufacturing divisions, such as pharmaceuti-
cals) which more likely make use of holding compa-
nies set in tax-favourable and offshore jurisdictions. 
In order to see anomalies besides the presence of 
multinationals, the second table presents the scores 
after weighting by company size. The results change 
significantly.
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Table 61 – Level of connections with risky jurisdictions by sector in Italy, the Netherlands and UK
Weighted by company size (average total assets). NACE Sections excluding T and U. 
Section O excluded in the Italian analysis. Standardised on 0-100 scale. 100 = highest risk
Italy The Netherlands United Kingdom
Business sectors – 
NACE Section Risky SH Risky BOs Risky SH Risky BOs Risky SH Risky BOs
A - Agriculture 32.2 20.1 22.9 1.7 100.0 26.1
B - Mining 12.3 0.0 8.6 0.7 14.2 3.6
C - Manufacturing 17.1 10.9 39.0 3.1 63.5 31.3
D - Energy 1.2 0.7 7.6 0.2 6.5 15.1
E - Water & waste 0.0 0.2 34.4 3.0 19.6 6.0
F - Construction 31.9 25.7 24.4 1.3 26.1 12.1
G - Wholesale & retail 42.0 32.9 70.9 16.6 86.8 77.5
H - Transport 4.9 3.1 61.3 9.7 49.4 26.1
I - Hotels & bars 100.0 100.0 86.9 100.0 67.3 100.0
J - ICT 32.5 14.5 100.0 3.6 67.7 55.6
K - Finance 9.8 1.2 10.3 0.6 0.0 0.0
L - Real estate 9.2 3.1 22.4 2.9 29.8 75.1
M - Professional activities 34.4 24.4 46.8 3.6 13.7 13.7
N - Support services 43.1 33.9 76.6 8.4 20.8 17.3
O - Public Administration 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.4
P - Education 52.3 45.0 58.1 6.9 20.2 9.3
Q - Health & social work 5.3 7.0 27.8 1.8 69.7 32.1
R - Entertainment 24.7 51.6 84.7 17.2 72.7 27.1
S - Other services 45.6 37.4 29.9 6.0 40.9 19.7
Source: Transcrime – UCSC elaboration 
Now at the top are sector I (Bars, restaurants, ho-
tels), and other NACE sections such as R (Entertain-
ment, gambling, gaming), J (ICT and media) and 
also G (Wholesale and retail trade) much emerge. In 
the UK, also A (Agriculture) now ranks high, while to 
be noted is that Section L (Real estate agencies) 
remains very high in terms of BOs risk both when 
weighting and when not weighting by company size: 
this result seems to confirm the concerns about in-
vestments from opaque and ‘risky’ jurisdictions 
in the UK property market (see Chapter 4).
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Thanks to the access to BvD data and to the devel-
opment of an innovative set of proxies, IARM has 
conducted an exploratory analysis of the degree 
of opacity of business ownership in Italy, the Nether-
lands and the UK. The exploration is only the first at-
tempt to investigate an increasingly crucial – but un-
der-researched and extremely complex – topic: how 
European companies are controlled, by whom and for 
which purpose. The findings are very informative, but 
at the same time they require further analysis (togeth-
er with an improvement of data quality).
Italian companies exhibit more direct control pat-
terns. BO distance is lower than in the UK and the 
Netherlands. The volume of connections with risky ju-
risdictions (such as off-shore countries) is also more 
limited. However, these figures vary greatly according 
to the area and sector considered. After controlling by 
company size, sectors like I (Bars, restaurants and 
hotels), S (Personal service activities) and R (Enter-
tainment) emerge promptly.
The UK and the Netherlands behave in a similar 
manner. They are both very open economies, attract-
ing high volumes of FDI and multinational companies, 
also thanks to the efficient incorporation systems, fi-
nancial hubs and favourable tax regimes. However, 
this also increases the riskiness in terms of busi-
ness ownership complexity (with higher BO dis-
tance, especially in some areas such as UK Crown 
dependencies) and connections with off-shore com-
panies.
5.3  Research and policy implications
At business sector level, the results are consistent 
across the three countries. Sections B (Mining), D 
(Energy), E (Water and waste), K (Finance) are 
characterised by higher complexity and opacity. But 
after controlling by company size, in order to offset 
the effect of multinationals’ presence, section I (Ho-
tels and bars), G (Wholesale and retail) and R 
(Entertainment) emerge. In the UK, also L (Real 
estate) emerges, highlighting the risk that individuals 
from opaque jurisdictions are involved in the UK prop-
erty market. Another anomaly difficult to interpret is 
the high number of Spanish beneficial owners – the 
most frequent foreign BO nationality in all the three 
IARM countries.
All these results are only the beginning – further in-
vestigation is needed, and more research is neces-
sary on how to treat these data and how to measure 
the complexity and opacity of business ownership. 
Undoubtedly, the results of this exploratory analysis 
go well beyond the perimeter of AML policies, and 
are of interest also to EU policy-makers dealing with 
taxation, industrial planning, consumers’ markets 
and international trade. The extension of this anal-
ysis to the other EU countries would be very helpful 
for improving our knowledge on European business 
ownership. 
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This report presented the findings of project IARM 
(www.transcrime.it/iarm), co-funded by European 
Commission, DG Home Affairs. 
IARM consortium
IARM was carried out by an international consortium 
including, as research partners: 
• the Università Cattolica Sacro Cuore – Tran-
scrime (Italy – IARM coordinator) 
• the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (the Nether-
lands)
• the Department of Criminology of the University 
of Leicester (United Kingdom) 
and as associate partners the Italian Ministry for the 
Economy and Finance (Italy), UIF - the Italian Finan-
cial Intelligence Unit within the Bank of Italy (Italy), 
the Dutch Ministry of Finance (the Netherlands), the 
Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice (the Nether-
lands) and the NPCC – National Police Chiefs’ Coun-
cil (United Kingdom).113 Associate partners provided 
input and feedback but are not responsible for what is 
written in this report.
IARM output
IARM developed an exploratory methodology to as-
sess the risk of money laundering (ML) and in partic-
ular a composite indicator of money laundering risk: 
• At geographic area level
• At business sector level
The methodology was tested in three pilot countries: 
• Italy (see chapter 2), where a ML risk score was 
developed for the 110 provinces and 77 business 
sectors (NACE divisions)
• the Netherlands (chapter 3), where a ML risk 
score was developed for 83 business sectors 
(NACE divisions)
• the United Kingdom (chapter 4), where a ML risk 
score was calculated for the 43 police force areas 
of England & Wales.
Moreover, IARM carried out a pioneering analysis of the 
shareholders and beneficial owners of Italian, Dutch and 
UK companies to explore their exposure to off-shore 
countries and other ‘risky’ jurisdictions (chapter 5). 
IARM strengths and weaknesses
Building on FATF guidelines and on previous NRAs 
and SNRA, IARM developed a methodology which 
follows various steps:
• the identification – in each of the three covered 
countries – of ML risk factors (threats and vul-
nerabilities according to FATF taxonomy) 
• their operationalisation into a set of variables to al-
low measurement;
• their combination in a single composite indicator 
of ML risk, at both area and business sector level;
• the validation of the final indicator through sen-
sitivity analysis and a range of tests.
The analysis was supported by a comprehensive re-
view of the literature (e.g. FATF reports, FIU and 
LEA reports, judiciary evidence, academic literature) 
and by a number of interviews with experts (e.g. 
policy-makers, public officers, industry representa-
tives at national and EU level, researchers).
The IARM methodology relies (mostly) on public 
data and it is designed so it can be replicated in oth-
er countries and contexts. With respect to existing 
NRAs, it stresses the quantitative approach and 
provides some important added values, like the high-
er disaggregation detail (e.g. sub-national perspec-
tive vs. national perspective of most of current NRAs) 
and the wider coverage of business sectors. 
Conclusions
113.  Support has been provided also by UK Home Office. See Acknowl-
edgements section for the full list of people and institutions that 
have supported the project.
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Table 62 - IARM methodological approach – Strenghts and weaknesses
Strenghts Weaknesses
• Complex phenomenon condensed into a single mea-
sure of risk
• Sub-national perspective (vs. NRAs’ national perspec-
tive) 
• All business sectors covered (vs. NRAs’ coverage of 
regulated sectors only)
• Transparent and replicable methodology
• Easily applicable in the everyday work of AML practi-
tioners (e.g. in CDD by obliged entities)
• Suffers from lack of data on certain risk factors and 
emerging trends (e.g. virtual currencies, NPMs)
• No coverage of risk factors at national level (e.g. weak-
nesses in AML legislation) 
• No coverage of ML consequences 
• Focus on ML (and not on TF) 
Policy and research implications
The indicators of ML risk developed by IARM could 
support the operational activity of both public agen-
cies and private entities, for example: 
• policy-makers, to better allocate AML resources 
and measures across the areas and sectors based 
on their ML risk level;
• investigative agencies (e.g. LEAs and FIUs), to 
identify the areas and sectors on which to strength-
en monitoring and investigation;
• obliged entities (e.g. banks, professionals, etc.), 
to enrich the set of indicators and red-flags to be 
used in AML customer due diligence (CDD).
IARM also provided a first contribution to the under-
standing of if and how the ownership of legitimate 
companies – in Italy, the Netherlands and UK - is re-
lated to money laundering risks. Anomalies in terms 
of businesses’ opacity and complexity could be 
identified in relation to specific geographic areas, 
business sectors and nationalities of shareholders 
and beneficial owners, which would deserve further 
investigation and research – not only for AML but also 
for tax evasion purposes.
Another concern is the relation between ML and 
cash-intensive businesses and regions: data on 
cash is generally scarce, but when it is available, it in-
dicates a correlation between cash-intensiveness and 
various illicit activities (like underground economy, tax 
evasion and organised crime).
However, it must be noted that IARM is only a first 
step towards a more robust assessment of ML risks. 
It follows an exploratory methodology which would 
much benefit from enhanced data availability and 
quality. In particular, it would be necessary to im-
prove the collection of statistics:
• on important ML threats such as tax crimes and 
fraud, for which data are scanty in most EU coun-
tries, especially at business sector level;
• on important ML vulnerabilities such as cash use, 
for which statistics (e.g. on payments) are avail-
able in most EU countries only at the national level 
but not across regions and sectors;
• on the ownership structure of European busi-
nesses, for which data are only available through 
private data providers, and still virtually impossible 
to obtain in harmonised format across EU MS pub-
lic business registers. 
In particular the IARM methodology is affected by 
data quality and availability – it works better in con-
texts characterised by richer set of information, while 
it may underestimate those risk factors for which data 
are still lacking. 
However, it is not intended to replace existing NRA 
but only to complement them. A comprehensive un-
derstanding of ML risks could be obtained only com-
bining a quantitative analysis – like the one con-
ducted by IARM – with a qualitative perspective 
which could take into account of experts’ insights into 
emerging ML trends.
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114.  Exceptions exist. See for example the in-depth analyis provided by 
the UIF – Italian Financial Intelligence Unit (within the Bank of Italy) 
in its Quaderni dell’Antiriciclaggio, and in particular the Quaderno 
n. 4, November 2015 (https://uif.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quad-
erni/2015/quaderni-4-2015/index.html) 
• on suspicious transaction reports/suspicious 
activity reports (STRs/SARs) which could be 
very rich sources of information also for research 
purposes, but are only partially exploited for this 
reason.114
In order to improve the quality and availability of data 
in a cross-sectorial field such as AML, it is suggested 
that European agencies better cooperate to exchange 
information, and that ad-hoc initiatives (such as more 
capillary surveys on cash use across countries and sec-
tors) are taken. In addition, public-private partnerships 
should be strengthened, with a wider data sharing by the 
industry (e.g. from banks and other AML obliged entities).
It is also suggested that the IARM approach could be 
replicated in other European countries to test its 
validity and refine the methodology. A more in-depth 
analysis of the ownership structure of European 
businesses should be carried out, to better under-
stand the drivers behind cross-border ownership links 
and to identify anomalies in shareholding and benefi-
cial ownership schemes. 
The benefits of such interventions would go much beyond 
the AML field, reinforcing also the fight against terrorist 
financing, tax evasion and corruption and improving 
the efficiency and security of the EU internal market. 
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